If Kelly is to meet fans’ expectations, he needs to get started on the right foot. In this regard Purdue is somewhat of an ideal opening opponent. The Boilermakers should rank in the bottom half of the 2010 Irish schedule with question marks on both sides of the ball including the secondary, at running back, and along the offensive line. This uncertainty makes it difficult to imagine Purdue improving on last year’s 5-7 record—4-4 in Big Ten play—that included only one impressive win (Ohio State at home).

Purdue, Version 2009 and Beyond

Head coach Danny Hope enters his second year in West Lafayette and makes his first trip to Notre Dame Stadium, likely hoping to erase the memory of last year’s defeat where a questionable timeout gave quarterback Jimmy Clausen and tight end Kyle Rudolph one last chance to seize victory.

Hope hasn’t significantly altered the blueprint of former Purdue head coach Joe Tiller. The Boilermaker offense likes to spread the field and throw the ball, and the defense operates out of a 4-3 alignment.

Last year’s unit struggled to control and protect the ball, ranking 87th in the country in turnover margin at -5. The Boilermakers were, however, a fairly disciplined team, ranking in the top 30 in penalties per game (5.3), and in the top 15 in penalty yards per game (41.3). If this discipline carries over into 2010, the Irish can expect little help from opening game jitters.

Offense

Offensive coordinator Gary Nord returns for his second year directing the Purdue offense. Nord operates primarily out of four wide, spread formations and likes to throw the ball (ranked 100th in rush attempts per game, 17th in pass attempts per game in 2009). Last year’s unit ranked in the top half of the FBS in most total offense statistical categories.

The 2009 Boilermaker offense generated the majority of their production through the air (34th in pass yards per game), was decent on third down (37th in third down efficiency), and very efficient in the red zone (20th in red zone efficiency, 5th in red zone touchdown efficiency). But the strong performance was limited to these areas.

The production in the red zone was mostly wasted by a unit that struggled to sustain drives (107th in red zone appearances per game). Yards on the ground were difficult to come by (75th in rush yards per game), turnovers were more rule than exception (107th in fumbles, 73rd in interceptions), and the pass offense wasn’t terribly efficient (81st in yards per attempt and pass efficiency).

An offensive line with minimal experience, no proven option in the backfield, and a new quarterback should make it difficult to improve on these numbers in 2010.

Purdue will field the least experienced front five the Irish will face all season. The Boilermakers must replace three linemen from last season and the projected starters have very limited experience (less than 40 combined starts).

Running back Jaycen Taylor exhausted his eligibility and fellow back Ralph Bolden—the leading rusher in 2009—tore his ACL in the off-season and is expected to be unavailable this year. Taylor and Bolden combined for roughly 80 percent of the rushing production last year and there is no experienced runner waiting to replace them. Running back Al-Terek McBurse does have potential and converted wide receiver Keith Carlos has big play ability, but both have virtually no experience at the position.

Former Miami Hurricanes quarterback Robert Marve replaces the departed Joey Elliott and will open the season as the Boilermaker quarterback. Marve sat out last year due to NCAA transfer rules and Purdue fans hope it allowed him to mature and improve upon a freshman campaign where he completed only 54.5 percent of his passes and threw 13 interceptions compared to only nine touchdowns. Still, Marve has the physical tools to be a strong passer and, if given time, is capable of getting the ball to his talented receivers. Additionally, Marve has good mobility and is a threat to scramble or pick up yards on designed quarterback runs.

The receiving corps took a hit with the loss of the second leading receiver from 2009 (Aaron Valentin), but Keith Smith returns after leading the Big Ten in receptions and receiving yards per game and Kyle Adams is back to provide a very capable option at tight end. Smith, Adams and Carlos were three of the top four receiving targets in 2009 and should form the nucleus of a strong receiving unit in 2010.

See the tables below for an in-depth look at the 2009 Boilermaker offense (the Opponent Average and Opponent Average Rank columns refer to Purdue’s 2009 opponents).

2009 Purdue Offensive Efficiency

2009 Purdue Total Offense

2009 Purdue Rushing Offense

2009 Purdue Passing Offense

Defense

Purdue will operate defensively with dual coordinators after Hope hired Gary Emanuel in the off-season to work alongside Donn Landholm. Emanuel was most recently the defensive line coach at Rutgers while Landholm is in his second season as the defensive coordinator and was with Hope at Eastern Kentucky prior to Purdue.

The Boilermakers hope to improve on the defensive side of the ball as the 2009 unit ranked in the bottom half of the country in a host of defensive categories. Among other things, last year’s defense struggled to get off the field (80th in third down efficiency, 90th in plays per game), allowed 29.1 points per game (89), and surrendered 173.4 yards per game on the ground (94). About the only bright spot was a penchant to get upfield—the unit averaged 6.5 tackles for a loss per game (32) and one sack per 11.6 pass attempts (17).

The unquestionable strength of this year’s Boilermaker defense—and perhaps the team—is the front seven. Purdue returns six players in this group that started all 12 games in 2009 including pass rushing specialist Ryan Kerrigan. Kerrigan led Purdue defensive linemen in tackles with 66, led the team in tackles for a loss with 18.5, and was third in the country and first in the Big Ten with 13 sacks.

Alongside Kerrigan are defensive tackle Kawann Short and end Gerald Gooden, the former of which was a freshman All-American last year. Behind the defensive line Purdue returns linebackers Joe Holland, Jason Werner, and Chris Carlino, active players that posted three of the top four tackle totals from last season.

But while the front seven has experience and the talent to be a strong unit, the backend of the defense is almost entirely untested. Emanuel and Landholm have the task of replacing four members of the 2009 secondary, all of which were seniors. The new starters are, for the most part, veteran players. But breaking in a completely new secondary is never easy and figures to be an especially daunting challenge against a pass-happy offense in the season opener at Notre Dame stadium.

See the tables below for an in-depth look at the 2009 Boilermaker defense (the Opponent Average and Opponent Average Rank columns refer to Purdue’s 2009 opponents).

2009 Purdue Defensive Efficiency

2009 Purdue Total Defense

2009 Purdue Rushing Defense

2009 Purdue Passing Defense

What Does It Mean for 2010?

It is difficult to imagine the Boilermakers taking a step forward on offense. The lack of a proven runner and shuffle in offensive line personnel don’t bode well for a unit that struggled to pick up yards on the ground last season. In all likelihood there will be a minimal running threat and pass protection could also be questionable. Marve’s athletic ability could prove to be an asset extending plays, but he could struggle as the centerpiece of the offense and will need the skill position players to make plays.

Even with virtually the same front seven last year, Purdue struggled to stop the run. The Irish ranked 84th in the country in yards per game (128.3) and 76th in yards per rush attempt (3.8) in 2009, but still managed 167 yards on the ground in West Lafayette. Stopping the run has been a focus for Emanuel and Landholm in the off-season, but with a completely new secondary it may be a “pick your poison” scenario for the Purdue defense. The Boilermakers should continue to be able to get upfield, but, like last year, it may not be enough to turn in a complete performance.

Keys to Winning

Offense

1. Protect Crist. Purdue’s defensive strength in 2009 was the ability to get upfield. With six of the front seven returning, the trend should continue. Protecting quarterback Dayne Crist will be paramount to success, and it has as much to do with play-calling as it does offensive line play. The Irish offensive game plan must counter Purdue’s defensive pressure with runs, screens, shovel passes, and the quick-release, short-drop passing attack that is a staple of the Brian Kelly offense.
2. Hit the edge, pressure the secondary. The matchups in the passing game strongly favor the Irish. Schematically, the spread offense is designed to get the ball into space, and the talented Irish receivers should have productive days against an inexperienced Purdue secondary. Wide receiver Michael Floyd and tight end Kyle Rudolph are certain to impress, but it will also be important for Crist to distribute the ball quickly and decisively to his other targets.
3. Execute. The Boilermaker secondary makes the offensive game plan fairly simple. The untested and inexperienced starters likely exclude the use of exotic coverages such that the challenge for Crist and company will be to execute. Kelly’s offenses have proven more than capable of this in the past, but many Notre Dame fans still remember last year’s lingering execution problems. The Irish offense must transition to the former and leave the latter behind.

Defense

1. Win first down, win the game. The cards are stacked against the Boilermaker offense, but execution is always easier when the entire playbook is open. First down play will be critical to success on defense. Win first down, force long down and distance situations to prevent the effectiveness of a quick-release passing offense, and the Irish defense has a significant advantage against an offensive line that should struggle to protect Marve for extended periods of time.
2. Pressure is the name of the game. Green quarterback plus inexperienced offensive line plus no proven ability to run the ball equals a pressure-based defense. Notre Dame must play the pass first and consistently pressure Marve without allowing him to extend plays with his feet. Coverage should be tight to prevent quick throws and defenders should be prepared for the cheater plays Nord will likely employ to slow the pass rush. Disrupting route timing and applying pressure will prevent Marve from getting comfortable, establishing a rhythm, and gaining confidence.
3. Give up nothing easy. The Boilermakers struggled to sustain drives in 2009 and, with so much personnel turnover, yards will likely be hard to come by Saturday. The Irish defense can’t do any favors and allow their opponent to generate big gains via broken plays, poor tackling, or mental errors. This has certainly been a problem in the past, and more than half of the yards (55.1 percent) surrendered in last year’s contest came from eight big plays (three runs, five passes), two of which resulted in touchdowns. Defensively, the game plan is as much about not doing something wrong as it is doing something right. Defensive coordinator Bob Diaco’s scheme is a decided departure from the blitz-heavy philosophy of last season, and should help in this regard.

Prediction

If the Irish offense comes out prepared, this could be an ugly affair. Notre Dame has the talent in the receiving corps to apply pressure to the inexperienced Boilermaker secondary and and Kelly’s offensive scheme amplifies this advantage. The key to offensive production will be protecting Crist and consistently affording him time to throw.

Offensively, Purdue doesn’t have the pieces to field an explosive unit. There are far too many questions marks and the lack of experience along the offensive line has the potential to be extremely limiting. Without running lanes for a depleted backfield or consistent pass protection, the Boilermaker offense should struggle against a very talented, albeit unproven, Irish defense.

Notre Dame 27, Purdue 13

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This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

To be certain, Kelly brings with him many attributes absent from the three previous coaches. He has college football head coaching experience, and lots of it. He’s had success at each of his three previous stops—elevating the programs at Grand Valley State, Central Michigan, and Cincinnati above any level in their history. And he’s progressed—rather naturally—from FCS, to the Mid-American conference in FBS, and finally to the Big East. It is these qualifications that have many fans excited about Kelly’s potential at Notre Dame, as well as the impending season.

But does immediate improvement in the win column mean athletic director Jack Swarbrick found his man? Does meeting, or exceeding, fans’ expectations of a 9-3 season in year one guarantee long-term success?

No. And a cursory look at the last two Irish coaches will tell you that. Tyrone Willingham went 10-3 in his first year before suffering through an 11-12 record the next two. Charlie Weis compiled the same opening year record in 2005, and even improved by a win in 2006, but subsequently faltered down the stretch winning only 16 of 37.

Wins and losses early in a coach’s tenure can be deceiving, and the real measure of success is in improvement and consistency over a period of time—it is far more instructive to measure Kelly’s inaugural season in terms of the overall direction of the program rather than in wins and losses.

To this end, the staff at Clashmore Mike sat down to answer a simple question regarding the offense, defense and coaching: What are you looking for in 2010 that shows marked improvement in the direction of the program?

Offense

Andrew

A run game. And by that I’m not talking so much about an offense that piles up rushing yards, but rather one that is consistent and successful when they do run. Not a single Weis team managed to average greater than four yards per carry, while only one Kelly team in the past six years has failed to do so. Despite Kelly’s air-it-out offense, he’s generally been able to establish the run wherever he’s been, and one of the keys to Cincinnati’s undefeated 2009 regular season was a quick-strike running game that had the 13th highest yard per carry average in the nation. The deepest position on the Notre Dame roster is at running back: the talent is there if the offensive line can open up holes for them. Once we start seeing 20-plus yard runs out of this offense, then I’ll know we’re heading in the right direction.

Andy

There are no more important two items to offensive success this year than offensive line protection and the establishment of an effective ground game. That being said, another area that I hope to observe progress in 2010 is at the quarterback position. Quarterback Dayne Crist will play a substantially different role than his predecessor—Jimmy Clausen was charged with making decisions on the field and generating much of the offensive firepower himself—acting as a distributor to the skill positions in the offensive unit. It is vitally important to Notre Dame’s success in 2010 that he appears comfortable, not only in Kelly’s system, but moving around in the pocket and executing his role with confidence. If Crist is consistently relied upon to win games in much the same role as Clausen, Irish fans could be in for a long season.

Anthony

It seems like ages since Notre Dame fielded a competent offensive line. College football starts up front and Weis put far too much emphasis on skill position play and not enough on the front five. This is particularly important in 2010, the Irish face several strong defensive fronts including Purdue, Pittsburgh, Utah and USC, and winning the battles in the trenches will be paramount to success. Offensive line coach Ed Warinner has talent to work with, but recently technique and fundamentals have been lacking. There is experience and skill at the wide receiver, running back and tight end positions, and Kelly has a history of developing very productive quarterbacks. If Warinner can instill better footwork, correct hand placement, and (perhaps most importantly) produce more physicality, the Irish could field a very prolific offense.

Jon

While the running game will be key to Kelly’s new offense, and Dayne Crist will have a big load on his shoulders this season, my colleagues already touched on those topics. Therefore, the biggest thing that I would love to see this season on offense is a competent passing game that starts with production at wide receiver. Biletnikoff Award contender Michael Floyd is still playing for the Irish, but the other wide receivers are largely untested. Deion Walker and John Goodman were wide receivers who were praised while in high school, but have been buried on the depth chart the past few seasons—largely because of the production of Floyd and Golden Tate. Another promising receiver, although one that was a work-in-progress, Shaquelle Evans, left the team because he was unhappy about his place on the depth chart. Then there are other receivers like Roby Toma, Theo Riddick, and some of the incoming freshmen who remain a mystery. The other x-factor for the unit is Duval Kamara. Was his freshman year a fluke? If he can have a Maurice Stovall-type season, he could redeem his lackluster sophomore and junior seasons. Because defenses will be keying in on Floyd and Kyle Rudolph, who is actually one of the top receiving tight ends in the country, the offense desperately needs other receivers to increase their production in order help Crist as well as open up the running game.

Defense

Andrew

I’m looking at you, Harrison Smith. Kyle McCarthy isn’t there to bail you out this year, so stop grabbing at people with your hands and finally run into someone with your body. A lack of tackling ability was a defense-wide issue, but Smith stood out like a sore thumb time and time again in nearly every game. If Kelly and his staff can fix his fundamentals, they should be able to fix anyone’s. Second, I’m looking for pressure in the backfield. How many of Jon Tenuta’s blitzes hit the other team’s offensive line like they ran into a brick wall? As Notre Dame fans have painfully learned, you can only do so much to manufacture pressure from designed blitzes; the rest needs to come from good technique, strength and speed. It’s been a long time since I’ve looked at an Irish defense and felt that they were the physically superior group of players on the field. When I start seeing the other team’s offensive line get pushed around, and I see players dropped with hard-hitting form tackles, then I’ll know we’re ok.

Andy

Coverage. The Irish have been so poor in many defensive areas over the last few years that it’s tough to pinpoint a specific unit that needs improvement the most, but one thing Notre Dame must do this season is keep their opponents’ big play production in check by providing sound coverage in the secondary. This can’t come at the expense of solid run tackling, but all too often Irish fans have been subjected to daggers through the heart by a poorly timed fade pass defended, or a blown assignment. These types of fundamental errors cannot be allowed to happen and defensive backs coach Chuck Martin will have his hands full focusing on removing the potential for huge shifts in momentum as a result of poor secondary play.

Anthony

Similar to the offense, there is plenty of talent currently on the Irish roster to field a defense in the top quarter of the country. The Irish have athletes—Darius Fleming, Manti Te’o, Steve Filer, Ethan Johnson, Gary Gray, and Jamoris Slaughter to name a few—but the raw skill hasn’t translated into production because of poor fundamentals. In other words, progress on this side of the ball is directly proportional to improving the basics. Better tackling, correct pursuit angles, and an increased ability to shed blocks are desperately needed to maximize the potential of the personnel. If the Irish can make progress in these areas, the athleticism should take care of the rest.

Jon

Fundamentals seems to be a prevalent topic, here, but solid execution of the fundamentals seem to get more sporadic throughout the season without the proper conditioning. I’m afraid that, because Kelly’s offense is designed to score quickly and often, the increased work load on the defense may begin to take its toll as the season winds on. While Paul Longo has the Irish putting up some impressive bench and squat numbers, the real key to the game for the defense will be endurance. If the defense can keep from losing steam as the season wears on, they will put the Irish in a good position to win. However, if they can’t maintain their endurance, they will put that much more pressure on Crist and the offense to dig the Irish out of preventable situations, a prevalent theme throughout Weis’ final three seasons.

Coaching

Andrew

I want a killer instinct. What I want to see is how we play against teams with less talent than Notre Dame: do we play paddy-cake with them, or do we bury them? Do we struggle to beat the San Diego States or do we enter half-time with a 40-0 lead? The elite teams close out games against inferior opponents early and often, and Notre Dame has not been able to do that on a consistent basis since Lou Holtz left. Part of being an intimidating team and having a psychological edge before a game even starts is to make opponents worried. Squeaking out victories doesn’t do it, you have to have a reputation for dismantling and demoralizing teams. It’s part of college football, and it’s part of being an elite program. You don’t take your foot off the gas pedal until the game is over, Charlie. Your team won’t learn to close people out and you send the message that you take it easy on your opponents. I think we’ll be OK if we start seeing Notre Dame handling itself like an intimidating and elite program once again.

Andy

What I have been dying to see for more than a decade is a return to classic Irish football. The same Notre Dame that popularized the forward pass has always had a distinct, smashmouth brand of play that every successful Irish unit has embraced. It involves a bedrock of tradition, an appreciation of excellence, and an approach to playing this glorious game that begins with the fundamentals: tackling, perseverance, grit, energy, emotion, determination, and a fighting spirit. It means playing for “Our Lady” instead of the individual and for each player and staff member to personalize that credo for themselves. It appears that Kelly “gets it”—I hope this is reflected in the squad he leads out of the tunnel this Fall.

Anthony

Holtz always fielded teams with several trademark characteristics—they were physical, energetic and emotional, well-conditioned, and almost never started a game flat. Lately, this has seemed more like the exception than the rule. If Kelly can transform the lethargic (pre-game smack-talking notwithstanding), finesse team with a penchant for slow starts he inherited into a unit more closely resembling those of the Holtzian Era, he will certainly be on the right path. Additionally, better conditioning is needed to reverse the second-half season skids of the past two years. These items should be priority number one for the new Irish head coach, as developing the proper team psyche in the early going is paramount to long-term success.

Jon

While Notre Dame has the talent to compete with nearly any program in the nation, a large portion of it is untested. Given the fact that Kelly’s style of offense will put added pressure on the defense, it will be imperative that conditioning is a high priority. However, the bigger issue for the Irish, and one that falls directly on the coaches, is the need to employ a fresh rotation of players throughout a game. The depth at some positions is thin, but depth will be paramount to success this season. Finding quality players to fill in behind the starters at the quarterback, wide receiver, offensive line, defensive line, middle linebacker, and cornerback positions is key to ensure that if something disastrous happens—you know, like Dayne Crist pulls a Ron Powlus and snaps his collarbone—it won’t be an excuse to throw in the towel. A significant drop-off in production and mental competency from the first to second team is just the thing to shoot an arrow in the Achilles Heel of the season.

Trends and Outliers

The predominant themes that resonate above are a focus on fundamentals and a return to the Notre Dame of old. No one is advocating for Kelly to abandon his spread offense in favor of two tight ends and an I-backfield, but the teams Holtz coached certainly had characteristics that have been lacking over the past several years. Getting those back will indicate a marked improvement in the underlying contributors to success.

Fundamentals, physicality, a running game, a defense that doesn’t give up big plays, smashmouth football—these are all items synonymous with a Holtz brand of football as well as other Irish squads that excelled, and perhaps even overachieved, on the field. There are plenty of players that will be pivotal to success this year, but if Kelly can get the team to buy into his mantra, play with passion and physicality, and focus on the details, the talent will take care of the rest.

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This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

The primary goal of this exercise is to move beyond simply estimating a win-loss record. Selecting the percent confidence in a win on a game-by-game basis is not only much more accurate, it also allows for some interesting follow-on analyses.

Examining the schedule on a game-by-game basis also illustrates the difficulty in going undefeated in a 12-game regular season. Even if the Irish had a 90 percent chance of winning every game, they would still only have a 28 percent chance of running the table. A 75 percent chance of winning each game—close to the mean win confidence of the voters—translates into only a 3.2 percent chance of going undefeated.

The results below aren’t intended to be an exact 2010 season predictor, the guys at Football Outsiders have the corner on that market. Rather, they are intended to represent the expectations of the Irish fan base.

The Simple Viewpoint

A typical win probability distribution is shown in the histogram below. Here Michigan has been used as an example, but the other games follow similar trends and are normally distributed.

Click to enlarge.

From a simplistic perspective, the voting distribution described by this histogram translates to an average win probability of 71.4 percent and a standard deviation of 15 percent. Expressed differently, the majority of those polled (67.4 percent) believe the Irish have a 70 percent or better chance of beating Michigan, while 87.5 percent of voters believe Notre Dame has at least a 60 percent chance of beating the Wolverines.

The table below details the average win probabilities and standard deviations for each game in 2010. Larger standard deviations mean more scatter in the data, i.e more disagreement among the voters about Notre Dame’s chances of winning or losing the game. Lower standard deviations are indicative of a more consistent opinion regarding the outcome of the contest, i.e. more confidence in a win or loss.

The mean win probability for all the games is 75.2 percent with a mean standard deviation of 15 percent—virtually identical to last year’s values of 76.1 and 13.8 percent respectively. USC is the obvious outlier with a 53.1 percent win confidence, but doesn’t significantly alter either value (77.2 percent mean win probability and 14.4 percent mean standard deviation excluding USC).

The simple way to translate the individual game average win probabilities to a season average win total is to sum the values. This equates to nine wins for the Irish. Multiplying the average win probabilities for each game gives the probability of an undefeated regular season at 2.7 percent.

The data also indicates which games are perceived to be sure wins, which could go either way, and which opponents are the most challenging. On average, voters predicted greater than a 90 percent win probability for Western Michigan, Tulsa and Army, and better than 80 percent win confidence for Purdue and Navy. Additionally, Western Michigan, Tulsa and Army have standard deviations below the 15 percent average (average of 9.6 percent for these three teams, high of 11.5 percent). In other words, the voters strongly agree that these three teams are the weakest opponents.

Michigan, Michigan State, Stanford, Boston College, Pittsburgh, and Utah all had average win probabilities between 60 and 80 percent (mean win probability of 66.4 percent), and relatively large standard deviations. These are games where voters believe the Irish have a slight advantage but the amount of variation suggests a relatively low confidence.

Finally, for the second consecutive year, the Trojans are the most feared opponent on the schedule as well as the one with the most disagreement. The contest against USC registered a 53.1 percent average win probability, with a very high 20.8 percent mean standard deviation.

There is, however, more confidence in a win this year despite being an away game for the Irish. It seems that the uncertainty surrounding the Trojan program and the lack of a proven head coach has bolstered fans’ confidence.

In summary, Western Michigan, Tulsa and Army are viewed as near certain wins, the Irish have slightly better than even odds against Michigan, Michigan State, Stanford, Boston College, Pittsburgh, and Utah, and USC is a coin flip.

Monte Carlo Simulation

As noted above, summing the individual win probabilities is a simple way to generate a season win total. But what about the variation of that win total? This is where Monte Carlo simulations are of value.

Using a large number (~50,000) of randomly sampled data points, a Monte Carlo simulation was performed with the average win probabilities in the table above. The results of this simulation are shown in the histogram below.

Click to enlarge.

The results of the Monte Carlo simulation are consistent with the simple summation of game win probabilities, i.e. nine wins is the average expectation. But the variation in this expectation provides additional insight.

On average, voters predicted a 95.7 percent chance the Irish will win seven or more games, an 85.8 percent chance in eight or more victories, and a 65.9 percent chance in nine-plus wins. Expressed differently, the average voter predicts only a 4.3 percent chance Notre Dame will win fewer than seven games and a 71.1 percent chance of a record between 8-4 and 10-2.

The Optimists and Pessimists

The mean win probabilities used to generate the season win histogram above are indicative of the average voter prediction, i.e. they represent a 50 percent confidence interval of the data.

The outlying data, however, can be thought of as optimistic and pessimistic predictions. In other words, the five and 95 percent confidence intervals of the game win probabilities bound voter expectations by approximating optimistic and pessimistic views.

The plot below shows the normalized probability functions for the optimistic, average and pessimistic season win predictions. The average curve is effectively a discretized version of the histogram above, normalized to an integrated probability of unity.

Click to enlarge.

Similar to the average predictions, the optimists and pessimists voted along the same lines for the second straight year. The 2009 optimistic win prediction was 11.4 wins with a standard deviation of 0.7 while the pessimistic prediction was 6.4 with a standard deviation of 1.6 wins. Compare these values to those represented by the curve above—11.5 wins for the optimists (standard deviation of 0.7) and 6.1 wins for the pessimists (standard deviation of 1.6)—and it is quite evident that the expectations in 2010 mirror those of 2009.

Where Did the Voters Go Wrong?

The average win probabilities rank the following teams as the five most difficult on the slate:

1. USC
2. Pittsburgh
3. Michigan State
4. Boston College
5. Stanford

Absent from this list is Utah—a team that has compiled a 47-17 record (0.734), 5-0 bowl record, undefeated season, 10-4 (0.714) record against BCS conference teams, and a 19-5 (0.792) out of conference record over the past six years. Additionally, the Utes are 8-3 (0.727) in November away games since 2003. That kind of success shouldn’t be taken lightly.

Offensively, the Utes will have plenty of firepower with two very solid quarterbacks, speed and power options at the running back position, and a seasoned offensive line. Utah’s defense doesn’t return as many starters, but will field a strong front four and have plenty of experienced players waiting in the wings.

Given the uncertainty surrounding USC (new coaching staff and NCAA sanctions), Pittsburgh (retooled secondary, must replace three interior linemen and the nation’s 10th most efficient passer from 2009), Michigan State (three new offensive linemen and a host of new defensive starters), and Stanford (no Gerhart and significant coaching changes on defense), it seems Utah certainly belongs somewhere in the top five.

New Coaching Staff, New Quarterback, New Offense, New Defense…Same Expectations

The expectations for the 2010 Fighting Irish are virtually identical to last year. While a case can be made that Notre Dame should have been far better than 6-6 last season, an off-season of changes doesn’t often equate to a three-win improvement.

Save wide receivers coach Tony Alford, the entire coaching staff is new, and Alford has moved to a position he’s never coached before. The offense must adjust from a pro-style philosophy to a spread-based scheme, replace two of the most productive players in recent history—quarterback Jimmy Clausen and wide receiver Golden Tate—and break-in two new tackles. And for the fourth time since 2006, the defense will have a new coordinator and scheme as Bob Diaco implements his no-crease 3-4.

Moreover, the schedule doesn’t appear decidedly less challenging than a year ago. Notre Dame faces seven foes in 2010 they played in 2009 (Purdue, Michigan, Michigan State, Stanford, Boston College, Pittsburgh, Navy and USC), and replaces Nevada, Washington, Washington State, and Connecticut with Western Michigan, Tulsa, Utah, and Army. The Irish lost to five of the common foes in 2009, but the voters didn’t put the Irish as an underdog in a single contest in 2010.

The expectation is a nine-win season, as nearly three quarters of voters predict between eight and 10 wins. Kelly has a proven track record of winning and maximizing talent, and there is plenty of the latter on the current Irish roster. It seems that the bar has been set hoping he can do at Notre Dame what he has done everywhere else. And as this assessment has shown, he isn’t lying when he says that he has to win, and win right away.

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This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

As Irish fans know all too well, Notre Dame hasn’t been part of the national title picture for over a decade. The last year the lads in blue and gold laid a legitimate claim to a championship was 1993, as a consistently strong team hasn’t been a fixture in South Bend since the end of the Holtz era.

Since 2000 the Irish have posted a pedestrian 70-52 (0.574) record including a 1-5 bowl clip to go along with five non-winning seasons. But there were some bright spots. Bob Davie led the Irish to a 9-2 regular season record in 2000 capped by a Fiesta Bowl appearance. Tyrone Willingham started his tenure in South Bend with a 10-3 mark and an invitation to the Gator Bowl. And the recently departed Charlie Weis opened his career with nine and 10-win seasons and consecutive BCS bowl births.

Unfortunately, the pervasive theme during those four years was a strong—albeit not great—regular season, capped by a bowl invitation that seemed motivated more by the financial draw of the Irish fan base than the on-field product.

Despite solid regular season records that potentially merited an upper-tier bowl invitation, the outcome of these season finales were far from favorable. The Irish were severely overmatched in the 2000 Fiesta Bowl, a 41-9 thrashing at the hands of Oregon State, the 2003 Gator Bowl was a 22-point loss to North Carolina State, and Weis’ 2005 and 2006 BCS bowl teams lost by an average margin of nearly three touchdowns. In many ways these bowl performances highlighted what many fans and detractors knew going into the game—these squads simply weren’t elite, national championship caliber teams.

But how far were these teams from title contention? Furthermore, what was missing, and is new head coach Brian Kelly the man to get the program pointed in the right direction?

Benchmarking Notre Dame to the Blueprint

What follows is a statistical comparison of the last 10 Irish squads to the BCS national championship blueprint identified in the previous four installments. The tables below include a 10-year average comparison of the BCS champions and Notre Dame, the value and ranking cutoffs, and the number of years the Irish met or exceeded these cutoffs for each blueprint metric. As with the previous segments, the data is divided among the three statistical categories (miscellaneous, offense and defense).

Miscellaneous

Benchmarking the Irish: Miscellaneous Metrics

The Irish have come up short in turnover margin over the past decade. The past 10 BCS title winners averaged a turnover margin of 14.2 compared to only 4.6 for the Irish. Additionally, Notre Dame only exceeded the value cutoff for this metric in two years, 2000 and 2005.

In most seasons the problem was generating turnovers and Weis’ more veteran squads were a perfect example of this trend. The Irish only lost 14 turnovers and ranked in the top seven in this category in 2005, 2006 and 2009, but failed to crack the top 35 in turnovers gained in the same years posting an average ranking of nearly 70.

Offense

Benchmarking the Irish: Total Offense Metrics

With the exception of two seasons, the Irish haven’t performed at a championship level in total offense. Over the past 10 years the Irish averaged more than a yard less per play, and 76.5 yards and 12.2 points less per game. The 10-year ranking comparisons are equally as different.

Weis’ 2005 offense was, by far, the best unit. The Brady Quinn-led squad met the value and ranking cutoffs in every total offensive metric including a gaudy 48.9 percent third down conversion rate, 6.1 YPP, 477.3 YPG, and 36.7 PPG. Last year’s unit wasn’t far off, exceeding the value and ranking cutoffs in YPP and YPG, and only narrowly missing the third down efficiency and PPG cutoffs.

The 2007 offense was the low point of the past 10 seasons (and perhaps in the history of Notre Dame football), but the 2001, 2002 and 2003 offensive units weren’t far behind. During these four years the Irish converted a paltry 33.4 percent of third downs and averaged a ranking of 107.5, 106.8 and 99.8 in YPP, YPG and PPG respectively.

Benchmarking the Irish: Rushing Offense Metrics

Notre Dame’s rushing offense has been somewhat of a bipolar affair over the last 10 years.

The focus of the offense shifted from a run-heavy approach under Davie and in the first year of Willingham’s tenure, to a more balanced unit in 2003-2005, and, finally, to a pass-first scheme with Weis at the helm. The offense averaged 532 rush attempts per season and a run/pass split of 68/32 from 2000-2002, 474 attempts and a split of 54/46 from 2004-2005, but only 424 attempts and a 49/51 split since 2005.

During the early part of the decade when there was a strong focus on the running game, the offense performed at high levels. The Irish met every rush metric value and ranking cutoff in 2000 with one exception, and met half of the cutoffs in 2001.

But since 2001 the Irish have only exceeded two value cutoffs (attempts in 2002 and 2005) and only one ranking cutoff (attempts in 2005) while averaging a paltry 3.4 yards per attempt, 126.3 yards per game, and 14.4 touchdowns per year. Compared to the 10-year BCS champion averages of 4.9 YPA, 198.9 YPG, and 32.6 touchdowns per year, these values don’t stack up well.

Benchmarking the Irish: Passing Offense Metrics

It’s should come as no surprise that the last 10 Irish offenses didn’t meet a single pass metric value or ranking cutoff until Weis installed his pro-style scheme.

From 2000 through 2004 the Irish averaged a modest 6.4 pass YPA, a paltry 11.6 passing touchdowns per year, a very inefficient 51.5 percent completion rate, and a pass efficiency rating under 110. The performance during these years was good for average rankings of 78.2 (YPA), 82.6 (touchdowns), 88 (completion percentage) and 80 (pass efficiency)—compared to average rankings of 17.8, 26.7, 21.2 and 14.5 for the last 10 BCS champions. Not only was the passing game an afterthought in terms of production, it was also woefully inefficient.

Weis arrived in 2005, modernized the Irish passing game, and morphed the offense into a much more efficient unit. Since 2005 (excluding the 2007 season) the Irish averaged eight YPA, 31 touchdowns, a 63.6 percent completion rate, and a pass efficiency of 148.8, much more in line with the averages of the last 10 BCS champs in the table above. Additionally, twice—in 2005 and 2009—a Weis-led offense met every blueprint passing value and ranking cutoff.

Defense

Benchmarking the Irish: Total Defense Metrics

The best total defensive unit Notre Dame fielded in the last decade was 2002, a unit that met the value cutoffs for third down efficiency, yards per play, and yards per game, and barely missed the value cutoff for points per game (16.7 compared to 16.4). Additionally, this defense met the ranking cutoff for YPP, and narrowly missed it for YPG (13 compared to 10) and PPG (nine compared to 8). All in all, the 2002 Irish defense was very nearly a top 10 unit.

But apart from 2002, there wasn’t a year that the defense came close to meeting the total defense blueprint value and ranking cutoffs. The Irish fielded (roughly) a top 30 defense in 2001 and managed to exceed the third down efficiency value cutoff in 2000, 2003 and 2008, but did not meet a single other total defense value or ranking cutoff during the last 10 years.

Excluding 2002, Notre Dame has allowed almost a 36 percent third down conversion rate, over 5.3 YPP, nearly 355 YPG, and almost 24 PPG. Comparing this performance to the 10-year BCS champion averages of 31.3 percent, 4.3 YPP, 277.9 YPG and 13.7 PPG shows just how far the Irish have been from fielding a championship caliber defense.

Benchmarking the Irish: Rushing Defense Metrics

The story defending the run isn’t wholly different from that of the total defensive metrics. The 2002 defensive unit was one of the best in the country, but the remaining years, with 2004 as a notable exception, didn’t measure up well.

The 2002 Irish defense allowed an exceptional 2.8 yards per attempt and a paltry 95.2 yards per game—good enough to meet the value and ranking cutoffs in both categories. This unit also allowed only 11 rushing touchdowns on the year, good for a ranking of 12th in the country. Both values are just outside the cutoffs (9 touchdowns, 10th place ranking).

But 2004 was an even better year for Notre Dame’s rush defense. This unit met or exceeded every value and ranking cutoff and allowed 2.7 YPA, 88.2 YPG, and only 6 rushing touchdowns on the ground—an exceptional performance that ranked 4th nationally in each category.

Excluding 2002 and 2004, the Irish only met one value and ranking cutoff—3.1 YPA (18th ranking) in 2003—as the defense allowed an average of 3.9 YPA, 147 YPG, and 15.9 rushing touchdowns per year, values that (again) do not compare well to those of the last 10 title winners listed above.

Benchmarking the Irish: Passing Defense Metrics

The pass defense follows a somewhat different trend than the total and rushing metrics.

The 2002 unit was tops in terms of scoring and in nearly all of the efficiency metrics, allowing only 12 touchdowns (15th ranking), a very low 49.3 percent completion rating (14), and a 98.2 (10) pass efficiency. Additionally, the Irish surrendered only 5.9 yards per attempt (17), 11.9 yards per completion (39), and 204.8 yards per game (46).

This was good enough to meet the value cutoff in touchdowns, completion percentage, and pass efficiency, in addition to the ranking cutoff of the first two metrics. The remaining metrics (YPA, YPC and YPG) only narrowly missed the value cutoffs.

Apart from 2002 the Irish performed very well in completion percentage and fairly good in a few other categories. Moreover, there were some other years where several value and/or ranking cutoffs were met and others only narrowly missed.

The last 10 Irish defenses averaged a 53.8 percent completion rate which compares very favorably to the 50.1 percent average of the title winners. Additionally, these defensive units allowed an average of 213.1 YPG and a pass efficiency of 121.9. While neither are as close to the BCS champs as the completion percentage comparison, both are respectable 10-year averages, especially considering the number of defensive coaching/scheme changes.

There were also some fairly solid units apart from 2002. The Irish met eight passing value and ranking cutoffs (YPA, YPC, YPG, and completion percentage) in 2007, and missed by small margins in touchdowns (19 compared to 14) and pass efficiency (111.8 compared to 101.3). The 2001 unit also fielded a strong pass defense, and met the value and ranking cutoffs in YPG and completion percentage, the value cutoff in touchdowns, and missed the 94.6 pass efficiency value cutoff by a relatively small margin (113.7).

The Fighting Irish of the Last Decade

It should come as no surprise to those who followed Notre Dame football over the past decade that the Irish did not field a championship caliber team during that period.

There were certainly a few good squads, but there was never an offensive unit that aligned with the BCS championship blueprint, only one defense that very nearly aligned with the blueprint, and never a complete team performance. Even pairing the best offense (2005) and defense (2002), the Irish fall short of meeting every metric value and ranking cutoff.

This trend was most evident in the aforementioned years of upper-tier bowl games where there were deficiencies on at least one side of the ball, and sometimes on both sides. The 2000 Fiesta Bowl squad protected the ball and fielded a strong rushing attack, but certainly benefited from luck and was not a complete defensive unit. The 2002 Gator Bowl team fielded the best defense of the last decade, but paired it with an offense that set many records in futility. And the 2005 and 2006 Weis-led BCS teams were good-to-very-good offenses coupled with below average defensive units.

Offensively, two years stand out. The 2000 team fielded a running attack consistent with those of the blueprint and the 2005 pass offense met or exceeded every pass and total offense value and ranking cutoff. But neither unit completely aligned with the blueprint.

Davie’s 2000 offense was never able to parlay the running game success into an efficient passing attack, and, while Weis’ 2005 squad was efficient and effective through the air, it didn’t match the efficiency and effectiveness of the previous 10 BCS champions on the ground.

Defensively, the 2002 Irish met or exceeded almost every value and ranking cutoff and narrowly missed on the others. But, apart from that year, there wasn’t a defensive unit that aligned with the majority of the blueprint metrics. Additionally, while the Irish offense has been fairly solid protecting the ball, the defense has struggled to consistently force enough takeaways to generate turnover margins consistent with championship level football.

Brian Kelly and Going Forward

The past is the past, Kelly is the future. And while it is difficult—if not impossible—to use his past to predict the future, his past is the only data available, limited as it may be.

His time in FCS isn’t directly comparable, and the same argument can be made for his tenure at Central Michigan. Historically the Irish have played a very strong schedule, and the Mid-American Conference is hardly a juggernaut. This leaves his three years at Cincinnati (excluding the 2006 International Bowl) as the most likely representation of what his Irish squads will look like, but here only his last two will be examined.

Measuring the Bearcats

The 2008 Bearcats amassed a 11-3 record, first place Big East finish, and BCS Orange Bowl birth against the Hokies of Virginia Tech, but certainly did not mimic a BCS champion. Cincinnati was minus eight in turnover margin and only met or exceeded three offensive and five defensive value/ranking cutoffs.

The offense was fairly balanced in its approach (49/51 run/pass split), but far more efficient and effective through the air averaging a ranking of 30.5 in the blueprint passing metrics. The defense ranked in the top 30 in all four total defensive blueprint metrics, was strong against the run (roughly a top 20 unit), and fairly good defending the pass (roughly a top 40 unit).

In 2009, Cincinnati went undefeated in the regular season and won their second consecutive Big East Conference title before being dismantled by the Gators in the Sugar Bowl. This unit improved dramatically in turnover margin (plus nine), and met or exceeded 16 value/ranking cutoffs on offense, but only one on defense.

Last year’s Bearcat offense was much more pass-heavy compared to 2008 (43/57 run/pass split), and the production on the ground suffered accordingly. Still, the offense met or exceeded every blueprint metric value and ranking cutoff with the exception of third down efficiency, rush attempts, rush YPG, and rushing touchdowns. The improvement on offense didn’t translate to the other side of the ball where the defensive performance regressed. But the loss of 10 starters obviously played a role as the unit ranked outside the top 40 in every defensive blueprint metric except rush YPA, YPC, and passing touchdowns.

What Does It Mean for Notre Dame?

Two years is a relatively small data set, but there are certain characteristics of Kelly’s teams that are very promising and others that are cause for concern. Offensively, his teams have shown the ability to be very efficient units capable of scoring early and often. Additionally, he was able to field a top 30 defensive unit in 2008 with a roster full of rather mediocre talent.

His offensive approach, however, is much more pass-heavy than the majority of recent champions. While the 2009 Bearcat offense was efficient on the ground (five rush YPA), they came up very short in rush YPG and the 361 rush attempts strongly suggests a de-emphasized running game. Additionally, Kelly hasn’t shown the ability to field the dominant, top 10 defense needed to capture a title, and his teams have also struggled to force turnovers.

Of course, Notre Dame isn’t Cincinnati. Weis left Kelly more talent—particularly on defense—than he has ever had, and he should continue to have a talented roster at his disposal provided he can recruit well.

Still, defensive coordinator Bob Diaco has only one year of coordinator experience and is a big bet for an Irish unit that needs immediate, dramatic improvement. Moreover, Kelly’s emphasis on throwing the ball isn’t consistent with the BCS championship blueprint and is a decidedly more risky approach than is needed. Morphing the defense into top 10 form is requisite to championship football, and, while a pass-happy offense certainly doesn’t doom him to failure, Kelly will need to go against the trend to bring the first title since 1988 to South Bend.

Similar Posts:

• Blueprint for BCS Championship Success III: Defensive Results
• Blueprint for BCS Championship Success I: Introduction and Approach
• Blueprint for BCS Championship Success II: Offensive Results

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

As the offensive and defensive results indicate, there is certainly a blueprint for winning a BCS national championship. The overwhelming majority of the last 10 champions performed at very similar levels in the same statistical categories, and, while there are always exceptions to the rule, most of the data is consistent and compelling.

Teams that follow this blueprint ensure a high probability of winning a title. The fundamental concepts that enable teams to perform at this level is potentially of more value, but setting the bar is also of merit as it establishes a benchmark for success.

The Blueprint Defined

The value and ranking cutoffs are outlined below for the three categories (miscellaneous, offense, defense).  As with the offensive (which include the miscellaneous metrics) and defensive results, the data is presented in tabular form with the ranking and value cutoffs, as well as the number of teams above/below these cutoffs, identified for each metric.

Only those metrics found to be common and/or important are shown here but the full list of investigated metrics can be found in the introduction.  Metrics absent from this discussion were excluded because of insufficient data (more on this below) or because the majority of the last 10 champions did not perform at a high level in the statistical category. Keeping consistent with the three previous installments, the cutoffs presented below only include the last 10 BCS champions, although some distinctions are made between the winners and losers of these games.

Miscellaneous

Miscellaneous Blueprint

Simply put, a team must protect the ball and generate turnovers to win a championship. No team with a BCS title in the last decade had a turnover margin lower than five and the average of 14.2 is worth about an extra possession per game. Comparing the winners and losers reinforces the importance of this metric. The losing squads posted an average turnover margin of approximately nine and an average ranking of 27.5—five less in turnover margin and almost 14 spots lower in ranking than the winners.

Offense

Offensive Blueprint

Offensively, BCS championship caliber teams are solid overall units that rank in the top quarter of the country, are efficient and effective running the ball, and efficient in the passing game.

Eight of the past 10 champions ranked 31st or better in yards per play, yards per game, and points per game, and the 10 teams posted a very high average third down efficiency of 43 percent.

The data also indicates a high level of efficiency (4.3 rush YPA cutoff) and effectiveness (177.4 rush YPG cutoff) running the ball and scoring on the ground. As a group the 10 teams averaged 4.9 rush YPA (average ranking of 20.4), nearly 200 rushing YPG (average ranking of 25.3), and more than 32 rushing touchdowns per season (average ranking of 13.7) with every offense scoring at least 24 times on the ground.

These squads were also very efficient throwing the ball. Yards per attempt, completion percentage, and pass efficiency all have relatively high value and ranking cutoffs that strongly indicate the necessity of being proficient in the passing game.

Last decade’s championship teams averaged 8.2 pass YPA, a 62.4 percent completion rate, and nearly a 149 pass efficiency rating, good for average rankings of 17.8, 21.2 and 14.5 respectively. These squads were also productive scoring through the air as the group averaged 25.8 passing touchdowns per year (average top 30 ranking) with eight offenses notching at least 22 passing scores.

But while efficiency in the passing game is important, the majority of these teams didn’t employ pass-first offenses, weren’t overly productive throwing the ball, and didn’t excel vertically stretching the field.

Only three units ranked in the top 38 in pass attempts and only four attempted more than 400 passes as the group averaged 375.3 attempts per year (average ranking of nearly 60), roughly 29 pass attempts per game. Expressed differently, seven of the last 10 championship offenses ranked 45th or lower in pass attempts. None of the previous 10 title winners ranked in the top 10 in passing YPG, only four teams ranked 34th or higher, and six ranked 40th or lower. As a group, these teams averaged a modest 232.3 passing YPG (average ranking of 47.5). Finally, only five teams ranked in the top 37 in yards per completion, with an average YPC of 13.2 and an average YPC ranking of roughly 37.

Furthermore, the BCS title game losers were typically more pass-heavy than the winners—the losing squads averaged 3.7 pass attempts and 33.3 passing yards more per game, and nearly seven more passing touchdowns per season.

So while balance is important, particularly scoring balance, running the ball is preferred to a dynamic air attack as the last 10 BCS champions were far more productive on the ground via a run/pass split of approximately 60/40.

Defense

Defensive Blueprint

In contrast, championship defenses of the last decade were extremely sound in virtually every facet.

The three primary total defensive metrics (yards per attempt, yards per game, and points per game) all have ranking cutoff values of 10 or higher with nine teams meeting this standard. As a group, these championship defenses allowed an average of 277.9 YPG, 13.7 PPG and 4.3 YPP. This equates to extremely high average rankings of 7.4 (YPG), 5.1 (PPG) and 7.4 (YPP).

Additionally, eight teams ranked in the top 10 in all three of these statistical categories with only the 2002 Buckeyes and 2007 Tigers failing to meet this standard. And, as one reader so astutely indicated, the 2007 Tigers played in two triple-overtime games that likely inflated their numbers. Perhaps most impressive was the Nick Saban-led LSU defense which was tops in the country in YPP, YPG and PPG in 2003.

These units also excelled getting off the field, posting an average third down efficiency of 31.3 percent as seven teams allowed no better than a 33 percent conversion rate on third down.

The run defense was almost as impressive allowing an average of three YPA, 95.8 YPG, and only 8.6 rushing touchdowns per year—good for average rankings of 14.5, 13.7 and 12.3 respectively. Nine teams ranked in the top 25 in rush YPA, eight ranked 23rd or higher in rush YPG, and seven ranked 10th or better in rushing touchdowns.

The strong performance continued against the pass where nine teams ranked in the top 10 in pass efficiency and yards per attempt, posting an average of 94.6 in the former (average ranking of 6.2) and 5.5 in the latter (average ranking of seven). The remaining pass metric ranking cutoffs (YPC, YPG, touchdowns and completion percentage) are 34th or better, highlighted by stout pass scoring defenses. On average these BCS title defenses surrendered only 11.5 passing touchdowns per year, and no team allowed more than 19.

Similar to the offensive metrics, there were distinct ranking differences amongst the winners and losers as the winning defensive units averaged a ranking of almost 10 spots better in YPP, YPG and PPG, and almost 13 spots better in rushing touchdowns.

A Few Caveats and Noteworthy Items

Value and ranking data for some of the metrics were not readily available making it difficult to determine if they were crucial to success. Time of possession, overall and touchdown red zone efficiencies, and sacks and sacks allowed (along with their normalized counterparts) all had missing values and/or rankings for at least one of these teams.

However, even with limited data, there didn’t seem to be a clustering of teams at the upper or lower ends of the spectrum for these metrics. Intuitively, both red zone efficiency metrics are critical to a high level of team performance, but the limited data didn’t support this conclusion. The same can be said for the various sack categories. While there were a few teams that excelled protecting the passer and pressuring opposing quarterbacks, it was more exception than rule.

Only time of possession showed a somewhat clustered trend in that eight of the past nine (missing data for the 2000 Sooners) BCS national championship teams averaged better than 30 minutes of possession per game. Including 19 of the 20 BCS title game participants, nearly 80 percent fell into the same category. It is difficult to determine if this is due to the offensive or defensive prowess of these teams. Most were run-heavy units which can churn through possession, but the teams also excelled in third down efficiency on both sides of the ball. Either way, 30 minutes of possession is not in indicative of a ball-hogging team or in the top quarter of the country in any given year.

Some metrics were purposefully excluded from this analysis. Fumbles, interceptions and their normalized counterparts (rush attempts/fumble and pass attempts/interception) were not included as turnover margin effectively captures a team’s ability to protect the ball and generate turnovers. Whether these turnovers come in the form of fumbles or interceptions was deemed irrelevant for the purposes of this study, but in most cases the teams that ran the ball well did not fumble often and teams that threw the ball effectively did not throw many interceptions.

Yards per play and rush/pass yards per attempt have a similar relationship, but were included. While YPP is a composite of the other two, excluding yards per rush and pass attempt would not allow for the determination of which is more important—efficiency running or throwing the ball. A similar case can be made for PPG and rushing and passing touchdowns, as well as total, rushing and passing YPG. Since one of the goals of this study was to determine the relative importance of being able to run and/or throw the ball, as well as being able to defend against the run and/or pass, these were included.

Pass efficiency is also a composite metric of many other statistical categories (attempts, yards, completions, touchdowns and interceptions) but was included because it is a relatively good characterization of a team’s overall efficiency throwing the ball and defending against the pass. Despite certain flaws, it is the easiest way to compare two teams across multiple years.

As previously indicated, rush and pass attempts were included for the offense, but not for the defense. Offensively, identifying the run/pass preference provides insight into the philosophy (run-first vs. pass-heavy). But not much value is added by exploring how opposing offenses chose to attack these defenses on an average basis. Offenses that are pass-heavy throw the ball more and run-first teams attempt more rushes. In the end, the run/pass split of offenses playing against these 10 defensive units was very nearly 50/50.

Finally, special teams metrics were not included as part of this analysis but some are likely critical to championship success. Field position plays a huge role in scoring opportunity (the chance of scoring on a drive starting from your own 20-yard line, as opposed to your own 35, is significantly different), and kickers are often the highest scoring players on a team. So there is certainly merit in investigating these metrics, it just wasn’t part of this particular assessment.

Tying It All Together

As noted in the introduction, football hasn’t fundamentally changed. Teams successful at the highest level excel in fundamentals, protect the ball and generate turnovers, play all-around good defense, and run the ball well. There is certainly luck involved, particularly in a 14-plus game season, but the data shows that following this blueprint is the highest probability method for winning a title.

Intuitively, this makes sense.

Solid fundamentals lead to good blocking and tackling. Protecting the ball and generating turnovers maximizes the number of possessions, and, thus, the number of scoring opportunities. Playing good defense limits opponents’ scoring opportunities and makes it “easier” to win. And running the football is a relatively simple, low-risk offensive strategy that comes with several ancillary benefits.

Teams that are efficient and productive on the ground routinely perform well on third down and wield an efficient passing attack. The former is helped by good rushing gains on early downs that result in manageable distances on third down. The latter is a common byproduct of forcing opponents to respect the run, utilizing play-action, and maintaining favorable down and distance situations that enable an equal run/pass threat. A four yard rushing gain on 1st-and-10 is overwhelmingly preferred to an incomplete pass as the nearly equal threat of running and passing on 2nd-and-6 keeps an opposing defense off-balance while the likelihood of running the ball on 2nd-and-10 is much lower.

In fact, out of the last 10 champions the two most prolific rushing offenses—Texas in 2005 and Florida in 2008—were also the most efficient passing teams. So while wide-open, pass-heavy offenses may excite fans and fills stadiums, it isn’t the preferred modus operandi of title teams.

But, compared to the defensive performances, the offenses take a back seat. While a top 30 offense is the common denominator of the last 10 BCS champions, a top 10 unit is needed on the other side of the ball. None of the offensive metric ranking cutoffs are inside the top 10 (average of just over 27), but half of the defensive ranking cutoffs are (average ranking of 16.7). Moreover, the losers of the title games almost always fielded more prolific offenses but less stout defenses. It appears the age-old mantra “defense wins championships” is as true today as it has always has been.

Admittedly, some of the conclusions outlined here may be obvious—i.e. a team can’t turn the ball over frequently and expect to win a lot of games—but others certainly aren’t. It isn’t necessarily intuitive that protecting the passer and being able to generate pressure on opposing quarterbacks isn’t a common element of modern championship teams, particularly given the number of prolific, spread passing offenses.

These results ultimately lead to a question: Can a team win a title without performing at the levels outlined above? Yes, without one or two. But for teams that do not align with the majority of the items in this blueprint, winning the BCS national championship is certainly not a high-probability proposition.

Up next, benchmarking Notre Dame to the blueprint, what has been missing and needs improvement, and how does new head coach Brian Kelly’s philosophy align with these shortfalls.

Similar Posts:

• Blueprint for BCS Championship Success III: Defensive Results
• Blueprint for BCS Championship Success II: Offensive Results
• Blueprint for BCS Championship Success I: Introduction and Approach

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

What is the defensive recipe for winning the BCS national championship? The aforementioned approach has been used to parse the data and identify the statistical metrics common to BCS champions. Staying consistent with the offensive results, these metrics have been divided into three categories (total, rushing and passing), and the data is presented in tabular form.

Each table includes the metric value (e.g. points allowed per game) and the corresponding national rank for the last 10 BCS champions. The last two rows indicate the established metric ranking and value cutoffs and the number of teams above (for ranking) and below (for value) these cutoffs.

The investigated metrics for each category are listed above each table and those found to be common and/or important characteristics of a BCS national championship caliber defense are italicized. Below each table is a brief discussion detailing pertinent characteristics and strong trends of the data. Where noted, data from all 20 BCS title game participants (winners and losers) has been incorporated.

The intent here is merely to present the results. The conclusions and implications of the data will be discussed in the fourth installment (Outlining the Blueprint).

Total

Metrics investigated:

• Third down efficiency
• Red zone efficiency
• Red zone touchdown efficiency
• Yards per play (YPP)
• Yards per game (YPG)
  
• Points per game (PPG)

Blueprint Total Defense Value And Ranking Data

Third Down Efficiency

Similar to the offensive results, ranking data was not readily available for third down efficiency in 2000-2004 and the value of Oklahoma’s 2000 defensive unit could not be found.

But the available numbers show a strong trend. Of the five teams with available ranking data, all fall in the top 30 and two posted top 10 rankings. Additionally, seven teams held opposing offenses to a third down conversion rate of 33 percent or less, and none of the nine defensive units allowed more than a 35.6 percent third down conversion rate. As a group, the nine defenses allowed an average third down conversion rate of 31.3 percent. Including all 20 participants, 14 teams generated a third down efficiency of 35 percent or lower.

Yards Per Play (YPP)

Nine teams posted top 10 rankings as only the 2002 Buckeyes fell outside the top 10 and allowed more than 4.5 yards per play. The 10 squads averaged 4.3 YPP, a number that doesn’t change when the losing teams are also considered. Additionally, 16 of the 20 participants allowed 4.6 YPP or less and 15 ranked in the top 10.

Yards Per Game (YPG)

Similar to YPP, nine teams posted top 10 rankings in yards per game. Again, the 2002 Buckeyes fall outside the 10th-ranked cutoff value and are the only defense that allowed more than 303 YPG. On average, the 10 defenses allowed 277.9 YPG with Alabama’s 2009 squad leading the pack at just over 244 YPG, good for 2nd in the country. Including the losers, 17 teams allowed 303 or fewer YPG and ranked 13th or better in this category.

Points Per Game  (PPG)

Same story, third verse. One team—LSU in 2007—ranked outside the top 10 as nine teams posted rankings of 8th or better and allowed fewer than 16.5 PPG, and seven teams were under 13.6 PPG. The average per game point production of the 10 teams is just under two touchdowns per game (13.7 PPG). Using all 20 data points, 16 teams allowed 16.8 PPG or less and ranked in the top 12 in this metric.

Rushing

Metrics investigated:

• Yards per attempt (YPA)
• Yards per game (YPG)
  
• Touchdowns

Blueprint Rushing Defense Value And Ranking Data

Yards Per Attempt (YPA)

Nine teams ranked 25th or better in yards per attempt and eight ranked 20th or better. The 10 teams allowed a paltry average of three YPA and an average ranking of 14.5 as nine teams held opposing rushers to 3.4 YPA or less. Including all 20 participants does not change the average as 19 teams allowed 3.8 YPA or less and 17 ranked in the top 30 in this category.

Yards Per Game (YPG)

The 10 teams allowed an average of 95.8 yards per game (average ranking of 13.7) in this category and include a 1st place ranking by the 2004 Trojans and a group-low 67 YPG by the 2003 Tigers. Additionally, eight teams allowed fewer than 110 YPG and ranked 23rd or better. Including the losing squads, 16 teams allowed fewer than 117 YPG and ranked 23rd or higher.

Touchdowns

Seven teams ranked in the top 10 in rushing touchdowns allowed, eight ranked in the top 25, and nine ranked in the top 30 including three first place finishes (2002 Buckeyes, 2003 Tigers, and 2009 Crimson Tide). As a group, the 10 teams allowed an average of 8.6 rushing touchdowns per year and a ranking of 12.3 as no team surrendered more than 15 touchdowns on the ground. Those on the losing side of the equation fared differently as only four losing squads allowed nine or fewer touchdowns and only three ranked in the top 10.

Passing

Metrics investigated:

• Yards per attempt (YPA)
• Yards per completion (YPC)
• Yards per game (YPG)
  
• Touchdowns
• Completion percentage
• Sacks
• Attempts/sack, normalized to account for differences in pass attempts
• Pass efficiency

Blueprint Passing Defense Value And Ranking Data

Yards Per Attempt (YPA)

All but one team—Ohio State in 2002—ranked in the top 10 as nine squads posted rankings of 9th or better and allowed 5.7 yards per attempt or less. As a group, the last 10 BCS champions allowed an average of 5.5 YPA (average ranking of seven). Including the losing defensive units, 16 teams allowed 5.7 YPA or less and ranked 9th or better.

Yards Per Completion (YPC)

Eight teams posted a ranking of 27th or better and allowed 11.8 yards per completion or less as the 10 defenses surrendered an average of 11 YPC for an average ranking of 21.7. Additionally, six teams allowed fewer than 11 YPC and five ranked in the top 10 in this metric. Finally, 17 of the participants allowed 12 or fewer YPC and 15 ranked 27th or better.

Yards Per Game (YPG)

Only the 2002 Buckeyes performed poorly in this category, allowing over 240 YPG and ranking 95th in the country. As a group, the defenses allowed an average of 182 passing yards per game and a ranking of just under 24 as nine teams allowed fewer than 200 YPG and ranked 34th or better. The losing defensive units aren’t appreciably different averaging 183.8 YPG and a 32nd ranking as 17 of the 20 participants allowed fewer than 205 YPG and 15 ranked in the top 35.

Touchdowns

Eight teams ranked 16th or better allowing touchdowns through the air and nine performed well enough to garner at least a 27th place ranking including the 2001 Hurricanes who allowed only five passing scores. Nine teams also allowed 14 or fewer touchdowns and four units allowed 10 or fewer touchdowns. On average, the 10 teams allowed 11.5 touchdowns per year and ranked in the top 16. Adding the losing teams, 17 allowed 15 or fewer touchdowns and 16 ranked in the top 30 in this metric.

Completion Percentage

On average, the defenses allowed opposing passers to complete only about half of their passes, a level of performance good enough to generate an average ranking slightly better than 18. Nine of the championship teams allowed less than a 54 percent completion rate and ranked 19th or better and 17 of the 20 participants allowed less than 56 percent completion rate and ranked 33rd or better.

Pass Efficiency

Nine teams ranked in the top 10 with pass efficiency ratings of less than 102 as the 10 defenses averaged a pass efficiency of 94.6 and a ranking of 6.2—the highest average ranking value of any defensive category with the exception of points per game. The 2001 Hurricanes led the way once again, posting a gaudy, 1st place pass efficiency of 75.6. Including the losers, 16 teams generated pass efficiency ratings of 105 or better and ranked in the top 10.

Next up, summarizing the offensive and defensive results, conclusions, and defining the blueprint.

Similar Posts:

• Blueprint for BCS Championship Success II: Offensive Results
• Blueprint for BCS Championship Success I: Introduction and Approach
• Blueprint for BCS Championship Success IV: Outlining the Blueprint

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

Offensively, what does it take to win the BCS national championship? The data below outlines the statistical metrics that answer this question via the approach described in the opening segment. The metrics have been divided into four categories (miscellaneous, total, rushing and passing) and the data is presented in tabular form.

Each table includes the metric value (e.g. yards per rush attempt) and the corresponding national rank for each of the last 10 BCS championship teams. The last two rows indicate the established metric ranking and value cutoffs as well as the number of teams above these cutoffs.

Above each table, all of the investigated metrics in each category are listed. As noted in the first installment, those found to be common and/or important characteristics of a BCS national championship caliber offense are italicized. Below each table is a brief discussion detailing pertinent characteristics and strong trends of the data. Where noted, data from all 20 BCS title game participants (winners and losers) has been incorporated.

The intent of this segment is merely to present the results and make note of strong trends. The conclusions and implications of these results will be discussed in the fourth segment (Outlining the Blueprint).

Miscellaneous

Admittedly, turnover margin is a team—not an offensive—metric. The choice was made to place it here with the offense as opposed to with the defensive results.

Metrics investigated:

• Time of possession
• Penalties
• Turnover margin

Blueprint Miscellaneous Value And Ranking Data

The average turnover margin is 14.2 with an average ranking of 13.9. No team had a turnover margin less than five, eight teams exceeded a value of six, and six generated turnover margins of 13 or better. Nine teams ranked inside the top 30, six ranked 16th or better, and five ranked 5th or better including first place rankings by USC in 2004 and Miami in 2001. Adding the losing teams, 75 percent of BCS title game participants ranked 29th or better and 70 percent had a turnover margin of five or more.

Total

Metrics investigated:

• Third down efficiency
• Red zone efficiency
• Red zone touchdown efficiency
• Yards per play (YPP)
• Yards per game (YPG)
  
• Points per game (PPG)

Blueprint Total Offense Value And Ranking Data

Third Down Efficiency

Ranking data was not readily available for third down efficiency in 2000-2004 and the value of Oklahoma’s 2000 offense could not be found.

The remaining data, however, shows a strong correlation. Of the five available third down efficiency rankings, four were 21st or better and seven posted a rating of 43.2 percent or higher. Additionally, the average third down efficiency of the nine teams listed is 44.5 percent, a value good for an average ranking of 23 in 2005-2009. Including all 20 squads increases the average third down efficiency to 45.9 percent as 16 teams converted third downs at a rate of 42.6 percent or higher.

Yards Per Play (YPP)

The last 10 BCS champions averaged 6.3 yards per play, good for an average ranking of 15.4. Two squads—Texas in 2005 and Florida in 2008—averaged a gaudy 7.1 YPP, nine gained 5.8 or more YPP, and seven averaged six-plus YPP.  All 10 teams ranked 31st or better in this metric, nine ranked 28th or better, and six posted a ranking of 12th or higher. Adding in the losers, 18 teams averaged at least 5.8 YPP and all but one (Texas last season) ranked 33rd or higher.

Yards Per Game (YPG)

The 10 teams averaged just over 430 yards per game, a value that increases to more than 450 when the losing squads are included. Only two teams—the 2002 Buckeyes and 2009 Crimson Tide—ranked outside the top 31 and averaged fewer than 403 YPG. Excluding these two teams, the remaining eight BCS champions averaged 443 YPG, good for a mean ranking of 16.5. Using data from all 20 participants, 17 teams ranked 31st or better and 18 gained more than 393 YPG.

Points Per Game (PPG)

The average per game point output was 37.8. No team averaged fewer than 29 PPG, three (Miami in 2001, Texas in 2005, and Florida in 2008) posted scoring totals of 40 PPG or more, and eight averaged more than 32 points per outing. Five ranked 7th or better and nine ranked 23rd or better. Including all 20 participants the mean PPG mark is 39.1 as all 20 teams averaged better than 29 PPG and 18 eclipsed a scoring rate of 31 PPG. Additionally, 18 of the past 20 BCS championship game participants ranked 23rd or higher.

Rushing

Metrics investigated:

• Attempts
• Yards per attempt (YPA)
• Yards per game (YPG)
  
• Touchdowns

Blueprint Rushing Offense Value And Ranking Data

Attempts

None of the previous 10 BCS winners attempted fewer than 410 rushes as the 10 teams averaged 538.6 rush attempts per season, a mark lowered about five percent by two outliers—the 2000 Sooners and 2001 Hurricanes. The average increases to 569.3 excluding these two teams as the remaining eight teams ran the ball 476 or more times and ranked 34th or higher in rush attempts. Including losing teams, 16 ranked 34th or higher in rush attempts and 18 posted 455 or more rush attempts.

Yards Per Attempt (YPA)

The 10 squads averaged just under five yards per attempt and just over a 20th ranking as only one team—Oklahoma in 2000—gained under 4.3 YPA. Additionally, five squads (the 2001 Hurricanes, 2005 Longhorns, 2008 Gators, and 2009 Crimson Tide) posted averages in excess of five YPA and eight teams ranked 32nd or better. Of all 20 participants, 16 met or exceeded a 33rd ranking and 17 gained at least 4.3 YPA.

Yards Per Game (YPG)

The 2005 Longhorns led the way in ground production gaining almost 275 yards per game and ranking 2nd in the country and five (the 2001 Hurricanes, the aforementioned Longhorns, LSU in 2007, Florida in 2008, and Alabama last season) posted marks in excess of 200 YPG. As a whole, the 10 champions averaged just under 200 YPG and just over a ranking of 25 as eight teams rushed for at least 177 YPG and ranked 33rd or better. Adding in the losing squads, 16 teams averaged 165 YPG or higher and a ranking of 33rd or better.

Touchdowns

No team rushed for fewer than 24 touchdowns and nine teams ranked 21st or higher. The 10 squads averaged 32.6 rushing touchdowns per season and slightly better than a 14th ranking. Again, the 2005 Longhorns led the pack this time with 55 rushing scores, good for 1st in the country. The losing teams weren’t decidedly different, averaging the same number of rushing touchdowns per season (32.6) and a slightly lower average ranking of 17.4. Of the 20 participants, 18 ranked 32nd or better in rushing touchdowns and no team rushed for fewer than 21 scores.

Passing

Metrics investigated:

• Attempts
• Yards per attempt (YPA)
• Yards per completion (YPC)
• Yards per game (YPG)
  
• Touchdowns
• Completion percentage
• Sacks allowed
• Attempts/sack allowed, normalized to account for differences in pass attempts
• Pass efficiency

Blueprint Passing Offense Value And Ranking Data

Yards Per Attempt (YPA)

The 10 squads averaged 8.2 yards per pass attempt (average ranking just under 18) including two teams—Texas in 2005 and Florida in 2008—that exceeded nine YPA. Eight teams gained at least 7.9 YPA and ranked 24th or better. Including the losers, 17 teams gained more than 7.7 YPA and ranked 24th or higher in the category.

Touchdowns

Only two teams—Ohio State in 2002 and Alabama last year—threw for fewer than 22 passing touchdowns on their way to the title as the 10 teams averaged 25.8 passing touchdowns per year, good for an average ranking of just under 27. Additionally, eight teams ranked 21st or higher. Including all 20 squads, 17 teams scored 22 or more times through the air and 16 ranked 21st or better.

Completion Percentage

Half of the past 10 BCS champions ranked in the top 10 in completion percentage as the teams averaged a 62.4 percent completion rate and a ranking of 21.2 with only Miami in 2001 and LSU in 2007 posting a mark lower than 60 percent. Additionally, eight winners and eight losers ranked 30th or better and posted completion ratings of at least 61.3 percent.

Pass Efficiency

Eight teams ranked 15th or better in pass efficiency including two—Texas in 2005 and Florida in 2008—that posted a top five mark. The average pass efficiency was nearly 149 (average ranking of 14.5) as nine teams exceeded a rating of 138.5. Out of all 20 squads, 18 generated pass efficiency ratings of 138.4 or better and 16 ranked in the top 15.

Up next, defensive results of the analysis including pertinent data trends.

Similar Posts:

• Blueprint for BCS Championship Success III: Defensive Results
• Blueprint for BCS Championship Success IV: Outlining the Blueprint
• Blueprint for BCS Championship Success I: Introduction and Approach

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

Despite these changes, football isn’t fundamentally different. The BCS may be a new era and offensive and defensive schemes may appear radically different from just 20 years ago, but the team characteristics critical to success are essentially the same. Football is about running, blocking and tackling—teams that display strong fundamentals in these areas execute well, excel on the field, and win championships.

But, apart from solid fundamentals, what are the characteristics of a national championship team? Is yardage output or being able to pressure opposing quarterbacks crucial to success? And, if they are, what yardage total and how many sacks are needed to win a BCS title?

In more general terms, what are the common statistical metrics of a BCS champion, and what are the rankings and values of these metrics above which championship teams perform? Furthermore, what was missing from recent Irish squads and why have they not competed at a national championship level for so long?

Laying the Groundwork

This is the first of a five-part installment dedicated to answering these two questions. The first is addressed via an analysis that creates a blueprint for BCS championship success by identifying the common and/or important characteristics of previous champions. The second is answered by measuring the Irish against this standard. An outline of the five articles is as follows:

1. Introduction And Approach—framing the problem and outlining the analysis approach
2. Offensive Results—offensive results of the analysis including pertinent data trends
3. Defensive Results—defensive results of the analysis including pertinent data trends
4. Outlining The Blueprint—summarizing the offensive and defensive results, conclusions, and defining the blueprint
5. Measuring The Irish—benchmarking Notre Dame to the blueprint, what has been missing and needs improvement, and how does new head Coach Brian Kelly’s philosophy align with these shortfalls

Analysis Approach: Creating the Blueprint

Here, the statistical metrics of the last 10 BCS national champions (2000-2009) have been used. These 10 teams were selected for two reasons. One, finding data prior to 2000 is very challenging, if not impossible. Value and ranking data wasn’t even available for all investigated metrics over the last 10 years. Second, 10 years of championship team data in the BCS era is considered a large enough sample to evaluate the common characteristics of a modern college football champion. In some cases, however, all 20 teams were used to corroborate the importance of a particular metric and/or to distinguish between characteristics of the BCS title game winners and losers.

The metrics investigated in this assessment are listed below. Those in italics were found to be common and/or important characteristics of  a BCS championship team,  will be presented in detail in the offensive and defensive results segments, and are included in the blueprint. The remaining metrics either weren’t crucial components of a championship caliber team or didn’t have enough data to draw a definitive conclusion (more on this in the fourth installment).

Miscellaneous

• Time of possession
• Penalties
• Turnover margin

Offense/Defense

Total

• Third down efficiency
• Red zone efficiency
• Red zone touchdown efficiency
• Yards per play (YPP)
• Yards per game (YPG)
  
• Points per game (PPG)
  

Rushing

• Attempts (only for offense)
• Yards per attempt (YPA)
• Yards per game (YPG)
  
• Touchdowns

Passing

• Attempts (only for offense)
• Yards per attempt (YPA)
• Yards per completion (YPC)
• Yards per game (YPG)
  
• Touchdowns
• Completion percentage
• Sacks allowed (offense) and sacks (defense)
• Attempts/sack allowed (offense) and  attempts/sack (defense), normalized to account for differences in pass attempts
• Pass efficiency

For each of these metrics, a two-fold analysis approach was employed.

First, a metric ranking cutoff was targeted above or below which the majority of teams (usually seven or more, or 70-plus percent) ranked. The upper limit of this ranking cutoff was approximately 30, i.e. a ranking corresponding to roughly the top 25 percent of Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) teams. On occasion this limit was slightly exceeded to capture seven or more teams.

If the majority of teams were above the metric ranking, it was considered a common metric, important to winning the national championship, and included in the blueprint. If a ranking cutoff in the 25th percentile could not be established, i.e. the majority of teams fell outside the cutoff ranking, it was not considered requisite to winning the title. Additionally, metric rankings spread over a large range with no discernible cutoff were excluded and not considered part of the blueprint.

Second, a metric value cutoff was targeted that captured the same number of teams as the metric ranking cutoff. This process was somewhat arbitrary as a metric value may produce a ranking of X in one year but a ranking of X +/- Y in another. The 2004 Trojans averaged 4.7 yards per carry, good for 23rd in the country. But Florida also averaged 4.7 yards per rush attempt in 2006 and posted a ranking two spots better (21). In most cases (including this example) the disparity in year-to-year ranking for a particular metric value was small.

Essentially, the goal of this two-faceted assessment was to incrementally increase the metric ranking and value cutoffs to capture as many teams as possible without overextending or going too far beyond the 25th percentile. For example, if a ranking cutoff of 12 captured seven teams and a cutoff ranking of 14 captured nine, 14 was used. But if a ranking cutoff of 16 captured nine teams and a ranking cutoff of 27 captured 10, 16 was used. In other words, increasing the ranking cutoff by 11 was not considered worth the inclusion of a single additional team.

First Impression(s) Can Be Deceiving

A quick glance at the relatively common statistics—e.g. yards per game, yards per play, and points per game—seems to indicate that championship caliber teams do everything well. And, to a certain extent, this is true. With perhaps one exception, no BCS championship team in recent memory had a serious weakness that repeatedly showed up in the box score.

But digging deeper reveals a different conclusion, provides insight into the makeup of the past 10 champions, and gives context to how these teams approached the game. As the analysis will show, certain aspects of team performance are far more important than others, and some are not critical at all.

Up next, offensive results of the analysis including pertinent data trends.

Similar Posts:

• Blueprint for BCS Championship Success III: Defensive Results
• Blueprint for BCS Championship Success II: Offensive Results
• Blueprint for BCS Championship Success IV: Outlining the Blueprint

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

In conjunction with this release, Clashmore Mike sat down for a Q&A with almanac author Brian Fremeau. Among the topics discussed: improvements in this year’s almanac, potential breakout teams in 2010, and the critical pieces needed for a successful season in head coach Brian Kelly’s first year.

Brian has been published at ESPN.com, FootballOutsiders.com, and in the Maple Street Press college football publications—including this year’s edition of Here Come The Irish where he details the tempo of Kelly’s spread offense. He is also the creator of the Fremeau Efficiency Index (FEI), a drive-based efficiency metric seven years in the making.

Introduction in hand, let’s proceed to the questions…

This is the third year of the College Football Outsiders Almanac and the second in which you’ve contributed. What was the impetus behind it, how has it evolved, and what is new and improved in the 2010 edition?

We have been developing ratings and college football statistics at Football Outsiders for several years. Most of that work has been focused on retroactive analysis to better understand and evaluate team success in the rearview mirror. When we discovered that there was a stronger year-to-year correlation of our opponent-adjusted data than we had originally hypothesized, we developed a projection model for the annual almanac.

The basis for the projection model is a five-year program success rating, adjusted with transition factors for the upcoming season. We collected and tested more data than ever before to create this year’s projection model—returning starters, recruiting ratings, talent lost to the draft, unsustainable success (e.g. high fumble recovery or outlier production on passing downs), and more.

In addition to making the projection model more robust, we’re debuting new “win likelihood” tables that detail the probability of any given record for every team. We think these tables demonstrate the relationship between projected team strength, schedule strength and record in a more comprehensive way.

College Football Outsiders specializes in non-traditional, but incredibly insightful, college football statistics and metrics. What are some of the most recent developments and improvements and how do they differ from previous versions?

The most noteworthy new development is our F/+ metric, a combination of two entirely separate rating systems. My system (FEI) is based on drive analysis, the success of a team maximizing its own possessions and minimizing those of its opponent. My colleague, Bill Connelly, works with play-by-play data, combining a measure of efficiency and explosiveness in his S&P+ rating system.

Both systems collect raw data and adjust for opponent strength. Both systems discount garbage time plays and possessions. But both systems are independently produced, make opponent adjustments in unique ways, and sometimes produce very different results. We created the F/+ metric as a way to arrive at a consensus between our two approaches, and discovered this off-season that F/+ had a stronger correlation to next year success than either of our independent rating systems. We will continue to produce FEI and S&P+ ratings and analysis this fall, but we’ll be featuring F/+ data in a more prominent way during the season as well.

Based on the 2010 predictions detailed in the almanac, what teams are poised to have breakout seasons and why?

Interesting question. To be perfectly honest, our system doesn’t typically identify any “breakout” teams. Since five-year success is the starting point, F/+ isn’t inclined to identify too many programs coming out of nowhere. Instead, we’re likely to project more modest expectations for other teams’ supposed “breakout” hype. Nebraska is an example of a team receiving plenty of top-10 preseason attention, and our system thinks they’ll be good, but not great, and certainly not elite. The Cornhuskers aren’t likely to be quite as strong defensively this year without Suh, and their offense was a liability for most of 2009.

Some of our projections are surprising, certainly. Despite major personnel losses, we think Alabama and Florida will still control the SEC and remain national title contenders. We think TCU is a better pick for a non-AQ run at the national championship game than Boise State. Tennessee is the biggest surprise in our projected top-25 (unfortunately, we don’t have a metric to account for bar brawl stupidity), though due to a brutal schedule, we are more conservative with our projected record for the Volunteers than their ranking might imply.

On to the Irish-specific questions. What two or three opponents project to give Notre Dame the toughest test in 2010 and why?

Our projection model forecasts three teams on Notre Dame’s schedule with a higher preseason F/+ rating than the Irish: USC, Pittsburgh and Boston College. But that doesn’t mean we expect the Irish to lose those games and win the other nine. Instead, we produce game-by-game win probabilities for the whole schedule, and those are used to project our overall win probabilities for the season.

USC and Boston College stand out as the toughest tests for Notre Dame according to our model. For starters, both are road games, which can account for up to a 20 percent difference in win likelihood per game than if the games were played at home. We expect both the Trojans and Eagles to boast top-20 defenses that ought to be tough against the run, an area that remains a question mark in Notre Dame’s offensive future under Kelly. We anticipate near toss-ups against Michigan State and Pittsburgh; the Panthers are our top-rated Big East team and figure to have another strong running game that can possibly control and disrupt the Irish tempo, and the Spartans return a decent core from last year.

Notre Dame is projected to be favored against the rest, but is likely to win only three of four against Utah, Stanford, Navy and Michigan. It all adds up to a “mean wins” projection of 8-4.

What will potentially limit success and what assets do the Irish have that are critical components to winning those eight games? Are there any fundamental problems (e.g. tackling on defense) that can be easily corrected by a new coaching staff and quickly produce a positive change in performance?

Offensively, the Irish appear poised to keep rolling—if not quite at the level of last season, then close to it. Obviously Kelly’s track record at Cincinnati suggests he is capable creating an offensive juggernaut, and there are athletes all over the field that can fill the void left by quarterback Jimmy Clausen and wide receiver Golden Tate. One red flag from last year’s Bearcats team that I’ll be watching closely with Notre Dame was their boom-or-bust tendency—their three-and-out rate was abnormally high for an elite offense. If Dayne Crist can move the chains on that first series of nearly every drive, they’ll be in great shape.

The defense was so out of sync last season, its hard not to expect at least some natural improvement this year. The recruited talent is maturing, and Kelly appears to have the entire staff on the same page, unlike his predecessor. Our college data doesn’t identify specifics like tackling fundamentals and their impact on defensive ratings, but there’s plenty of anecdotal evidence to suggest that a new staff with a renewed focus on such details can right that ship. But actually, we’ll be launching a new college football game-charting project at Football Outsiders this fall that will help us collect better data to evaluate more detailed observations of every play.

Clashmore Mike would like to thank Brian for taking the time to entertain our whims. Those interested in picking up a copy of the Football Outsiders Almanac 2010 can go here for all the ordering details. If you wish to purchase only the college portion and study up on the NCAA football odds for all FBS teams, it is available here for a reduced rate.

Similar Posts:

• A Theory on College Football Performance: Part 1 – The Players
• 2008 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Eight
• Blueprint for BCS Championship Success I: Introduction and Approach

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

For the fourth time (excluding George O’Leary) since 1997, Notre Dame welcomes a new head coach. Brian Kelly has had success at each of his previous stops, and brings something absent from two of the previous three hires—college football head coaching experience. The Irish offense will morph from former head coach Charlie Weis’ pro-style attack to Kelly’s spread-based scheme, and Notre Dame’s defense will shift from Jon Tenuta’s aggressive 4-3 to new defensive coordinator Bob Diaco’s no-crease 3-4. This transition will mark the fourth different defense and defensive coordinator since 2006.

Offensively, plenty of talent returns at the receiver position, as well as talent and experience at tight end and in the backfield. But the unit must break in at least two new offensive linemen and quarterback Dayne Crist has little game experience. Additionally, the Irish must replace the production of two of the most dynamic players in recent memory—quarterback Jimmy Clausen and wide receiver Golden Tate—who accounted for over 70 percent of the yardage and scoring production in 2009. The defense has an athletic and experienced front seven and good talent in the first line of the secondary, but lacks depth at most positions.

Despite the coaching staff turnover, changes to the offensive and defensive schemes, and potential personnel concerns, many have high expectations for 2010. The uncertainty surrounding the program isn’t enough to offset the remaining talent from Weis’ recruiting efforts and a favorable slate of opponents. The Irish will play seven home games and only three true road contests, and does not face an opponent without question marks on both sides of the ball. Additionally, the usual juggernauts—Michigan and USC—appear poised for weaker-than-usual years, the bye week is conveniently placed in the middle of the season, and lower tier opponents Army, Western Michigan and Tulsa are peppered throughout the second half of the schedule.

But there was similar uncertainty and a seemingly weak schedule entering the 2009 season when the pre-season predictions were suprisingly bullish. The average pre-season vote in 2009 predicted a 9-3 regular season record with the optimists forecasting 11 or more victories. As it turns out, the pessimistic prediction of six wins was right all along.

With that caveat in hand, please indicate your percent confidence in an Irish victory for each opponent. Those who subscribe via e-mail or RSS, or are reading this elsewhere, are encouraged to visit the linked article in the title and cast your vote. The poll will remain open for about week and the results will be posted before the season begins.

Note: There is a poll embedded within this post, please visit the site to participate in this post's poll.

Similar Posts:

• 2009 Season Predictions Survey
• 2008 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Eight
• 2010 Season Predictions Survey Results

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.