Improving the Irish Rushing Attack: Personnel, Predictability, and Synergy
At times during the 2008 season the Irish offense looked like a passing juggernaut. Other times Notre Dame sputtered when faced with a short field, frequently failing to produce an effective rushing attack. This led to poor red zone and third down efficiency that cost the Irish more than one game.
In fact, many of the problems with the 2008 (and 2007) offense were due to poor production on the ground.
Fans have opined about the causes of the anemic Irish running game. Some blame zone blocking, others a passive offensive line. The latter is undoubtedly true, but is not the focus of this discussion as it is not easily rectified with schematic adjustments.
This discourse focuses on the schematic problems with the running game and the corrections needed to improve the Irish rushing attack.
How Do The Irish Use Zone Blocking And The Running Game?
Before identifying the problems, a discussion of how zone blocking is used and the functionality of the run in head coach Charlie Weis’ offense is needed.
Weis’ offense almost exclusively uses zone blocking in half (three wide receivers, one tight end, one running back) and other “spread” (three or more wide receivers) personnel groupings. In this personnel the most commonly called run plays are the inside and outside zone, as well as the zone-stretch. The most commonly used running backs are Armando Allen and, to a lesser degree, Robert Hughes.
In regular (two wide receivers, one tight end, one fullback, and one running back) and other “heavy” (multiple fullback and/or tight end) personnel groupings the Irish also utilize zone blocking. The most popular plays are the inside zone, wham, and isolation. Man schemes are not the primary blocking strategy, but they are used more often with heavy personnel where running back James Aldridge is the featured ball carrier.
Weis (and former offensive coordinator Mike Haywood) favored half personnel more than any other in 2008. When quarterback Jimmy Clausen was under center in half the Irish run/pass split was about even. However, when Clausen was in the shotgun, whether in half or some other spread personnel grouping, the Irish threw the ball on the overwhelming majority of plays.
When in regular and other heavy personnel packages the Irish were run-heavy. Despite this tendency, play-action wasn’t effectively utilized in these formations.
Weis’ offense also employs screens, flares, look passes, and quick hitch routes. While these aren’t technically considered running plays, they are effectively “long” hand-offs designed to attack shallow zones or defenses dropping multiple defenders into coverage.
In Weis’ offense the running game is primarily used to keep the opposition honest, i.e. to prevent defenses from selling out against the pass. To some extent, balance is created by using the pass to open up the run. Darius Walker enjoyed quite a bit of success running the ball during Weis’ first two years (2005 and 2006) because quarterback Brady Quinn was such a threat in the passing game. This has not been true over the past two years of Weis’ tenure.
What’s Wrong With That?
There are three primary problems with the Irish running game: personnel, predictability, and synergy.
As outlined here, zone blocking requires smaller, more athletic offensive linemen and patient, quick running backs that read play development and are able to accelerate through running lanes.
The Irish have neither in large supply.
Notre Dame’s offensive line isn’t particularly agile or athletic, whether it be from a lack of natural ability or Weis’ 2008 off-season edict aimed at increasing the size and strength of this unit. In many ways the front five are more suited for man blocking.
Additionally, only Allen possesses the ideal physical skill set needed to excel in zone schemes. Running backs Aldridge, Hughes, and Jonas Gray are far better downhill runners who benefit from a defined running lane that allows them to attack the line of scrimmage at full speed.
The result is sluggish play development and a higher burden of execution. Asking slower, less athletic linemen to execute zone running plays exacerbates their physical shortcomings. Tasking bigger, more powerful backs with patient, lateral running doesn’t maximize their talents.
Second, Notre Dame is extremely predictable when and how they run the football.
Personnel grouping and formation indicate when, while the running back telegraphs how. Simply speaking, heavy personnel means run, spread formations mean pass. Allen is used to stretch the defense laterally while Aldridge is used as a power back. Hughes is somewhere in between but seems to have far more success when running North and South due to quickness and speed limitations.
Moreover, backs are set deeper on running plays (presumably to allow time to read play development), but shallow on pass plays. This was apparent nearly every time Clausen called an audible in 2008.
This predictability is amplified by a lack of misdirection and play-action, both of which are needed to exploit aggressive defenses that over-pursue. Reverses are sometimes used, but these are slow developing plays that allow the defense to react. Counters and other misdirection running plays are virtually absent from the Irish offense.
This is also true in the passing game where bootleg, roll-out, and play-action (see below) passes are rarely called. The Irish ran the zone-stretch a host of times in 2008, but executed a play-action pass off this run motion fewer than five times.
Finally, the running game is disjointed from the Irish air attack.
Part of the running game predictability is due to play-calling, but the approach is also deliberate. The primary weapon in Weis’ offense is the passing game. The run offense doesn’t supplement this. It merely attempts to prevent opposing defenses from honing in on the pass.
The result is a running approach that is obvious, doesn’t utilize play-action or complementing plays, and lacks deception.
So What’s The Solution?
Three problems require three solutions.
First, Weis, offensive line coach Frank Verducci, and running backs coach Tony Alford need to take advantage of the physical and athletic potential on the current roster.
Zone plays that require larger, slower offensive linemen to beat smaller, faster defenders to the point of attack is an exercise in futility. In 2008 the zone-stretch resulted in a paltry per play average but was continually called.
This doesn’t mean abandoning zone schemes, but it does mean down-selecting to a subset of zone runs that require less agility from the front five as well as mixing in some man blocking to maximize the strengths of Aldridge and Hughes.
Weis must also adjust play-calling.
The Irish don’t need an even run/pass mix out of every formation and personnel grouping, but the current tendencies are unforgivable. In shotgun and spread formations pass plays were called at an alarmingly high rate. Similarly, heavy formations all but forecasted a run.
Run/pass trends, coupled with running back-driven tendencies, create a level of predictability that hampers the offensive players and makes execution unnecessarily difficult. The offense must exhibit more balance in play-calling regardless of personnel grouping, formation, or back.
This doesn’t mean Weis must jettison the passing game. The Irish can be successful with a pass-first offense. Throwing the ball to open up the run is a valid offensive strategy, but only if there is an equal—or nearly equal—run/pass threat before the snap.
Misdirection and play-action must also be incorporated in the running game to keep opposing defenses and defensive coordinators guessing. Bootleg passes in short yardage and red zone situations would be a good start.
Finally, Weis and his offensive staff must develop more cohesion between their running and passing strategies.
If the pass is used to open up the run, the two must be linked. Running and passing out of the same formations and personnel groupings is a start, but integrating packages of plays with complementary run/pass motions is also needed. Without this, defending the run becomes a trivial matter.
In other words, the intent of both the running and passing strategies must be well-defined and synergistic. The benefit of stretching the field with a dynamic vertical passing attack is lost when coupled with slowly developing run plays. Safeties can still play deep against the pass and have time to react and fill running lanes.
In Summary…
The answers are relatively apparent, implementing the solutions is the real challenge.
Change is necessary to achieve the level of rushing production required to consistently compete at a championship level. While Weis’ offense has orchestrated a productive passing game during his tenure, more balance is needed to be successful in the future. The running game needs to be adjusted to take advantage of the offensive line and running back skill sets, play-calling needs to be less predictable, and the ground attack needs to become integrated with Weis’ passing offense.
If these problems are rectified, the 2009 version of Weis’ offense will look much more like Quinn and company in 2005.



I could not agree more with your analysis which quite frankly is pretty obvious if you have been watching Irish football over the past several years (or decades in my case!). The big problem I have screaming at the TV during football season is the predictablity of the Irish offense over the past few years. The bigger problem is why does the so-called offensive genius – Coach Weis not see this? I honestly believe ND recruits great atheletes every year- some better than others. It is up to the coach to not only get the best out of these kids but to put in place a “scheme” or system that (1) makes the best use of the talent on the field and (2) gives the team the best change to win. Your analysis is right on! A little mis-direction every now and then, hand-offs from the shot-gun, etc., etc., etc., would make the defense respect our running game instead of knowing when its coming and just stacking the line every time a run play is called. I don’t blame the kids- CW must find a way to put in a scheme that works for the talent he has.
I agree, gjs1972, the predictability of our offense was none more apparent than this past season when ND was in the red zone. Just about 80% of the time, it was a fade route to Floyd or Tate (usually Tate). Even though it worked the majority of the time, it was still atrocious to see. However, I think this season will be a bit different for several reasons.
1: Haywood isn’t calling plays anymore. I’m not sure how the relationship between Haywood and Weis was last year in terms of play calling, but I have a feeling that Weis didn’t take over too much.
2. ND has a new RB coach and O-Line coach. To get back to Anthony’s points, it’s imperative that the o-line and the running backs work together (synergy) to put forth a reliable rushing attack. Hopefully some fresh faces and fresh philosophies from the coaching staff will help to put a spur in the side of these players.
3. I think Weis is done learning on the job – at least, he better be. I think part of the problem in 2007 was Weis was still using an advanced offense with a team who couldn’t handle the offense mentally. He didn’t have that problem in 2005 and 2006 with Quinn, Stovall, Samardzija, Walker, and Co. However, in 2007, he was using fresh talent who couldn’t handle that mentally. Hopefully this season, Weis’ offense will start to come to full fruition because the talent on the team is developed a bit more mentally than last year.
Thanks for your comment! Always nice to talk football with a fellow fan!
gjs1972,
Thanks for the comment.
The primary problem is that it takes more than balanced play-calling to achieve balance. Over the past two years, a more even run/pass mix wouldn’t have solved the Irish problems. The execution simply wasn’t there. Part is this is youth, part of it is Weis trying to fit some square pegs into round holes, and part of it is his on-the-job learning.
I think Jon is correct in his assessment.
But my concern is more deeply rooted. In 2005 the Irish had an offense that was nearly capable of winning the national championship (the defense was another matter). This came with Weis at the helm calling the plays, a veteran offensive line, a very intelligent and gritty quarterback, a versatile running back, and some surprise performers in the receiving corps.
Since then, the production on offense hasn’t been nearly as good.
A natural question follows: Does Weis need a veteran, talented team for his offense to operate at a high level?
The Irish may gel this year, with all of the pieces coming together, and put up gaudy numbers. It will come against pedestrian competition, but the 2005 Notre Dame squad didn’t face many defensive juggernauts either.
My concern is that the departure of many key offensive players (graduation, NFL, etc.) after 2009 (or 2010) will result in another year like 2007. It may not be quite so catastrophic, but if the answer to the question posed above is “yes,” this will continue to happen under Weis’ offensive guidance.
To be certain, graduation, departure for the NFL, etc. causes drop-offs in performance. But these things happen, there is turnover every year in college football and players must be replaced. If Weis needs a veteran, experienced, and talented team to succeed at a high level he may be in trouble.
Yeah, but the problem with 2007 was two fold. First, there was a fall-out with talent and numbers from the previous coach’s recruiting efforts. That forced underclassmen to play when they were underdeveloped, mentally and physically, when normally they wouldn’t have to. Second, Weis didn’t get enough meaningful snaps to the back-ups in 2005 and 2006. This is why Sharpley wasn’t as prepared as he should have been. This is why the offensive line was still underdeveloped when they shouldn’t have been.
Hopefully, Weis will get some meaningful snaps to the back-ups this year if the Irish are comfortably ahead in the 4th quarter of some games. Hopefully back-up receivers, o-lines, and quarterbacks (mainly Crist) will get some playing time if the situation is right for it.
Other than that, I’m not sure the talent drop off will be as significant. Weis has had almost zero lapses in recruiting since he’s been here so there’s not going to be a major drop-off in numbers from one year to the next. He’s getting Notre Dame to the point where (hopefully) we can just reload the talent once a class graduates or enters the NFL.
I would reference my Rivalry article here for comparison to USC’s program, but that would just be a shameless plug. As much as it pains me to say it, in many ways, Pete Carroll has done a good job of this and Weis could learn a thing or two from him.
Jon,
I agree 2007 was a unique situation. I also think it won’t happen again so long as Weis is able to continue recruiting well.
But I think unnecessarily large drop-offs in performance are still possible.
“If Weis needs a veteran, experienced, and talented team to succeed at a high level he may be in trouble.”
Recruiting well can take care of the “veteran” and “talented” aspects of my statement. But the experience is often difficult to replicate without seeing the field in games.
Increased depth/competition in practice will help, but Weis expects a very high level of play from the quarterback position. Without a respectable running game there is little to pressure off the Irish signal-caller.
Well, then hopefully Weis can get some playing time to the underclassmen this season.
I have a pair of thoughts on this discussion on problem number 2 and 3 in the article.
Problem (2) – Predicatability
I think sometimes Weis uses Regular when it’s third and short and he wants to take the first down by force. There’s the old cliche, if you can’t get one yard, you don’t deserve to win. On occasion (perhaps too rarely), he will call play action and usually hit for a big play if the execution is there from the QB and receiver. Outside of third and short, do we really use the Regular package? Should we really be upset that we run the ball on third and short to get the first down? Granted, our production in third and short trying to take a first down by force is pitiful for reasons that I don’t understand, but I don’t think I have a problem being predictable running out of Regular if we’re only really using it on third and short. Now, if you have a philosophical issue with Weis using Regular in only those situations and you would like to see more of it as an every-down package, then that’s just not the scheme that this offense tries to employ.
Problem (3) – Synergy
I could not agree more with your identification of this as a major problem for the Irish running game. I guess I’ve always felt this frustration but never put words on it the way you have in this article. The Irish running game just has no feel of connection to the passing game or the offensive plan as a whole. There are teams who, when you see them line up before the snap, you have no idea if the call is going to be a pass, a run, a screen, a draw. Just when you think they’re going to call run; they pass. Just when you think they’re going to pass; they call a screen. You just get a feeling that the running plays called have a clear objective which is meaningful to the offensive gameplan in-full. When I watched ND last year, you just always had a feeling like the running plays were executed without the passion shown on passing plays. It leads to a disconnected feeling where the runs seem totally thrown in without a plan for what the call is supposed to achieve. This is especially true of the zone stretch play call. It’s hard to explain the difference between teams that have synergy between the passing and running game. I don’t even know what I would suggest to get us there. Perhaps it has to do with using a look in a running play that sets up subsequent passing play – but also using a look on a passing play to set up a big running play. I feel like having Weis call the plays again is a huge first step in getting right in this area. We all talk so much about how Weis has a knack for calling just the right play at just the right time. I’d like to have a feeling that he’s calling a pass, watches what the defense does, and based on that, he has a running play that is going to gash the defense. I just haven’t had that feeling in a while. I belive he does it well in the passing game (give a look, either a run or a pass; observe the defense’s reaction; then dial up a passing play that’s going to go for a huge gain). I guess this is a lot of rambling on the issue but again, it’s probably the most difficult of the three problems you identified to dig in to and lay out a plan for fixing it.
ndscoggins,
With respect to 2):
Against Navy and Washington we used regular quite often. We also ran the ball quite often. It is hardly a coincidence that two of the three highest rushing totals of 2008 came against these two teams where Weis frequently called running plays (it also helps that they couldn’t defend the run).
Spreading it out in half and other formations is a viable option, particularly with the talent the Irish have at the quarterback, wide receiver, and tight end position. However, there are three inherent problems.
One, when the Irish use these personnel packages the formation tends to be in the shotgun where the Irish almost never run.
Two, on a short field, i.e. in the red zone, spreading the field becomes less effective if you don’t have a complementing running game.
And three, it doesn’t fit well with the Irish offensive line and running back personnel.
With respect to 3):
The lack of passion in the running game is likely proportional to the emphasis placed on it in practice. I am speculating here, but I believe there is a disproportionate amount of practice time spent on the run.
I think you hit it on the head when you said “it has to do with using a look in a running play that sets up subsequent passing play – but also using a look on a passing play to set up a big running play.” Simply put, runs needs to look like passes and passes like runs. It also helps if some runs look like others, but with different blocking schemes.
I agree with you as well that Weis calling plays should improve this. The only potential “problem” is Verducci. If Verducci wants to revamp the blocking up front, it may take some time for Weis and the players to adjust in order to execute at a high level. In that case play-calling is secondary to execution.
The fix is simple. Find the weakness of the opposing defense, devise a way to attack it, whether on the ground or with the pass, and develop a complementing package of plays by which to do it. The offense needs to have this flexibility and consistency.