Some question the lack of a consistent, power running element while others worry about ball control. There are also concerns about the how a spread passing scheme will fare against good defensive competition and Kelly’s ability to fill the roster with elite talent at the skill positions.

Former head coach Charlie Weis’ recruiting record should be enough evidence to negate the last of these concerns, but the others may be valid. There are certainly negatives that come with Kelly’s offense, but many successful teams like Utah, Boise State, Texas, Oklahoma and Florida run versions of the spread, and excel doing it.

So what is a spread offense and how does Kelly’s particular brand work? Furthermore, what is the fundamental problem with his approach and is it compatible at Notre Dame?

What Is Kelly’s Spread Offense and How Does It Work?

At a fundamental level, the intent of a spread offense is to stretch the field horizontally with multiple wide receivers. This effectively accomplishes two goals. First, it makes crisp tackling in open space a commodity. And second, it forces defensive coordinators to use smaller, quicker personnel, and to empty the box in order to matchup on the outside. The result is an advantage for the offense on the interior. Defenses can’t overload the box and the offense has one-on-one blocking opportunities in the running game and in pass protection.

The guys over at NDNation asked Chris Brown of Smart Football to summarize Kelly’s flavor of the spread. True to form, Chris penned a solid synopsis. He makes some excellent points and the entire read is worth the time, but a few highlights are noted here with some additions of my own below.

• Kelly’s offense is a “traditional” spread that, for the most part, maintains balance and doesn’t tilt too much towards the run (e.g. Michigan) or pass (e.g. Texas Tech).
• The run game is simple, particularly without a running quarterback. There is a lot of zone blocking and Kelly’s approach is based on space and angles rather than power, but he does make frequent use of a lead blocker. Mostly, he utilizes inside and outside zone running plays, counters, and some power runs.
• The concepts in the passing game are almost equally simple. Kelly prefers a vertical stem route tree aimed at getting upfield while giving the same initial post-snap motion. This accomplishes his goal of being aggressive, but also detracts from the ability of opposing defenses to read routes as they all appear similar through the first several steps.
• Kelly also likes to use overloaded formations to isolate receivers on the backside. This generates favorable one-on-one matchups for players like wide receiver Michael Floyd or tight end Kyle Rudolph, or overloads the strongside of the field if the defense rolls the coverage to double the weakside receiver.

Some Additional Discussion Points…

Brown states that Kelly’s offense doesn’t make use of the fullback or tight end as much as Oklahoma or Texas, but that doesn’t mean he doesn’t use them at all. His running game often employs playside down-blocking and pulling linemen, tight ends, and/or H-backs that lead into the hole (counter and power plays). This is somewhat similar to the traditional counter-trey, albeit with much different personnel and run from spread formations.

Unlike Weis’ offense, in the future Irish signal callers won’t be tasked with an extremely high burden of execution. In Kelly’s scheme the quarterback position is primarily one of distribution. The offense uses similar concepts to combat the blitz, e.g. hot routes and sight adjustments, but the implementation is simple and requires less precision. Moreover, most of the drops in Kelly’s offense are fairly short and facilitate a quick release.

This simplicity translates into a high level of execution. Kelly’s offense is explosive, but the goal isn’t always to go downfield. He wants to accomplish what spread concepts were invented to do (stretch the field horizontally, empty the box and generate good one-on-one blocking opportunities, force open field tackling, etc.), but he mostly does this using complementing looks and concepts, rather than trying to intentionally generate a big play. Additionally, he wants to put a lot of pressure on opposing defenses by operating at a high pace, getting as many snaps as possible, and wearing defenders down.

In this regard, there should more consistency than the Irish offense displayed the past three seasons. Weis relied heavily on the big play, both as a form of randomness and as a catalyst for production. And, as Brown notes, this is why his offense required elite, experienced talent to effectively operate, and why it would be explosive at times and practically dormant at others.

What’s the Fundamental Problem?

In Brown’s opinion, the biggest question mark is if the offense can win the matchups generated by spreading the field.

Talented teams like Oklahoma, Texas and Florida use a spread scheme because they can recruit an abundance of skill talent. They want to get as much of it as possible on the field, isolate defenders, and win the one-on-one battles. Few teams have two good corners, let alone the four or five needed to effectively matchup against a spread offense with good wide receiver depth.

But this comes with the assumption that there is a threat to run and that offensive line can protect the passer, often times with little or no help. As recent Irish fans can attest, this isn’t always the case.

Last year the Irish had plenty of skill talent capable of winning one-on-one matchups (Floyd, Rudolph and wide receiver Golden Tate to name a few), but the offense frequently stalled due to the inability to keep opponents off-balance with the run and protect the quarterback with five and six players.

In other words, spread offenses are controlled by defenses that are able to contain the run and get pressure with four, drop seven, and play physical, press coverage on the outside.

The pressure from the front four allows the defense to drop multiple defenders and minimize passing lanes. The press play on the outside disrupts route running, frustrates timing between the quarterback and his receivers, and forces the passer to hold onto the ball. And the combination of the two allows aggressive outside secondary play with help over the top to prevent downfield throws.

If the offensive line can’t provide extra time for the quarterback, the passing game struggles. Alternatively, without a solid run presence to take advantage of the even numbers in the box, the defense isn’t required to adjust, commit more defenders to stopping the run, and open up the outside.

For most defenses, this is not an easy proposition.

But against USC the Trojan front four dominated the trenches, and the Irish struggled. Quarterback Jimmy Clausen was frequently pressured and the Irish had a razor-thin margin for error. The offense was productive at times, but largely inconsistent.

Likewise, Kelly’s offense was dismantled in the Sugar Bowl against Florida. Quarterback Tony Pike rarely had time to throw as the Gator defensive line consistently applied pressure. The corners played aggressive, tight coverage on the outside, and, without solid rushing production, the linebackers were able to flex and run free. There was obviously a huge talent gap at work as well, but (at least for the Bearcat offense) it was most evident in the line play.

Will It Work at Notre Dame?

There’s really no way to know.

Kelly’s offense has been successful everywhere he’s been and provided he recruits well he will have more talent at Notre Dame than any of his previous stops. This should help with the athleticism mismatches evident in the Sugar Bowl.

Additionally, Kelly’s approach differs from Weis’ style in that there is more focus on the running game, it is based on simplicity and execution rather than complexity and scheme, places less execution burden on the quarterback, and is less deliberate and predictable. All these things will certainly help.

But it still comes down to having balance and being able to protect with five—this is the crux of the problem.

The running game must be serviceable enough to force defenders into the box and prevent opposing defenses from keying on the pass and rushing the quarterback without restraint.

And the offensive line must be able to take advantage of the equal numbers in the box by winning the one-on-one battles. If opposing defenses are able to stop the run and consistently generate pressure with four or five defenders, Kelly’s unit will appear eerily similar to Weis’ squads of the past few years.

Similar Posts:

• They Call It Powder Blue, Irish vs. Tar Heels News and Notes
• What Does a Tenuta-Coached Irish Defense Look Like?
• Spring Football Focus Part I: Personnel Changes

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

But if there was an Achilles’ heel—and there was—it was red zone point production.

The Irish struggled inside the 20-yard line in 2009, but this is hardly a new trend for former head coach Charlie Weis’ offensive unit. The same was true last year, and the red zone touchdown efficiency in 2007 was a paltry 52 percent. Coupled with an anemic running game, the recurrence of this fundamental problem was a tough pill to swallow for many fans.

Weis and his offense will not be back in 2010, but many of the same offensive players will and improvement in the red zone is a must to take pressure off a new starting quarterback, particularly if Dayne Crist does not completely recover from his ACL injury. But was Weis’ offensive scheme and play-calling really to blame for the red zone woes? Furthermore, is new head coach Brian Kelly’s spread attack the answer?

Before these questions can be answered, the fundamental problems must be identified. What follows is an evaluation of the 2009 Irish red zone offense framed in the context of Weis’ offensive approach and subsequent production, including a brief summary of how Kelly’s offense addresses these issues.

Definitions and Disclaimers

Before diving into the analysis, a few definitions and disclaimers are necessary to establish the framework for this assessment.

• The personnel groupings referenced in the discussion below are grouped into two categories: “heavy” and “spread.” Heavy personnel groupings have two or fewer wide receivers and two or more players from the fullback and/or tight end positions. Spread personnel groupings have three or more wide receivers (with one exception). The two tables below outline the heavy and spread personnel packages and the guys over at Blue Gray Sky have a nice pictorial summary for a subset of them.

Heavy Personnel Groupings

Spread Personnel Groupings

• This analysis includes charting of the offensive plays from all 12 games in the 2009 season but does not include plays that were significantly influenced by situational characteristics. These are listed below and exclusion of this relatively small number of plays is not expected to significantly alter any conclusions.

1. Plays on which a penalty occurred—regardless of whether or not the penalty was on the Irish offense or accepted.
2. Plays which took place in an overtime period. All play-calling and production is influenced by situational characteristics (see below), but overtime periods occur under a very specific set of circumstances that are not replicated in regulatory quarters of play.
3. Plays that occurred in the “Victory ” formation, i.e. snaps where the quarterback simply takes a knee.

• As scrambles and sacks are called pass plays, they are counted as such. Lost or gained yardage is included in the passing totals, but completion percentage calculations are based only on plays in which a pass was attempted.
• An explosive—or big—gain is a running play that produces 15 or more yards or a pass play that gains 20 or more yards.
• Finally, there are three categories of down series and plays:

1. Outside the red zone refers to down series and plays that occurred beyond an opponent’s 20-yard line.
2. Inside the red zone refers to down series and plays that occurred inside an opponent’s 20-yard line, but excludes goal-to-go situations. Nota bene, these are not the same as those characterized as red zone down series and plays which include goal-to-go situations.
3. Goal-to-go refers to down series and plays that begin with first and goal, i.e. where a first down is not possible without scoring a touchdown.

Wherever possible, the data from the game charting was corroborated with that found at the Notre Dame football statistics homepage.

Irish Scoring Production

Scoring points in football can be expressed as a function of opportunity. Every possession is an opportunity to generate points and the odds of scoring are increased by gaining first downs in succession, extending drives, and moving closer to the goal line.

In other words, scoring is a considerably more facile—and potentially more lucrative—proposition from 10 yards than from 40. Not only does the probability of a successful field goal attempt increase at closer distances, far more touchdowns are scored on a short field than via long gains.

This is where the higher payoff comes into play. The probability of scoring six points, rather than three, increases closer to the goal line.

To this end, part of an offensive play-caller’s goal is to generate situations that maximize scoring potential, i.e. red zone and goal-to-go opportunities. Once this is accomplished, the odds of scoring a touchdown are greatly increased and all that remains (in theory) is execution.

The table below outlines the 2009 Irish scoring production (production from point after attempts are not included) broken into three categories: possession, red zone, and goal-to-go. The red zone numbers are a subset of the possession numbers, and the goal-to-go values are a subset of the other two. Logically, the points per opportunity should increase in the red zone and then again in goal-to-go situations.

Offensive Scoring Production

The Irish notched 20 scores—15 touchdowns and five field goals—from outside the red zone. These 15 touchdowns represent 36 percent of all touchdown scores and came via big pass plays as the Clausen and Tate-led air attack was extremely explosive.

As expected, the scoring percentages and per-point opportunity values significantly increased once the offense entered the red zone. Irish kickers did their part and were successful on 13 of 15 red zone field goal attempts. Additionally, the touchdown scoring rate increased by more than 83 percent once the Irish crossed the 20-yard line.

But in goal-to-go situations, the rate of scoring didn’t appreciably change. While all seven field goal attempts were successful, touchdowns were scored at the same rate on goal-to-go down series as in all red zone situations.

This represents missed opportunity. The touchdown efficiency in goal-to-go situations should certainly be higher than 56.5 percent, but the offense didn’t convert a large percentage of these high probability scoring opportunities into six points. Because of this, the overall red zone efficiency suffered.

Moreover, only half of the red zone appearances resulted in a goal-to-goal series and three of these resulted in zero points. The Irish turned the ball over on downs against Boston College and Navy, and fell short against USC as time expired (with an extra timeout and down no less). Additionally, one go-to-goal opportunity against Michigan State was squandered as a fumbled snap on third down led to a field goal.

What Was The Approach?

Why weren’t more points scored inside the red zone? And, in particular, why weren’t more touchdowns scored in goal-to-goal situations?

This is essentially a question of red zone touchdown efficiency. As noted above, red zone field goal kicking was efficient, but the touchdown efficiency was in the bottom half of the country and was the primary deficiency preventing a good offense from being great.

Understanding the offensive approach is the first step to an answer. While there are a host of ways to dissect play-calling, the focus of this discussion is a high-level investigation designed to uncover Weis’ play-calling intent and answer two primary questions.

First, how were runs and passes used to gain first downs and score. And second, what were the preferred personnel packages and alignments.

To answer these questions, three metrics will be used to characterize the play-calling approach:

1. Run/pass preference
2. Personnel preference, i.e. the use of heavy and spread personnel
3. Quarterback placement preference, i.e. the use of shotgun in the passing game

Run/Pass Tendencies

The charts below tackle the first category by illustrating the run/pass preference outside the red zone, inside the red zone, in goal-to-go situations, and as a whole (these four categories will be used for all subsequent charts).

As the charts indicate, the offense was pass-heavy in almost every category with a high of 60 percent outside the red zone. In contrast, the run was favored only in goal-to-go situations and comprised only 41 percent of total play calls.

The Use Of Heavy And Spread Personnel

Due to Weis’ penchant for creating player mismatches, the use of personnel groupings are often a strong indicator of his offensive approach. The charts below outline the use of personnel.

Under Kelly, the Irish won’t be changing to a spread offense as much as learning a new one.

As a whole, 64 percent of plays were executed from a spread personnel grouping with Half (3 WR, 1 TE, 1 RB) the overwhelmingly popular choice. Half was used 445 times during the 2009 season, good for nearly 85 percent of plays run from spread packages and 54.3 percent of all snaps.

The preference towards spreading the field was strongest outside the red zone where almost 70 percent of plays were executed from these packages. As the offense neared the goal line, this trend faded. Inside the red zone the split was virtually even, and in goal-to-go situations heavy personnel replaced spread groupings as the strong favorite.

Similar to the spread packages, one heavy grouping was strongly preferred as Weis used Detroit (2 WR, 2 TE, 1 RB) personnel on 26.5 percent of all snaps and 74.3 percent of all heavy packages.

Together, Half and Detroit accounted for 662 of 819 (80.8 percent) snaps and comprised the majority of the Irish offense. Integrating run/pass preference, the run was favored in Detroit (61.3 percent), while a pass was called on 70.8 percent of all plays run from Half (more on these integrated tendencies below). Even with these one-sided tendencies, the Irish still averaged 5.4 yards per carry in Detroit and 7.4 yards per pass attempt in Half.

Quarterback Placement

Clausen was in shotgun more than he was under center in 2009, but not by a large margin. Outside of the red zone Weis utilized the shotgun 54 percent of the time. Somewhat surprisingly, this increased to 57 percent inside the red zone before diving sharply to 34 percent in goal-to-go situations.

These percentages do, however, come with one caveat. The shotgun plays noted above include 35 snaps taken from the Wildcat formation. As these plays accounted for only five percent of all snaps, they were not excluded.

Putting It All Together

Personnel, quarterback placement, and run/pass tendencies are certainly of value, but more insight is gained from mixing the first two with the latter. The data above indicates strong trends in personnel use as well as the run/pass mix, but the chart below shows how the two were coupled.

The offense essentially moved form a spread passing attack outside of the red zone to a heavy, run-based approach in goal-to-go situations. Inside the red zone there was more balance, particularly in heavy packages, but spread personnel still strongly indicated a pass.

As a whole, 46 percent of all snaps were passes from spread personnel. In contrast, only 23 percent were runs executed from a heavy package. While the Irish were predictable, there is asymmetry to the trends, i.e. the personnel used in the running game was more balanced.

The charts below indicate sharper trends for quarterback placement.

The offense operated similarly outside and inside the red zone, but that doesn’t mean both weren’t predictable. In either situation shotgun formations were almost synonymous with a pass. There was more balance when Clausen was under center, but the run was still favored nearly two-to-one. Finally, goal-to-go situations were mostly runs from under center.

The data above indicates Weis preferred to place the quarterback under center and run with heavy personnel close to the goal line in lieu of the shotgun-based, spread passing attack utilized in the open field. In other words, inside the red zone—and especially in goal-to-go situations—the Irish offense looked nothing like it did beyond the 20-yard line.

Approach + Execution = Production

Does it really matter? Is there something fundamentally wrong with a spread passing team shifting to a more balanced, heavy-personnel offense in the red zone? The short answer is no, not if it is productive.

The table below shows the production in the running game outside and inside the red zone. The “Under center run %” and “Heavy run %” columns indicate the percentage of runs that occurred from under center and in heavy personnel groupings respectively.

As goal-to-go down series are entirely unique, production in these situations will be outlined later rather than directly compared to the numbers shown here.

Run Production

The numbers indicate, as the charts did above, that more and more runs occurred from under center and in heavy formations once the Irish crossed the 20-yard line.

Due to the increased predictability and shorter field, the per-carry average dips approximately 13 percent, but a decrease of this magnitude doesn’t suggest the running game to be entirely ineffective inside the red zone. Additionally, no rushing touchdowns were scored outside the red zone and only four came from non-goal-to-go situations.

A quick glance at the passing data paints a slightly different picture (the under center and heavy run percentage columns have been replaced by shotgun, spread and play-action pass percentages).

Pass Production

Again, the numbers show Weis called fewer pass plays from spread formations on a shorter field. Play-action, on the other hand, was used at a fairly even rate.

The sharpest trend in the data occurs in the efficiency categories (completion percentage and average per attempt), as both decrease significantly on a short field. Due to the lack of real estate, the latter is somewhat expected. But the completion percentage declines from an exceptional 69.9 percent outside the red zone, to a pedestrian 54.5 percent inside the red zone.

“Equivalent” Production Outside And Inside The Red Zone

The production outlined above indicates that the offense didn’t perform as well inside the red zone as outside it, but the comparison isn’t back-to-back.

As noted, production will often appear lower on a compressed field as players can’t reel off big plays to increase averages. Additionally, offenses routinely face different, more compact defense inside the 20-yard line.

This is especially true for the Irish. Explosive gains were a huge part of the offensive output in 2009 as big plays accounted for 40.3 percent of the total offense and increased the per-snap average by almost 53 percent. In particular, the pass production was a huge contributor to this trend. The Irish averaged 4.7 yards per attempt excluding big plays but 7.6 yards per attempt overall.

These influences make it much more appropriate to use similar situations and exclude big plays than to directly compare production outside and inside the red zone. To this end, the two tables below show “equivalent” production by comparing the same run and pass metrics as above, but without big gains and only including plays on first and 10. To a large extent, this effectively removes situational bias and is a much more back-to-back comparison.

Equivalent Run Production

Equivalent Pass Production

There are relatively few data points, but the equivalent comparison shows the offense performed similarly inside and outside the red zone, especially throwing the ball.

The Irish averaged 3.3 yards per carry inside the red zone compared to four outside the red zone, but the running game predictability certainly played a part in the lower production.

The passing data is very similar for both categories. Weis used play-action with less frequency inside the red zone and the completion percentage was lower, but the other numbers compare favorably and a 64.3 percent completion rate is still very high.

In other words, the Irish offense threw the ball with nearly equal efficiency inside and outside the red zone on first and 10. The per-attempt average inside the red zone is only slightly less than outside the red zone, a quarter of the pass plays inside the red zone were good for touchdowns, and the average per completion was actually higher.

This type of first down efficiency is critical on a short field. Maintaining favorable down and distance situations is always important, but on a short field defenses play much tighter and there is no opportunity make up ground via big gains. As such, getting behind the chains is severely limiting.

This wasn’t a problem for Notre Dame, particularly in the passing game. The run/pass balance was nearly even outside (40.5 percent run) and inside the red zone (38.5 percent run), but production in the latter category was actually better. So, if production inside the red zone wasn’t the problem, what was?

Goal-To-Goal Production

As stated above, goal-to-go situations are so specialized that they aren’t comparable to down series on other parts of the field. Whereas maintaining favorable down and distance situations and gaining first downs are both good measures of performance outside and inside the red zone, the only objective of a goal-to-go situation is to score a touchdown. Any play that fails to produce a touchdown or, in the very least, inch closer to the goal line is ultimately unsuccessful.

As such, the tables below use some different metrics than those above. First, the goal-to-go production is categorized by down. Additionally, “Run %” and “Pass %” columns have been added to indicate the run/pass split and an “Avg yds to goal line” column is used to gauge the impact of distance on play-calling. Finally, per-play averages have been replaced by “Gains <= 0″ and “Gains <= 0 %” to indicate how many and what percentage of plays went for zero or negative yardage.

Goal-to-go Run Production By Down

Goal-to-go Pass Production By Down

On goal-to-go series, Weis was run-heavy on first and second down but passed more on third and fourth. All but six runs came from under center in heavy formations while the passing game was more balanced in terms of personnel and quarterback placement.

On first down, runs and passes yielded nearly the same touchdown scoring percentage but other downs showed a bigger disparity as overall the run was slightly better than the pass. Weis preferred to keep the ball on the ground in shorter yardage situations as the average distance to the goal line was 3.6 yards for runs compared to 6.3 yards per pass attempt.

Compared to inside the red zone, rush attempts in goal-to-go situations generated a 50 percent increase in touchdown percentage as approximately one out of every four runs resulted in six points. The goal-to-go passing touchdown percentage (22.2 percent) isn’t appreciably different.

But perhaps the most disheartening trends are the relatively low use of play-action, the paltry completion percentages, and the number of negative or zero gain plays.

On the only part of the field where play-calling favored the run, play-action was only used on 25.9 percent of called passes, not much higher than inside (17.4 percent) or outside the red zone (20.8 percent).

Play-action or not, passes were completed at a dramatically lower rate in goal-to-go situations than anywhere else on the field and this ultimately limited its success.

Including incomplete passes, 63 percent of pass plays went for zero or negative yardage and 41.2 percent of runs fell into the same category. Combining both runs and passes, better than half of the goal-to-go snaps did not move the Irish closer to scoring a touchdown. In these situations, desire and execution are primarily responsible for success, and the Irish seemed lacking in both.

The Goal-To-Go Execution Problem And What Is To Come

The scoring and production data above illustrates that the poor red zone efficiency was really a goal-to-go touchdown problem.

The Irish didn’t generate enough of these scoring opportunities and didn’t take advantage of the ones they had. Five additional goal-to-go touchdowns (out of 10 non-touchdown outcomes) would have increased the goal-to-go touchdown efficiency to 78.3 percent. This is closer to the national average and would have put Notre Dame in the top 30 in red zone touchdown efficiency.

The drop-off in passing efficiency for goal-to-go situations can be attributed to the shorter field. But it is puzzling that the offense struggled running the ball near the goal line when they were very effective rushing for first downs in short yardage situations.

These first down conversions, however, mostly occurred in the open field where there remained the possibility of a downfield throw. In fact, Weis’ primary form of play-calling randomness is the big play, and the passing game was—by far—the biggest threat to produce an explosive gain. Without this threat, the offense sputtered trying to pound it into the end zone.

The deliberate and bipolar approach didn’t help.

It isn’t practical to create an even run/pass split in each personnel grouping, in every down and distance situation, and irrespective of quarterback placement, but the rushing and passing trends in 2009 were far too much in either direction. There is something to be said for keeping things simple, but simplicity doesn’t necessarily equal predictable, and the Irish certainly were.

Two personnel groupings (Half and Detroit) comprised better than 80 percent of all snaps and the run/pass mix was very one-sided for both packages. Compared to earlier versions of Weis’ offense, the lack of diversity is astounding. Heavy personnel with the quarterback under center meant run and shotgun, spread formations all but forecasted a pass.

This deliberate approach made execution difficult as opposing defenses were able to anticipate tendencies and force a very small margin of execution error. The Irish were talented and explosive enough throwing the ball to overcome this in the open field, but struggled in the red zone without the threat of a big play.

Similar to 2008, the offense was also disjointed and lacked synergy. Weis favored a spread passing attack in the open field, but morphed into run-first, heavy-personnel approach closer to the goal line. This made it difficult to establish any identity and created unnecessary complexity. Moreover, asking a third tight end (or reserve offensive lineman) to come off the bench, enter the game cold, and suddenly pound the rock in from first and goal, isn’t always reasonable.

Ultimately, the approach spelled disaster in goal-to-go situations where failed execution prevented the offense from cashing in on high probability scoring chances. The rate of zero and negative yardage plays in these situations is indicative of poor execution, and the efficiency and effectiveness throwing the ball elsewhere on the field suggests Weis would have been better served riding the spread passing approach all the way to the end zone. Perhaps most discouraging, both suggest a disproportionately small amount of practice time spent on goal-to-go offensive situations.

And this is where Kelly’s offense will help. He favors simplicity and execution over complexity and scheme. As Cincinnati quarterback Tony Pike’s 2009 red zone production indicates, better execution translates into more touchdowns and enables the offense to capitalize on high probability scoring opportunities.

Furthermore, Kelly’s offense has many more complementary looks including runs and passes in the shotgun, from the same personnel groupings, and on virtually all parts of the field. In other words, Kelly’s approach aids offensive execution via consistency and less predictable play-calling.

That isn’t to say he won’t use heavy personnel groupings or be deliberate and predictable in certain situations, but it does mean that his offensive strategy is consistent and applicable on all parts of the field and in almost all situations. His spread, pass-happy approach may not be well received by Irish fans pining for a more dominant run game, but results are all that matter.

Similar Posts:

• How Good Are the Irish? A Year-End Defensive Statistical Review
• How Good Are the Irish? A Year-End Offensive Statistical Review
• Spread and Pass, Brian Kelly’s (Somewhat) New Irish Offense

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

Considering the underwhelming on-field product of the three previous seasons and a late-year coaching change, the results were about as good as one could hope for. The Irish lost a couple of recruits late in the cycle, but still managed a very solid haul. So who are the future superstars, hidden gems, and probable busts?

Offense

Cameron Roberson

RB, 6′1″, 220 lbs
2nd ranked FB by Scout (3 stars)
17th ranked RB by Rivals (4 stars, #231 overall)

Jon: Cameron will be a bigger back, similar to current running back Robert Hughes. However, I see him putting on a few pounds and playing as a fullback for the Irish. He has good hands for a running back and has decent speed overall. However, if he does move to the fullback position, he will need to learn not to bounce so many runs outside of the tackles and run behind his guards. Fullbacks don’t play a major role in Brian Kelly’s offense, however, so there is a chance that Cameron will stay at the running back position and with that position already loaded with running backs, I’m not sure how much of a chance he will get to see the field before his junior or maybe his senior season.

Anthony: Roberson is a bigger back with very good feet and vision to accompany a decisive running style. He accelerates well, hits the hole hard, and is a determined runner, albeit without a bruising, tackle-shedding style. Additionally, he has soft hands and catches the ball well out of the backfield. From the press conference it sounds as though Kelly is very high on Cameron and excited to have him on board. In former head coach Charlie Weis’ offense, he would have been a good change of pace back. But in Kelly’s offense I’m not sure he is a great fit and may struggle running from the shotgun and behind a large dose of zone blocking.

Matt James

OT, 6′6″, 291 lbs
11th ranked OT by Scout (4 stars)
14th ranked OT by Rivals (4 stars, #86 overall)

Jon: If he puts on a bit of bulk, James could turn into a player in the same mold as Sam Young. He has nice size and could develop nicely into a solid contributor in the years to come. However, most lineman Matt’s size struggle with pad level and he is no exception. Furthermore, he is prone to injury and the right injury will bring down any football player’s chances of contributing in the way they are expected (see: James Aldridge).

Anthony: James is a very solid offensive line prospect with great upside that could play either tackle position. He finishes plays, has a good first move off the ball, and has very good size with the frame to grow even bigger. Linemen with James’ combination of footwork and size aren’t extremely common. It will, however, probably take a while for him to contribute. While his footwork is good, he tends to play tall and will need to learn to utilize a pad level that maximizes leverage. Additionally, he doesn’t have great length and tends to over-reach when blocking in space, something that could limit his pass blocking performance.

Bennett Jackson

WR, 6′1″, 170 lbs
51st ranked WR by Scout (3 stars)
61st ranked WR by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: Bennett Jackson will definitely need to hit the weights hard before his body will be big enough to stand taking hits at the next level. While not particularly tall, Bennett Jackson could turn into a great all-around player (flanker). He is very elusive and hard to tackle with just one defender. If Jackson’s size keeps him from making a contribution at wide receiver, look for him to make a splash as either a punt or kickoff returner.

Anthony: While Jackson’s strength and size will likely limit him from making an early contribution, there is a lot to like about his future. He is very good after the catch, displaying good speed and acceleration. But his biggest assets are elusiveness and body control. He has the ability to adjust to the ball on the move and is a very fluid runner. His route running isn’t excellent, but his natural abilities should help his progress in this area.

Christian Lombard

OL, 6′5″, 293 lbs
2nd ranked OG by Scout (4 stars)
5th ranked OG by Rivals (4 stars, #221 overall)

Jon: Christian already possess the size needed to play at the guard position on the offensive line. He is a very explosive lineman who gets to the second level of the opposing defense quickly. However, Lombard will need to work on his blocking and footwork technique. He comes off the ball too high and has lazy hand technique. Being an interior lineman is all about leverage, and right now, Lombard is not going to win that match. If he shores up his technique difficulties, he has the ability to be a solid contributor on the offensive line when his time comes.

Anthony: Lombard doesn’t possess the same the footwork as James, but he doesn’t necessarily have to as an interior lineman. He moves well getting to the second level and getting position, and finishes blocks with authority. Christian excels as a straight-line blocker, but often struggles to engage in space. His biggest challenge appears to be developing his technique, as size, strength and attitude were all he needed to be successful at the high school level. Improved footwork and hand placement will go a long way to seeing meaningful minutes on the field.

Alex Welch

TE, 6′5″, 225 lbs
4th ranked TE by Scout (4 stars)
12th ranked TE by Rivals (4 stars)

Jon: When it all is said and done, Alex Welch could be similar to John Carlson. Welch should put on a few pounds in the weight room, but he already has some good blocking ability. What Welch will need to work on is his speed and route running. He has decent hands for a tight end but after the catch, he lacks that little extra speed to elude some linebackers in pursuit. Whether or not Alex contributes to the team the way John Carlson did his junior and senior season will depend on his development in size and speed.

Anthony: While Welch doesn’t have the same speed and at athleticism as current Irish tight end Kyle Rudolph, he is a very similar prospect. Hailing from the same high school as Rudolph, Welch has good hands and is very fluid for a player his size. At this point in his career, he is a better blocker than Rudolph, mostly due to better hand placement, strength and tenacity. From a receiving standpoint he doesn’t match the current tight end, as his speed and route running need time to develop.

Daniel Smith

WR, 6′4″, 215 lbs
53rd ranked WR by Scout (3 stars)
89th ranked WR by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: While Smith will not likely need to add a ton of weight, getting into the weight room and adding a bit of muscle for strength wouldn’t hurt. He posses great leaping ability and will be a force to be reckoned with in the red zone. However, Smith will definitely need to refine his route running skills as he sometimes makes lazy cuts. Regardless, in Brian Kelly’s spread system, look for Smith to be a solid contributor, at least in the red zone, once he adds a bit of muscle.

Anthony: Smith is a possession receiver that has the size and length to be a threat in the red zone. He elevates well, has good body control in the air, and possesses very soft hands. Smith will, however, need to develop his strength, speed and quickness to be more effective. Even at 6′4″ and 215 pounds, he struggles off the line against more physical corners and isn’t going to beat most opposing defensive backs down the field in one-on-one situations.

Andrew Hendrix

QB, 6′3″, 226 lbs
29th ranked QB by Scout (3 stars)
13th ranked QB by Rivals (4 stars, #235 overall)

Jon: Of the three quarterbacks in this year’s recruiting class, Andrew Hendrix is probably the most physically ready to play right now. He has good arm strength, even when throwing on the run, which could prove valuable in Kelly’s offense. However, Hendrix has a tendency to turn the ball over, and in an offensive system that stresses scoring fast, turning the ball over could prove very disastrous as the Irish defense will already be on the field much more than they were last year. If there’s one area that Hendrix needs to improve on, it’s his decision-making with the football.

Anthony: Hendrix is a solid quarterback prospect from Cincinnati with good measurables and raw talent. He throws with good velocity and has surprising mobility for his size. The primary drawback for Hendrix is his experience. He didn’t play in an offense that stressed reading progressions and his decision-making skills and ability to identify coverages are lacking as a result. From a pure talent perspective, he has good upside. However, he is raw and will need time to develop.

Austin Collinsworth

WR, 6′1″, 195 lb
99th ranked S by Scout (3 stars)
Unranked by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: Collinsworth is your typical project. While he already posses some intangibles like toughness, he will definitely need to work on other qualities, such as speed, strength, and route running, that make a sub par wide receiver great. If he does this, he could definitely be projected as a solid slot receiver. If he can’t seem to refine these qualities, however, look for Collinsworth to make a switch to the other side of the ball and play as a free safety.

Anthony: Collinsworth is a tough, determined football player with good pedigree and production in high school on both sides of the ball. He is agile and quick for his size, and displays very good change of direction, acceleration in and out of breaks, and body control. He lacks elite athleticism, speed, size and strength but, like many other prospects in this class, his attitude and intangibles may be able to make up for those deficiencies. He should be a very good fit at the slot receiver position in Kelly’s offense and figures to make a splash on special teams as well.

Tate Nichols

OL, 6′7″, 291 lbs
70th ranked OT by Scout (3 stars)
62nd ranked OT by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: Even though most people project Nichols as a project, tabbing him as an outside lineman, I don’t necessarily see him playing that role for the Irish. He could bulk up a bit and make a solid contribution as a prototypical blocking tight end. He has excellent blocking ability and he already has experience at that position. If there’s anything that keeps Nichols from that role, it’s that blocking tight ends don’t have a big role in the spread offense. If this is the case, Nichols may not make much of an impact on Saturdays, but more during the week on the scout team.

Anthony: Nichols is more of a “project” recruit. Due to his height and frame, he projects as an exterior offensive linemen but will need time to grow into his body and transition from the tight end position he played in high school. He displays good intensity and physicality when he blocks, particularly when he drives opposing players. But it may take some time for him to learn to play in space and master pass blocking.

Luke Massa

QB, 6′5″, 205 lbs
75th ranked QB by Scout (3 stars)
28th ranked QB by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: On Scout.com, Massa is listed as 175 pounds. Massa will definitely need to hit the weights in order to add some size and strength. He is a good pro-style quarterback and obviously Brian Kelly sees something he likes in Massa, as Luke was previously committed to Cincinnati, giving Brian Kelly is verbal this past summer. The one thing that Massa will need to improve is his arm strength. Sometimes, rather than getting the ball to his receiver in a tight window, he puts too much air under the ball. Massa will need to learn to make quick decisions and quick throws in Brian Kelly’s offense.

Anthony: Massa does not have the physical skill set of Hendrix, but he does have plenty of upside in his own right. In high school Luke played in a more traditional offensive system and as a result has better footwork and good play-action ability. He is not as raw as Hendrix, but he will need to improve physically to compete. The good news is that Massa has plenty of room to add size and strength to his 6′5″ frame. Increasing this measureables will also improve his arm strength.

Tommy Rees

QB, 6′3″, 192 lbs
65th ranked QB by Scout (3 stars)
31st ranked QB by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: If Rees has a leg up on any of the other quarterbacks in this class, it’s with his decision-making. He is very proficient at making reads at the line of scrimmage. Unfortunately, his body size may overshadow that and make it hard for him to contribute right away, even though he is needed badly. Enrolling early to work with Strength and Conditioning Coach Paul Longo can only help Rees as he, alongside current wide receiver John Goodman, will be taking the majority of the reps this Spring if Dayne Crist is still not healthy enough to do so.

Anthony: Rees is perhaps the least physically ready to play of the three quarterback recruits in this class, but what he lacks in arm strength he makes up for in accuracy. He isn’t as polished in fundamentals as Massa, and will have to improve his technique going forward. Enrolling early will greatly benefit him as he prepares to become a viable option behind projected starter Dayne Crist. But it may be too much to expect for him to be ready to contribute meaningful minutes by the fall.

Tai-ler Jones

WR, 6′0″, 183 lbs
21st ranked WR by Scout (4 stars)
19th ranked WR by Rivals (4 stars, #141 overall)

Jon: Jones doesn’t have the greatest size for a wide receiver, but his ball-catching abilities and speed definitely make up for that. While I hesitate to compare him to Golden Tate, he could very well play a similar role in Brian Kelly’s offense. Jones did play in a spread offense in high school and has experience being highly productive running the ball on reverses as well. Even though the wide receiver position is very full right now, Jones could very well work his way into the mix by his sophomore year at the slot receiver position.

Anthony: While he does lack some size and strength, Jones is an elite wide receiver prospect for a host of reasons. He is a polished route runner, has excellent ball skills, and is very quick and agile. Jones is also one of the more dangerous wide receiver prospects in the country with the ball in his hands. He will need to develop physically before he is ready to consistently compete, but he is certainly one of the more exciting prospects in this class.

Danny Spond

ATH, 6′3″, 232 lbs
14th ranked MLB by Scout (3 stars)
27th ranked ATH by Rivals (4 stars)

Jon: Danny Spond is probably the most versatile recruit in this class. He has played a whole host of positions in high school, but I see him in a similar position that Bobby Burger is playing now. He could line up as a second receiving or blocking tight end, but he is also a bruiser running the ball. The other position I can see him at is the hybrid Defensive End/Linebacker position. The only worries I would have with that is his vulnerability defending passing situations. Out of all of the recruits in this class, Spond definitely has the most upside.

Anthony: There is a lot to like about Danny Spond. He is very athletic for his size, displaying good speed and quickness. Spond is also tough, runs with determination and authority, and doesn’t shy away from contact on either side of the ball. His versatility is nearly unmatched as he could play a host of positions. It is most likely that he bulks up and lines up at tight end/H-back or at a linebacker spot, but it isn’t out of the realm of possibilities for him to see some time in other, more niche roles as a situational player on defense.

Derek Roback

ATH, 6′3″, 225 lbs
103th ranked QB by Scout (2 stars)
Unranked ATH by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: Technically, Derek Roback is Notre Dame’s fifth quarterback in this recruiting class, however, I don’t think that’s where he’ll end up. I’m sure that he may take a few snaps there this summer, but I think it is much more likely that Roback heads to the weight room and comes back as a linebacker. He is a very similar prospect to Danny Spond, but he doesn’t have a general direction that he’s headed. If heavily competing for the job at quarterback doesn’t pan out for Roback, I expect him to be Zeke Motta’s replacement as the nickle linebacker/safety position once Zeke graduates or moves to safety.

Anthony: Roback is a rather intriguing prospect in that he may suffer from not projecting at a specific position at the college level. Early in the recruiting process he seemed to generate good measurables and accolades, but the recruiting services never matched this with good evaluations. Like Spond, Roback is versatile, but has more quickness and is position-limited by his smaller size. He is certainly athletic, but hasn’t played any position long enough to fully develop into a polished player. Because of this it will likely take him some time before he can contribute for the Irish.

Defense

Kona Schwenke

DL, 6′4″, 227 lbs
33th ranked DE by Scout (4 stars)
34th ranked DE by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: Schwenke is an interesting prospect. He shows plenty of potential at his position, but he currently lacks the technique to be truly productive. He is truly explosive off the ball, but sometimes that speed hurts him as he tends to over-pursue his targets. He either needs to add about 40 or 50 pounds and become a true defensive end in Brian Kelly’s 3-4 defense or add 25 to 30 pounds and fit in at the outside linebacker/defensive end position. Luckily with his 6′4 frame, he has the ability to do this without really affecting his speed.

Anthony: Similar to many of the recruits in this class, Schwenke is a prospect that needs grow into his projected position. He is a fearless pass rusher who has excellent speed and quickness upfield, but he will need to add size and get stronger to consistently contribute at the college level. Fortunately, he has the frame to do it. Schwenke will also need to become a more complete player. Raw ability and determination made him a potent force in high school, but better fundamentals will be needed to be productive at Notre Dame.

Justin Utupo

DE, 6′3″, 250 lbs
50th ranked DE by Scout (3 stars)
62nd ranked DT by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: I’m very excited with landing Justin Utupo. He doesn’t rank very high on Scout or Rivals, but he is a solid prospect nonetheless. He has great speed and strength, often times, allowing him to chase down running backs or quarterbacks from behind. And at 250 pounds, he won’t have to add much size to his frame to fit in at defensive end in the 3-4 defense. If there’s one thing Utupo could improve, it’s his tackling technique. Many times, he tries to take down ball carriers with arm tackles. That may have worked in high school, but he will need to learn the importance of putting a body on the opposition to bring them down. If anything else, expect him to make an impact on special teams while he waits his turn to make an impact on the defense.

Anthony: Utupo is a team player with a motor that is second to none. He has decent size, strength and speed, but what he lacks in natural athletic ability he makes up for with determination. He relentlessly pursues the ball and plays much bigger and faster than his measurables indicate. It is somewhat unclear where he will line up in the 3-4, but his attitude and approach to the game can be contagious and elevate the work ethic of those around him.

Kendall Moore

LB, 6′3″, 235 lb
18th ranked MLB by Scout (3 stars)
22nd ranked OLB by Rivals (4 stars)

Jon: Kendall Moore will be a punishing linebacker–against the run. Right now, he lacks the speed and agility to be a force in pass coverage, even if only keeping up with bigger running backs and tight ends. Look for Moore to either bulk up and move to defensive end, or continue to hone his ball hawking skills and remain as an inside linebacker, stuffing the run.

Anthony: Moore reminds me a lot of Irish linebacker Toryan Smith. He is a punishing tackler with good size, strength and instincts, but lacks the requisite athleticism to play well in space. Moore does produce in the interior, particularly against the run, but struggles in coverage due to limited lateral movement. It is difficult to imagine him being an every down defender with his coverage limitations, but he could be productive as a run-stuffing linebacker. He could also bulk up and move to the defensive line.

Louis Nix

DL, 6′3″, 315 lbs
9th ranked DT by Scout (4 stars)
7th ranked DT by Rivals (4 stars, #85 overall)

Jon: Louis Nix is a solid defensive lineman. He comes off the ball with great explosion and forward lean to gain leverage against opposing offensive lineman. He is also a very powerful tackler who can usually take down ball carriers by himself and at 315 pounds, he already has the size to fit in at nose tackle at the next level. He will, however, need to work on his technique. Some of the pass rushing moves he put on opposing lineman in high school will not work in college, as lineman are much stronger at the next level.

Anthony: Nix reminds me of Omar Hunter as he is a terrific talent due to his blend of size and athleticism. He is very quick off the ball, especially for a player of his size, and uses his strength well to generate excellent inside push. Nix isn’t a pass rushing interior defensive lineman, but pursuit isn’t a strong requirement for the nose tackle in a 3-4. His primary concern may be keeping his weight down and playing with the appropriate pad level. At 6′3″ he has a tendency to come off the ball high, and a nose tackle must maintain leverage to hold his ground and control both A-gaps against frequent double teams. If he can maintain conditioning, he could contribute early and often.

Prince Shembo

LB, 6′2″, 232 lbs
42nd ranked OLB by Scout (3 stars)
7th ranked ILB by Rivals (4 stars, #238 overall)

Jon: I expect Prince Shembo to add a bit of weight and muscle to move to the outside linebacker position. He could play as a defensive end, but his body type isn’t ideal for that position. He certainly has the speed necessary to come off the corner and rush the passer, but he must work on his side-to-side mobility to truly be effective in that capacity.

Anthony: Shembo is a “tweener” who could play at the linebacker position or could grow into a defensive end. He has the frame to add more weight, but at only 6′2″ lacks ideal height to play on the defensive line. Shembo is athletic, with good straight-line speed and excellent pass rushing skills, but does have limited lateral movement and lacks good tackling technique. My bet is that he ends up as a pass rushing specialist from an outside linebacker spot in the 3-4, and he has the skills to do very well in that role.

Bruce Heggie

DL, 6′6″, 240 lbs
Unranked DE by Scout (2 stars)
Unranked TE by Rivals (2 stars)

Jon: The recruitment of Bruce Heggie is a bit of a mystery to me. Besides his offer from Notre Dame, the only other offer from a Division I school came from William and Mary. Because there is little information on Heggie, it’s hard to gain an accurate assessment of his build, natural abilities, and technique. All signs point to him making an impact on the scout teams in practice and nothing more. I guess in this case, we’ll have to trust that Kelly sees something in Heggie that the rest of us don’t.

Anthony: Heggie is a bit of an unknown. His lack of other offers and listless cohort make him a surprise recruit for the Irish. He has good size, with room to grow, and is athletic for his build. However, it is difficult to imagine him as anything but a utility player.

Lo Wood

DB, 5′11″, 176 lbs
46th ranked CB by Scout (3 stars)
44th ranked CB by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: Wood, at best, is a very inconsistent player. He truly lacks, what some would call, the necessary attributes to be a good cornerback at the college level. He doesn’t have the greatest size or speed and sometimes lacks the toughness to keep with a determined wide receiver. He does, however, have good instincts. If he can work on his size and technique in college, he could turn out to be a decent backup option. If not, look for Wood to make his biggest impact on special teams coverage.

Anthony: Wood is primarily a cover corner. He lacks the size to compete right away, but has plenty of room for growth and decent height to play on the outside. Wood shows good anticipation and awareness in the secondary, but doesn’t have elite speed, lacks physicality, and frequently struggles to wrap up when tackling. Instincts are tough to teach, and Wood has them, but his athleticism and lack of physical play may limit his ability to contribute as a corner at the college level.

Chris Badger

DB, 6′1″, 192 lbs
28th ranked S by Scout (3 stars)
41st ranked S by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: Say hello to your next Tom Zbikowski. If he adds a bit of muscle to his frame, Badger could turn out to be a very bruising hitter. He hits like a freight train and has decent closing speed, but could afford to increase that area with some training. However, the one thing keeping Badger from being a very good prospect is his coverage abilities. If he can improve his technique in coverage, Badger could turn out to be a solid contributor on the defensive side of the ball, especially as a strong safety focusing on screen passes and underneath crossing routes.

Anthony: In my opinion, Badger is one of the more underrated prospects in this class, and, if used correctly, could be a strong contributor for the Irish. He lacks the ideal speed to perform well as a coverage safety, but his change of direction is underrated and his instincts and anticipation are very sharp. Badger’s most impressive attributes are his toughness and tackling skills. He breaks extremely well, arrives at the point of attack with tenacity, and punishes opposing ball carriers. Once he reads the play, he closes on the ball like a torpedo. I can easily see Chris growing into a hybrid safety-linebacker and making strong contributions as a situational player on defense.

Spencer Boyd

DB, 5′10″, 175 lbs
59th ranked CB by Scout (3 stars)
39th ranked CB by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: Boyd is another interesting recruit. He doesn’t have outstanding coverage abilities, but what he lacks in coverage technique, he makes up for with his speed and instincts. He has great closing speed and is very good at playing as a defensive receiver when the ball is in the air. If he could add a bit of muscle to his frame and retain his speed, he could be a solid coverage cornerback. If anything else, he could be an interesting special teams returner.

Anthony: Boyd is an interesting corner prospect and one that I feel is underrated by the recruiting services. He has the physicality and tackling ability to play strong against the run, but better speed, agility, and change of direction than Wood. Boyd is excellent with the ball in the air, and this is an asset that may make him more suited to play the field corner position. Like Badger, Boyd has good instincts, but he is a more gifted athlete with good quickness and a sharp ability to break on the ball. I think Boyd could be one of the sleepers in this class.

Biggest Commitment

Jon: Matt James would have to be my biggest contributor to this class. There is no mystery to the shortage of quality defensive lineman prospects and Louis Nix definitely fills that need, but it is imperative that, in Brian Kelly’s offense, that there is also no shortage of good offensive lineman to provide the protection necessary to run the offense effectively. With the right weight training and practice, James could step in and contribute very early.

Anthony: I’d have to say Nix. He is the type of interior defensive lineman the Irish have whiffed on in the past, an elite talent with the ability to contribute early and develop into a dominant force down the line. Outside of Nix I really like the ability of Jones to create with the ball in his hands and think he will be a very deadly receiver in the not too distant future.

Biggest Miss

Jon: The biggest prospect that got away from the Irish would have to be Chris Martin. Seantrel Henderson would have been a great acquisition for this class, but the pure lack of bodies along the defensive line makes losing Chris Martin an even tougher pill to swallow. However, I’m not sure there is much that Brian Kelly and his staff could have done to keep Martin with this class. I even think that Charlie Weis may have had difficulty keeping Martin. I believe Martin will be a solid professional prospect and I would rather him be wearing Blue and Gold in college.

Anthony: More of Nix. Losing Blake Lueders and Martin hurt at a position where the Irish are dangerously thin. Kelly will need to shore up this area with quantity and quality in next year’s class. Skill talent means little if the offensive and defensive lines can’t win the battle in the trenches. Some more athletic safeties would have also helped this class and will be another need for next year.

Rating The Class…

Jon: This recruiting class was an interesting one. It started out being fairly solid, but as the wire drew closer, there were a lot of personnel changes. The Irish lost Chris Martin, but gained Louis Nix. They “lost” Seantrel Henderson, but gained Matt James. I think overall it’s a decent class, but it truly lacks the star power to push it over the top like some of Charlie Weis’ previous classes. Good coaching will do wonders for this class, but sometimes a program needs true impact players in order to be productive on Saturdays and I’m not sure this class has enough of those impact players.

Anthony: From top to bottom, this class appears similar to last year, albeit lacking the star power of a Manti Te’o-type recruit. There are several very solid commitments, but also a fair share of “project” players that will take time to develop and may lack the athleticism needed to compete at an elite level. Some needs were addressed but the defensive front and safety still loom as positions where quality and depth are a concern going forward. The versatility of some recruits will provide flexibility, which is an advantage for Kelly if he needs to fill holes from transfers or injury. If I had to assign a letter grade I’d probably go with a B.

On Rating Kelly’s Recruiting Approach…

Jon: It’s hard to gauge the type of recruiter that Brian Kelly is from this class. We will gain a more accurate depiction of his style next year when he has more than a month to recruit players. But the time he did have to recruit players, he signed players like Derek Roback, Kona Schwenke, and Bruce Heggie. His approach remains somewhat of a mystery to me. Judging by this class alone, he is either a great evaluator of potential or a horrible evaluator of talent. Only time will tell which one it is.

Anthony: Kelly did his job. He minimized defections, maintained most of the current commits, and even managed to pull in a few of his own prospects. As stated above, the class is heavy on players that will need time to develop before being able to contribute, but with current roster this isn’t a huge concern. Going forward, it will be more important to gain commitments from elite players, as well as avoid taking too many athletes and prospects that require substantial growth in order to contribute. Over-reliance on player development is not an option for Kelly at Notre Dame, the competition level is higher than anywhere he has been.

Similar Posts:

• Notre Dame Recruiting Signing Day Recap
• They Call It Powder Blue, Irish vs. Tar Heels News and Notes
• Spread and Pass, Brian Kelly’s (Somewhat) New Irish Offense

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Many (myself included) believed Notre Dame’s 2009 defense would be a large step forward from a 2008 unit that was below average. The Irish returned a host of starters, an off-season coaching responsibility realignment by head coach Charlie Weis put co-defensive coordinator Jon Tenuta in charge of play-calling, and the personnel seemed to fit Tenuta’s aggressive scheme.

The reality was far different as poor tackling and confusion in the secondary doomed the Irish. The former is both inexcusable and inexplicable while the latter is mostly the result of inconsistency derived from the scheme and coordinator changes of the past four years.

What follows is a comprehensive analysis of Notre Dame’s 2009 defensive unit. Four tables (defensive efficiency, total defense, rushing defense, and passing defense) with 21 statistical categories are listed below with supplementary data used to understand the more subtle factors that contributed to the high-level performance.

For clarity, a detailed description of the table columns can be found here. I highly recommend this refresher in order to understand the data presented below.

This assessment is consistent with previous analyses that benchmark the Irish production against the competition. Please visit here or here for an explanation of this benchmarking process and the benefits associated with assessing statistical production from this perspective.

Definitions and Disclaimers

The following disclaimers and definitions are pertinent to this analysis:

• Disclaimer: The numbers presented here were taken from the NCAA statistics website and the Notre Dame football statistics homepage and are accurate to the best of my knowledge as of December 14, 2009, i.e. these values do not include any bowl production of Irish opponents.
• Definition: An explosive—or big—gain is a running play that produces 15 or more yards or a pass play that gains 20 or more yards.
• Definition: A short yardage situation is any down and distance pair that requires three or fewer yards for a first down.
• Definition: A medium yardage situation is any down and distance pair that requires greater than three, but fewer than seven, yards for a first down.
• Definition: A long yardage situation is any down and distance pair that requires seven or more yards for a first down.

Additionally, for reference purposes, the following are links to the statistical recaps for each 2009 Irish opponent: Nevada, Michigan, Michigan State, Purdue, Washington, USC, Boston College, Washington State, Navy, Pittsburgh, Connecticut and Stanford.

No Efficiency To Speak Of

Third down defense was poor despite fairly good situational characteristics while red zone touchdown efficiency was inflated by a handful of games.

Defensive Efficiency

The Irish ranked in the bottom half of the country in two (third down and red zone touchdown) of the three major defensive efficiency categories.

Red zone efficiency ranked 15th, but the performance in this area is largely exaggerated by the few (eight) opponent red zone field goal attempts as the Irish allowed 88.4 percent of all red zone points to come on touchdowns (86th in the country).

The third down woes started on first down where the defense was largely bipolar.

Notre Dame allowed 6.1 yards per snap on 350 first down plays with two or fewer yards surrendered on over 44 percent of these plays. However, 43.7 percent of first down plays generated five or more yards including 43 explosive gains. These big plays accounted for almost 50 percent of the total first down production for opposing teams.

Despite this poor first down play the third down situations were fairly favorable for the Irish. Out of 350 play series, 158 (45.1 percent) resulted in a third down and more than 74 percent of these were medium or long yardage situations that favored the defense.

Normally, this would be a good thing. Outside of short yardage situations the defense gains the advantage on third down. The Irish just didn’t play well on medium and long distance third downs ranking only 65th in third down efficiency despite opponents needing an average of 7.6 yards to move the chains.

Conversely, on short yardage third downs the defense performed admirably, holding their opposition to a 56.1 percent conversion rate and only 47.8 percent on the ground. But the defense struggled with more than three yards to go as they allowed conversions on almost one-third of opportunities and surrendered 14 big plays, 11 of which came through the air.

The most palpable example of this rather inexplicable phenomena occurred against Boston College. Despite an average distance of 9.5 yards, the Eagle offense converted six of their 13 third down attempts as the Irish allowed five passing plays of 20 or more yards.

The red zone touchdown inefficiency was arguably worse and was most deficient in the season finale against Stanford where the Cardinal scored a touchdown on five of their six red zone trips.

Officially, the Irish allowed touchdowns nearly 57 percent of the time their opponents crossed the 20-yard line as 25 of 35 offensive touchdowns (71.4 percent) came inside the red zone. Expressed differently, 18.4 percent of opponent drives resulted in red zone touchdowns.

Three games, however, significantly skewed these numbers.

Whether it was turnovers by the opposing team (Nevada), stout short goal-to-go play by the Irish (Washington), or the opponent’s conservative game plan (Pittsburgh), these three outings substantially bolstered Notre Dame’s performance in the red zone. Excluding these contests, Irish opponents were exceedingly efficient, scoring touchdowns on 81.3 percent of their red zone appearances.

Totally Offensive Defensive Production

Considering the competition, points allowed weren’t that bad, but opposing offenses were very efficient and effective with their yard production.

Total Defense

The total defensive numbers appear poor, but are just about on par with opponents’ yearly production.

The Irish allowed 25.9 points per game and 38 touchdowns on the year, both good for rankings in the middle of the country and the bright spots of the total defense numbers. The highest point total allowed was 45 in the final outing against Stanford.

The majority of the point production occurred in the second and fourth quarters as 166 of 311 points (53.3 percent) were scored in these periods. However, the point per quarter averages—five, 6.8, six, and 7.1 points per quarter—were fairly similar. Points came fairly evenly on the ground and through the air as well as the defense allowed 18 rushing touchdowns and 17 passing scores.

The remaining three touchdowns came via special teams (two kickoff returns) and a Jimmy Clausen fumble recovery by Washington’s Desmond Trufant. Adjusting for these three non-defensive touchdowns reduces the points per game allowed to 24.2 and bumps the points per game ranking about 10 spots.

Additionally, Notre Dame generated positive PR’s in both points per game and touchdowns. While both rank in the middle of the country, the performance came against good scoring offenses.

The preferred method of moving the ball against the Irish was on the ground. The yards gained favored the pass as 57.2 percent of yards came through the air, but this was mostly due to the large per-play averages throwing the ball. The first down production mimics this as more first downs were generated passing (118) than running (103).

The true preference is in the play-calling.

Opposing offenses ran the ball almost 56 percent of the time (430 runs to 341 pass attempts) against the Irish. On first down, a more apt characterization of play-calling preference, opposing offenses ran the ball on nearly 59 percent of plays. On second and third down short yardage situations a run was called 70 percent of the time.

Moreover, only four games (Michigan State, Purdue, Washington and Boston College) featured a pass-first approach by the opposing offense, i.e. greater than 50 percent of snaps were passes. The remaining eight games were characterized by run-first play-calling while three opponents (Navy, Connecticut and Stanford) called runs on more than 60 percent of plays.

Excluding overtime periods, opponent drives averaged 5.7 plays, 34.1 yards, 2:28 in time of possession, and 1.7 first downs. Most drives were rather short as only 15 generated 10 or more plays and only eight lasted five or more minutes. These short drives were largely the result of big plays (see below) that led to quick scoring opportunities.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, 31 of 136 (22.8 percent) drives were three plays and punt while 33.1 percent of drives resulted in scores. Expressed differently, 23 of 136 non-overtime drives (16.9 percent) ended in red zone touchdowns while eight other touchdowns were allowed from beyond the 20-yard line.

But the most deficient statistics in the table above are the yard efficiency and effectiveness categories as the Irish rank 103rd in yards per play (6.2) and 87th in yards per game (397.8). The former is largely due to big plays and the ability of opponents to exploit the Irish secondary with play-action. The season-high in both categories came against USC as the Trojans gained 501 yards at an incredible rate of 8.1 yards per snap.

Can’t Stop Bleeding Yards On The Ground

Against a tough slate of running teams, the Irish did little to impress.

Rushing Defense

Opponents preferred the run because Notre Dame couldn’t stop it, and because they were built to do it. Five opponents—Nevada, Michigan, Navy, Pittsburgh, Stanford—ranked 30th or better in rushing yards per game and all of these teams but Michigan ranked 30th or better in yards per carry. Unfortunately, with few exceptions, the Irish did little to slow these potent running offenses.

The defense ranks 101st in yards per rush (4.8) and 90th in rushing yards allowed per game (170.3), both dubious honors. Excluding sacks, the per-carry average increases to 5.3 yards.

Seven Irish opponents (Nevada, Michigan, Washington, Navy, Pittsburgh, Connecticut and Stanford) exceeded 150 yards rushing. Seven (Michigan, Michigan State, USC, Navy, Pittsburgh, Connecticut and Stanford) opponents also recorded two or more rushing touchdowns.

The last four Irish foes accomplished both of these feats in addition to averaging 5.7 yards per carry (5.9 yards per rush excluding sacks). It seems that late-season fatigue coupled with good running teams spelled disaster for the Irish run defense.

The problem started on first down, but it didn’t end there.

Despite strong run tendencies, opposing offenses averaged 5.6 yards per first down rush and gained five or more yards on 88 of 205 running plays (41 percent). The defense managed to hold opponents to two or fewer yards almost 43 percent of the time, including 27 negative rushing plays, but it was the frequency of the bigger gains that were the primary problem.

Second down wasn’t much better.

Notre Dame allowed 5.2 yards per second down carry including gains of five or more yards on 42.1 percent of rush attempts. Similar to first down, inconsistent play was also evident on second down as the defense was able to hold opposing offenses to two or fewer yards on a good percentage of plays (40.7).

Short yardage situations were also problematic.

Notre Dame faced 89 short yardage down and distance situations of which 62 (almost 70 percent) were runs. These 62 rush attempts averaged 3.9 yards and over 30 percent produced five or more yards. Perhaps most problematic, nearly 60 percent of these short yardage runs resulted in first downs.

About the only bright spot of the running game was holding opponents to fewer rushing touchdowns than they routinely scored and the performance on third and short. Irish opponents called runs on 23 of 41 (56.1 percent) short yardage third downs. Seven of these 23 attempts (30.4 percent) went for negative yardage and only 11 (47.8 percent) moved the chains.

Giving Up Huge Chunks Of Yards Through The Air

The run was preferred, but selling out to stop it cost the Irish dearly down the field and prevented consistent quarterback pressure despite frequent blitzing.

Passing Defense

Because opponents were able to run the ball effectively, they were also able to throw it with great efficiency. The Irish allowed a 58 percent completion percentage and ranked 81st in pass efficiency as opponents that ran the ball the best also generated the highest per pass attempt and completion averages.

Against these strong rushing offenses Tenuta was forced to stack the box to stop the run. The result was vulnerability to the vertical passing game, particularly off play-action. Both directly led to the defense surrendering eight yards per attempt (100) and 13.8 yards per completion (113).

A stronger, more experienced front four would have partially rectified this problem, but poor tackling also contributed to high yard-after-contact production for opposing ball carriers.

Additionally, because opponents preferred the run and made heavy use of play-action, Notre Dame was unable to consistently pressure quarterbacks. The Irish averaged one sack per 17.9 pass attempts (76), with 19 sacks on the year (89). However, five sacks came against Washington State. Excluding this game the Irish notched only 14 quarterback takedowns, one per 22.7 pass attempts. This is especially puzzling given Tenuta’s penchant for blitzing and applying pressure.

But perhaps most troubling was the inability to stop big gains through the air in obvious passing situations.

On third down, opposing quarterbacks averaged 8.3 yards on 104 pass attempts despite being very pass-heavy (65.8 percent third down pass preference) and facing long distances (average of 8.4 yards to go). The result was a 42.3 percent third down conversion rate when a pass was attempted.

Fourth down was even worse. The Irish allowed 9.6 yards per pass attempt despite opponents needing an average of 8.4 yards to move the chains. Moreover, opponents generated 16 explosive pass plays on third and fourth down for an average of 30.4 yards per play.

Performance in long distance situations was more of the same. Excluding first down, the Irish faced 256 long yardage plays of which 153 were pass attempts (59.8 percent). Opponents averaged 7.6 yards per attempt, gained five or more yards 70 times (45.8 percent), and notched 23 big gains that averaged 28.7 yards per play. On these downs, despite needing an average of 10.9 yards to move the chains, 31.4 percent of these pass plays resulted in a first down. On many of these obvious passing situations, confusion in the secondary led to big gains down the field.

The secondary was, however, somewhat opportunistic, notching 12 interceptions (44) on the year. But 11 of these picks came in the first eight games and the defense was only able to force an interception once every 28.4 pass attempts.

Explosive Gains = Achilles’ Heel

As (painfully) illustrated above, big gains were the crux of the issue for the 2009 Irish defense. And they came in all shapes and sizes.

As a whole, Notre Dame allowed 89 big plays that gained 2,321 yards, an average of 26.1 yards per play. This accounted for 48.6 percent of the total production. Expressed differently, 11.5 percent of opponent offensive plays gained nearly half of their yards. Without these plays the Irish defense allowed 3.6 yards per play, up from the 3.3-yard value in 2008.

But the per-game numbers are simply baffling as opponents averaged 7.4 explosive gains and 193.4 big play yards per game.

The most production occurred on first down where 43 of 350 plays (12.3 percent) gained 1,056 yards (24.6-yard average). The Irish allowed 46 explosive plays on the other downs for an average of 27.5 yards per play.

Running

Almost half (47.2 percent) of the big gains came on the ground as Irish opponents generated 42 runs of more than 15 yards.

These 42 plays gained 958 yards (22.8 yards per attempt), good for 46.9 percent of the rushing production and 20 percent of the total offense. Without these big gains the Irish surrendered only 2.8 yards per carry.

Most of the big runs came on first down or medium and long yardage situations.

The defense allowed 24 explosive rushes on first down, at an average of 22.2 yards per attempt. This production was good for 46.2 percent of all first down rushing yardage without which opponents’ averaged only 3.4 yards per rush.

Excluding first down, 14 more big running gains came in medium and long yardage situations. These 14 plays gained 327 yards (23.4-yard average) and produced 40.5 percent of the total rushing production in these down and distance situations. Many of these big plays were the result of Irish defenders blitzing themselves out of position.

Passing

The other half of the big play production came through the air as the defense allowed 47 big passes go for 1,363 yards (29 yards per completion). These 47 plays accounted for just under 50 percent of the passing yards and 28.6 percent of the total offense. Excluding these plays the Irish allowed 4.6 yards per attempt and 9.1 yards per completion.

Unlike the big play production in the running game, the explosive gains through the air were fairly evenly split on first, second and third down. However, as detailed above, the most costly big play production came through the air in down and distance situations that favored the Irish defense.

Facing long yardage down and distances, opposing offenses managed 23 big gains. These 23 plays gained 606 yards and averaged 28.7 yards per play. In other words, 40.4 percent of big pass plays occurred when defenders knew—or should have known—that the ball was going downfield.

In Summary, Is There Any Good News?

There is seemingly little good in the numbers above.

Situationally, first down defense was erratic for the Irish. Opponents were able to run the ball efficiently and effectively as well as frequently generate big gains. At times the defense performed well, but inconsistent first down play was a critical element to the deficiencies of this unit as the Irish often faced unfavorable situations on second and third down.

But the Irish also struggled in favorable down and distances. Far too many big plays occurred in these situations due to poor tackling (yards after contact) and confusion in the secondary. The latter problem is mostly attributable to constantly changing schemes and play-calling over the prior three seasons, and was exacerbated by the blitz-heavy approach in 2009.

From a higher level perspective the Irish simply could not stop the run.

A good defense can consistently defend the run with seven defenders, at least against most teams. A weak and inexperienced front four and rather unphysical play frequently forced Tenuta to drop an extra defender into the box.

But even with eight defenders the defense was often unable to slow opposing runners. This resulted in vulnerability to vertical passes, particularly those off play-action, and hampered attempts to pressure opposing quarterbacks.

Perhaps most disheartening was the impact of the Irish defense on the offense. The defense all but forced an offensive game plan with a low probability of success. Moreover, the defensive values above would likely be much worse if the Irish offense wasn’t so productive and if ball control hadn’t favored Notre Dame in almost every contest.

But there is a silver lining—small improvements could lead to dramatically better play.

Not only did the Irish surrender a large percentage of production from explosive plays, they also allowed many of them in favorable defensive situations. Moreover, the causes of the breakdowns are correctable.

In other words, the problems aren’t with personnel. With the possible exception of the front four, the Irish defense doesn’t lack for athleticism. And the young defensive line should be considerably helped by another year of maturation.

The issues are more closely tied to fundamentals and coaching.

The former is easily rectified. If Brian Kelly and his defensive staff focus on physicality and tackling, first down defense will improve and become more consistent and the Irish will surrender fewer big plays.

However, the inevitable change back to a 3-4 alignment will be a tough challenge for a unit beset with inconsistent coaching styles and schemes. This constant change is largely responsible for the confusion that enabled so many big plays and only excellent teaching by the new defensive staff will mitigate this problem.

Similar Posts:

• How Good Are the Irish? A Year-End Offensive Statistical Review
• Missed Opportunity and Failed Execution, Notre Dame’s Red Zone Woes
• They Call It Powder Blue, Irish vs. Tar Heels News and Notes

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

Similar to last year, the final AV Ranking values (see the values in the table below) will be used to predict the BCS bowl game winners against the spread.

The BCS games are as follows:

• Rose Bowl presented by Citi: Ohio State vs. Oregon
• Tostitos Fiesta Bowl: Boise State vs. TCU
• Allstate Sugar Bowl: Cincinnati vs. Florida
• FedEx Orange Bowl: Iowa vs. Georgia Tech
• Citi BCS National Championship: Texas vs. Alabama

The AV Ranking predicts the following winners:

• Ohio State (0.836) over Oregon (0.765), margin of 0.071
• TCU (0.855) over Boise State (0.839), margin of 0.016
• Cincinnati (0.882) over Florida (0.838), margin of 0.044
• Iowa (0.784) over Georgia Tech (0.747), margin of 0.037
• Alabama (0.986) over Texas (0.897), margin of 0.089

The BCS National Championship game has the largest AV Ranking margin while the Fiesta Bowl seems to be the most evenly matched contest. The AV Ranking correctly predicted the winner in 80.8 percent of the regular season contests last year. This year is not much different, as the outcomes of 82.3 percent of the regular season games were correctly predicted.

But predicting the winner is far less interesting than predicting which teams will cover the spread.

Using the methodology outlined here, the AV Ranking was used to generate a point spread for the five BCS games listed above. The table below shows these point spreads along with the Vegas point spreads and the corresponding delta. The Vegas spreads were taken on December 7th, so they have likely changed since then.

AV Ranking and Vegas Predictions

As the table shows, the AV Ranking is against the odds in three (Rose, Sugar and Orange) of the five games. This effectively means that the AV Ranking predicts people are overestimating the favorites.

The largest disparity is in the Sugar Bowl, where Vegas has Florida as 10-point favorites while the AV Ranking predicts Cincinnati to win the game. The second largest difference is in the Rose Bowl, where Vegas predicts Oregon to beat Ohio State while the AV Ranking likes the Buckeyes. Both Vegas and the AV Ranking predict about a five-point win for Alabama in the BCS National Championship Game.

As a side note, predicting the Bowl Game winner is not a facile proposition. The best indicator of winning is previous wins, i.e. the strongest corollary to predicting the winner of a game is the Adjusted Win Percentage (AWP) of the two participants. As such, this is the most heavily weighted metric of the AV Ranking.

In Bowl Games the AWP values of the two teams are nearly always similar, as the teams are usually evenly matched. In this scenario, Strength of Schedule (SOS) or Team Performance Ratio (TPR) are better predictors of which team will win as the AWP of both teams is virtually identical.

The AV Ranking SOS predicts the following winners:

• Oregon (0.728) over Ohio State (0.589), margin of 0.139
• TCU (0.310) over Boise State (0.251), margin of 0.059
• Florida (0.578) over Cincinnati (0.552), margin of 0.025
• Iowa (0.608) over Georgia Tech (0.432), margin of 0.176
• Alabama (0.608) over Texas (0.595), margin of 0.014

The AV Ranking TPR predicts the following winners:

• Ohio State (0.778) over Oregon (0.724), margin of 0.054
• TCU (0.835) over Boise State (0.762), margin of 0.073
• Florida (0.847) over Cincinnati (0.691), margin of 0.156
• Georgia Tech (0.669) over Iowa (0.625), margin of 0.044
• Alabama (0.957) over Texas (0.906), margin of 0.052

This data supports the Vegas odds favoring Florida over Cincinnati rather than the AV Ranking prediction of the Bearcats over the Gators. Cincinnati’s number one AWP ranking (see below) trumps its lower SOS and TPR. In other words, the delta between the AV Ranking and Vegas point spreads above is likely overestimated. Additionally, the turnover in Cincinnati’s coaching staff likely favors the Gators even more.

The final ESP and AV Ranking values are shown below. For reference purposes the weekly releases can be found here: week seven, eight, nine, 10, 11, 12 and 13.

Elite Selection Playoff (ESP)

AV Ranking

Adjusted Win Percentage (AWP)

Strength of Schedule (SOS)

Team Performance Ratio (TPR)

Margin of Victory (MOV)

Quality Wins/Losses (QWL)

Rank	Team	Points
1	Alabama	1
2	Ohio State	0.833
3	Iowa	0.577
4	North Carolina	0.52
4	Northwestern	0.52
6	Purdue	0.434
7	Southern Cal	0.419
8	Cincinnati	0.416
9	Florida St	0.405
10	Stanford	0.398

Similar Posts:

• 2009 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Eleven
• 2008 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Fifteen and BCS Championship Predictions
• 2009 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Ten

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

There is no bowl game. Sensational quarterback Jimmy Clausen and unanimous All-American and Biletnikoff Award-winning wide receiver Golden Tate have left for the NFL. And Notre Dame head coach Charlie Weis has been replaced by Brian Kelly.

This seemingly serves as a forward-looking time for Notre Dame football and many are wondering about the direction of the program under its new leadership.

There are several obvious challenges. Can an offensive-minded head coach restore respectability to a woeful defense? Where will the Irish turn without Clausen and Tate and with little depth at quarterback? Will the running game continue to be an afterthought and can the offense solve the red zone problems persistent in the past two seasons? In short, how will Kelly address these looming problems moving forward?

But this does not mean a look back isn’t of value and can’t provide insight into the subtle, fundamental deficiencies plaguing the Irish. As such, this is the first of a two-part, comprehensive statistical review of the 2009 Irish offense and defense. The former will be addressed here, saving the latter for a future installment.

The Benchmarking Discussion

Consistent with previous assessments (including the 2009 offensive and defensive mid-year analyses), the results presented here will be benchmarked to the competition. This approach plays a vital role in appropriately gauging the efficiency and effectiveness of a team’s performance in two primary facets.

Mathematically, examining a team’s production in a vacuum excludes how the competition impacts the results as the largest variable in comparing two teams’ statistical  is the schedule they play.  Performance ratios (or PR’s), while imperfect, provide insight into how the opposition can skew a team’s performance. Here, PR’s are used to adjust the production of the Irish relative to their competition.

But there is also a practical reason.

At the mid-point of the 2008 and 2009 seasons Notre Dame’s offense appeared to be a juggernaut, amassing points and passing yards with seeming ease and ranking with the best in the country in most of the statistical metrics associated with both categories. However, there were fundamental problems that weren’t readily evident until the Irish suffered through second-half season slumps.

In 2008 it was an over-reliance on the big play. While wide receiver Michael Floyd’s injury certainly hurt production, the inability to produce yards without going downfield ultimately spelled disaster.

This season the dependence on the vertical passing game diminished, but a lack of consistency frequently created unfavorable down and distance situations and the pass-heavy play-calling was mostly ineffective inside the red zone. Additionally, the front-end of the schedule featured a slate of weak defensive teams that artificially overstated offensive production. A critical, benchmarked evaluation of the Irish offense revealed these problems long before the losses did.

What Do The Table Values Mean?

The tables below contain 24 statistical values divided into five categories (miscellaneous, offensive efficiency, total offense, rushing offense, and passing offense). This data will be supplemented with more detailed analyses aimed at understanding underlying causes.

For clarity, a detailed description of the table columns can be found here. I highly recommend this refresher in order to understand the data presented below.

Definitions and Disclaimers

The following disclaimers and definitions are pertinent to this analysis:

• Disclaimer: The numbers presented here were taken from the NCAA statistics website and the Notre Dame football statistics homepage and are accurate to the best of my knowledge as of December 14, 2009.
• Definition: An explosive—or big—gain is a running play that produces 15 or more yards or a pass play that gains 20 or more yards.
• Definition: A short yardage situation is any down and distance pair that requires three or fewer yards for a first down.
• Definition: A medium yardage situation is any down and distance pair that requires greater than three, but fewer than seven, yards for a first down.
• Definition: A long yardage situation is any down and distance pair that requires seven or more yards for a first down.

Additionally, for reference purposes, the following are links to the statistical recaps for each 2009 Irish opponent: Nevada, Michigan, Michigan State, Purdue, Washington, USC, Boston College, Washington State, Navy, Pittsburgh, Connecticut and Stanford.

Possession, Discipline and Turnovers

Ball control was solid, penalties were untimely, and turnover margin is respectable despite a second-half season slide.

Miscellaneous

The Irish faced a time of possession deficit only three times (Washington, Navy, and Stanford) during the 2009 season en route to averaging 31:55 per game, good for 16th in the country. The possession was spread fairly evenly in the four quarters of play as Notre Dame averaged more than eight minutes of possession in all but the fourth quarter.

Excluding overtime periods the offense had 140 drives that averaged 2.1 first downs, 6.1 plays, and 38 yards per drive. This production was good for an average time of possession of 2:44 per drive.

Many drives were fairly quick as only 27 (19.3 percent) exceeded 10 plays and only 15 (10.7 percent) eclipsed the five-minute mark. However, to the credit of Clausen and company, only 27 drives (19.3 percent) were three plays and punt.

For the second straight year Weis’ unit showed a significant lack of discipline, ranking in the bottom half of the country in penalty yards. In 2009, however, the number of penalties wasn’t as critical as their timing. Holding and personal fouls, in particular, frequently took away yards, removed points from the scoreboard, and extended opposing team’s drives.

The Navy game aside, protecting the ball was a strong point of the 2009 season as the offense surrendered five turnovers through the first six games and nine in the last six. Those 14 turnovers are good for 13th best in the country. The passing game was particularly good protecting the ball with one interception per 89.4 attempts.

The takeaways aren’t as positive. The Irish rank 76th with only 19 gained turnovers, but struggled most down the stretch as only four turnovers were generated in the final five games.

Not Terribly Efficient

Not much changed from the mid-year point: the kicking game is strong but third down and scoring touchdowns in the red zone continue to be problematic.

Offensive Efficiency

No offense can be considered great without consistently efficient play. The Irish offense was able to move the ball well (see below), and with a good per-play average. However, the third down and scoring efficiencies were pedestrian against average defensive teams.

Notre Dame had 402 play series of which 38.8 percent contained a third down. These opportunities were converted at a rate of 41 percent, good for 61st in the country. The third down inefficiency is mostly due to inconsistent first down offense.

The offense averaged seven yards per first down play, a very respectable number. But it was largely hit or miss as big plays skewed this value (see a more detailed discussion of big plays below).

Better than 50 percent of first down snaps went for more than five yards including 34 out of 73 explosive gains (46.6 percent). However, 36.6 percent of first down plays gained two or fewer yards and excluding big plays the Irish averaged only 4.5 yards per first down snap.

The result is long distances on third down. The Irish offense averaged 6.9 yards to go on third down in addition to needing more than three yards for a conversion on 69.2 percent of third down tries. The third down efficiency in these situations was a paltry 33.3 percent compared to a 60.4 percent conversion rate when faced with short yardage.

While many play series didn’t require a third down, the Irish struggled when faced with one. This was mostly due to the absence of a methodical running game. Sustaining drives with big passing plays is a high rish, low probability modus operandi.

The red zone offense was also problematic. While the field goal kicking was very respectable, the Irish only scored touchdowns 56 percent of the time they entered the red zone. As has been discussed ad nauseum, the offense bogged down inside the 20-yard line where a spread passing game is least effective (more details on the red zone woes forthcoming in a future article).

Let’s Talk Totals

Still more than respectable, but red zone touchdown efficiency hurts the scoring and a tougher slate of defensive teams has dimmed the overall picture.

Total Offense

Save scoring, the total offensive picture is very good and stacks up very similarly to the mid-year numbers.

The Irish rank 15th or better in yards, yards per play, and yards per game, mostly due to one of the country’s most productive passing offenses. The scoring, however, doesn’t match the ability to move the ball. Many times—most notably against Washington and Navy—the Irish were able to churn out yards with ease only to fail to score a touchdown inside the 20-yard line. The relatively low per-game point total is a direct correlation to the poor red zone efficiency.

Excluding overtime periods the Irish had 140 drives and scored on 59 of them (42.1 percent). Of these 59 scores, 20 occurred outside of the red zone (33.9 percent), as 15 touchdowns and 5 field goals came from beyond the 20-yard line. The 15 non-red zone touchdowns account for more than 36 percent of the Irish touchdowns. Expressed differently, 29 percent of drives (41 of 140) resulted in touchdowns but only 18.6 percent (26 of 140) of drives ended with a red zone touchdown.

With the exception of Navy and Pittsburgh, the first half belonged to the Irish. Excluding these two contests the offense averaged almost a touchdown more than their counterparts through two quarters of play.

The second quarter was the most productive as the offense notched 119 of 361 total points (33 percent). The third quarter was quite the opposite as the Irish managed only 47 points (13 percent).

As a whole, the numbers in the last seven games are lower than those in the first five as almost every statistic and ranking are down from the mid-year point. This is mostly due to tougher defensive opposition which has not only lowered the values and rankings, but the PR values as well. It seems the Irish offense was good, but certainly not as prolific as the early season results suggested.

Was Running The Ball Really That Bad?

Efficiency and effectiveness were understated by the way the run was used.

Rushing Offense

Notre Dame ranks 76th or worse in all four major rushing categories. Based on the data above, the effectiveness (yards, touchdowns and yards per game) is equally as low as the efficiency (yards per carry). Moreover, the Irish ground game wasn’t as productive as the opposing defenses typically allowed as every PR is less than zero.

A cursory glance at these numbers shows that the 2009 Irish ground game isn’t much better than last year’s version. A more critical examination leads to a different conclusion.

Officially, Notre Dame attempted 401 rushes for 1,539 yards, a paltry 3.8 yard per carry average. Perhaps more disheartening is the long gain of the year, a 37-yard scamper by running back Robert Hughes.

But removing Clausen’s attempts (sacks, scrambles, sneaks and a handful of designed read option plays) increases the average to 4.8 yards per carry. Additionally, the top four players in rushing yards—running backs Armando Allen, Theo Riddick, Hughes, and Tate—gained 1,489 yards on 284 carries and averaged a solid 5.2 yards per carry. In other words, had Clausen been better protected (see below), the rushing efficiency would be much better.

But there were also other factors that impacted the effectiveness and efficiency of the running game: frequency and situational use.

Notre Dame ranks 90th in rushing attempts with a run/pass split of 401 to 447—52.7 percent in favor of the pass. Excluding Clausen’s carries the offensive rushing attempt rank falls to 115th and the run/pass split decidedly favors the pass as nearly 60 percent of plays were called passes. With so few opportunities, the per-game rushing yards are understandably low.

Additionally, the running game was most heavily used in short yardage situations which decreased the per-attempt average.

Counting sacks as passes, 44.8 percent of first down plays were runs that gained 803 yards at a clip of 4.5 yards per attempt. The 803 yards is more than 52 percent of the total rushing production and the per-carry average is significantly (18.4 percent) above the 3.8-yard team average. On first down, i.e. when there is a relatively equal threat of running and passing, the running game was both effective and efficient.

But in short yardage situations, the running game was used much more frequently with (expected) lower production. Excluding first down, Weis called 195 runs out of 447 snaps (43.6 percent). Of these 447 plays, 24.4 percent were short yardage situations where runs were attempted 68.8 percent of the time, a disproportionately higher amount than any other down and distance situation.

The offensive line and backs delivered, converting nearly 71 percent of these runs into first downs compared to a 55.9 percent conversion rate in the air. But the per-carry average is obviously lower and skews the overall efficiency.

In summary, considering the frequency and method in which it was used, Notre Dame’s running game was both efficient and effective.

Is This What A Weisian Offense Looks Like?

Play-calling made protection difficult and partially limited an otherwise exceptional air attack.

Passing Offense

With very few exceptions, the Irish passing game was phenomenal. Notre Dame ranks 10th or better in every category except yards per completion and the two pass protection metrics.

The former is a result of more conservative play by Clausen. The maturation process came full circle in 2009 as passes to the outlet receivers were preferred to ill-advised downfield throws.

Clausen and company averaged 323.5 yards per game through the air at a clip of 8.7 yards per pass attempt. The junior signal caller finished his career by completing 68 percent of his passes for 3,722 yards, 28 touchdowns, and only four interceptions. Clausen eclipsed the 300 yard passing mark in eight games, had his highest output against Navy (452 yards), and threw a season-high five touchdown passes in the finale against Stanford.

His favorite targets were Floyd and Tate. The former averaged 113.6 receiving yards per game and 18.1 yards per reception. The latter set record after record, catching 93 passes for 1,496 yards—good for a 16.1-yard per-reception average. The Irish receiving tandem also combined for 24 touchdowns.

The pass offense was most dangerous on first down. Counting sacks as pass attempts, the Irish averaged a gaudy 9.2 yards per attempt on 222 plays. Additionally, 59 percent of first down passes went for five or more yards compared to only 32 percent of plays gaining two or fewer yards. It is no coincidence that the down when the run/pass threat was almost even was also the down with the greatest production through the air.

Perhaps most impressive was the pass efficiency. On average, Notre Dame was more efficient than opposing defenses with a mean PR of 0.25 in the “efficiency categories” (yards per attempt, completion percentage, interceptions, and pass efficiency). The ability to operate at this efficiency level is directly responsible for the ball control advantage.

About the only deficiencies were a puzzling regression in pass protection from a very respectable 2008 campaign and poor third down play.

Much of this can be attributed to play-calling, the burden of execution on the offensive line was very difficult as the Irish frequently attempted to protect with five out of the shotgun and with very little pocket diversity, e.g. play-action, roll-out’s and/or bootlegs.

These factors also contributed to poor third down passing where the offense needed an average of 8.5 yards for a conversion. In these situations the Irish only managed to move the chains 34.7 percent of the time. But even on short yardage third downs the Irish struggled to gain first downs throwing the ball (three of nine).

And this is what makes this performance even more impressive . The Irish pass offense was exceptionally efficient despite throwing the ball with great frequency, without a solid running presence, and with fairly predictable tendencies.

It’s Always About The Big One

The 2008 Irish offense was far too reliant on the big play. This was not a problem in 2009 as a dramatically more efficient passing attack emerged. The 2009 unit was certainly explosive, but was efficient even without the vertical passing game.

Notre Dame ran 848 plays of which 73 (8.6 percent) were big gains. These 73 plays gained 2,183 yards (29.9 yard per play average) and accounted for 40.3 percent of the total offense. Excluding the explosive gains, the Irish averaged a respectable 4.2 yards per play, a substantial increase over the 3.3-yard per play average last season. On average, the Irish offense generated 6.1 plays and 181.9 yards per game in explosive gains.

As expected, most of the big play production occurred on first and second down. The Irish notched 34 explosive gains on first down and 29 on second. The average per explosive play, however, was considerably more on first down—33.7 yards compared to 27.3 yards per play on second down.

Running

The running game’s big play production wasn’t as prolific as that through the air as only 34.2 percent of the 73 explosive gains came on the ground.

The Irish averaged 2.1 big runs and 41.2 explosive rushing yards per game. All in all, 32.1 percent of the ground production came on big runs which averaged 19.8 yards. Without these runs the offense gained only 2.8 yards per carry, a value that is not markedly better than last year, but was undoubtedly impacted by the heavy use of the run in short yardage situations.

Most of the big runs occurred on second down where nearly 44.7 percent of the explosive rushing yards came on 12 plays (18.4 yards per attempt).

Passing

Clausen and company notched 48 big gains through the air, averaging 35.2 yards per completion and good for 43.5 percent of the total passing production. Without these plays the Irish passing offense still managed 5.5 yards per attempt and 8.7 yards per completion.

As noted above, the majority of these pass plays occurred on first down as 25 big completions (52.1 percent) accounted for 953 yards (56.4 percent), a 38.1-yard per play average. All three values were, by far, well above the other down averages. Excluding these big gains on first down, however, cuts the average gain by more than 40 percent and was largely responsible for the inconsistent first down production referenced above.

So What Was The Offensive Game Plan?

It seems Weis’ high-level game plan was consistent throughout the year: score early and often to counter an inept defensive unit. The former aimed at forcing opposing offenses to become one-dimensional while the latter was necessary to offset the 25.9 points per game surrendered by the Irish defense.

As the running game lacked an explosive element, the preferred method of accomplishing this was a pass-heavy play-calling approach and virtually every offensive statistic supports this interpretation.

Notre Dame ranked 20th in pass attempts, rarely had long drives, and gained over 71 percent of their yards through the air. The most productive Irish players were integral to the passing game (Clausen, Floyd, Tate and tight end Kyle Rudolph) and with such efficient play from Clausen, ball control wasn’t an issue and the running game wasn’t needed to chew the clock. Moreover, the best PR values are all directly or indirectly related to throwing the ball.

The run was mostly used to keep defenses honest (fairly even run/pass split on first down) and convert short yardage situations (nearly 69 percent of short yardage plays were runs), both of which contributed to artificially underestimate its effectiveness.

This offensive approach is only problematic on third down and in the red zone, the two fundamental deficiencies keeping an otherwise strong unit from being truly great.

Erratic first down play—mostly in the passing game—frequently led to long down and distances and the spread passing scheme struggled to produce touchdowns inside the red zone. Additionally, the lack of diversity and play-calling predictability led to protection problems.

Better—read, more balanced—use of the running game would have likely produced more consistent first down gains and created more favorable down and distances. More than 57 percent of second downs and almost 43 percent of third downs were long distance situations. Given the efficiency of the Irish backs (and Tate), this seemed like viable option.

But these problems aside, the offense was certainly good enough to win 10 or 11 games. With a more respectable defensive unit the Irish could have exhibited more balance and been even more productive.

Perhaps most frightening is what lies ahead. As Clausen and Tate depart for the NFL, not only will Kelly have to replace one of the finest quarterbacks and wide receivers in the illustrious history of Notre Dame, he will also have to replace 70.1 percent of the total yardage output and 76.7 percent of the Irish touchdown production.

Similar Posts:

• How Good Are the Irish? A Year-End Defensive Statistical Review
• Missed Opportunity and Failed Execution, Notre Dame’s Red Zone Woes
• They Call It Powder Blue, Irish vs. Tar Heels News and Notes

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

What follows are some further responses and elaboration on questions from the interview. The audio of the interview itself can be found at the bottom of this article.

On Brian Kelly’s Impact On The Irish Fan Base And Whether Or Not Notre Dame Settled…

Many fans will never be satisfied, especially after 20-plus years of mediocrity in a football program that defines tradition. As such, some fans will view this hire as a failure.

Other fans will view it as an upgrade. Kelly is a very different coach than Charlie Weis, and this will breath life into those frustrated with Weis’ consistent trumpeting of X’s and O’s.

The reality is somewhere in between.

There are a lot of positives about Kelly. He’s coached in the college game at three levels (Division II at Grand Valley State, Central Michigan in the Mid-American conference, and Cincinnati in the Big East) and has been successful at all three. His 85 percent win rate (34-6 record) at Cincinnati includes 5-3 against teams that finished in the AP top 25 and 16-4 against teams with a winning record. This performance is very impressive, as is his 118-35-2 overall record. Kelly consistently does more with less, and he will certainly have more talent in South Bend than at any of his previous stops.

But a good argument can be made that he doesn’t meet Notre Dame athletic director Jack Swarbrick’s criteria as a coach who has built and sustained a successful program at the highest level of college football. And from that standpoint, his hiring carries a certain amount of risk.

On The Importance Of Defense vs. Recruiting…

This is not an either/or question. It is a both/and proposition.

Recruiting is the bloodline of a program, and a particularly challenging task at Notre Dame. The Irish are not in a talent-rich part of the country and compete with schools that have a strong regional presence.

As such, recruiting must be national, and Kelly has yet to face this challenge. He must continue—if not improve upon—the momentum of Weis. Getting less talented, but passionate, players will not be sufficient to consistently compete in South Bend.

Defense is also important.

Weis’ tenure has been mostly characterized by dynamic passing teams with poor production on the defensive side of the ball. This was never more true than this season when the record-setting production of quarterback Jimmy Clausen and wide receiver Golden Tate was undermined by poor defensive play. A respectable defensive unit would have been worth four or five more wins.

A head coach must be well-versed in all aspects of the game, and, in the case of the Irish defense, simplicity and continuity trump everything else. The current defensive players have been through three defensive schemes (4-3, 3-4, and blitz-heavy 4-3) and three defensive coordinators (Rick Minter, Corwin Brown and Jon Tenuta) in four years. They need continuity and simplicity to reach their potential and gain confidence.

On The Cincinnati Players’ Reactions And Handling The Media…

Kelly has yet to coach at a program with a heavy dose of national media attention. The spotlight at Notre Dame is second to none and it is absolutely certain that he will live under a microscope while in South Bend.

This is a unique problem to football programs like Notre Dame, one that he has never dealt with. His responses to questions pertaining to the job weren’t handled particularly well, even with a hired public relations consultant, and he doesn’t seem prepared for what is coming.

This is a skill Kelly must learn quickly in order to handle the scrutiny coming his way. As Weis proved, even comments from your opening press conference can become sound bites characterizing your coaching tenure.

On Academic Standards…

The media overstate the extent to which high admission standards limit the success of Notre Dame’s football program. It seems to be a convenient, blanket excuse like “no team speed” given by pundits who haven’t critically evaluated the program.

While it is true that admissions requirements for student-athletes are higher at Notre Dame than at many other schools, it isn’t a limiting factor. The Irish coaching staff has a smaller pool of potential recruits to select from, but that doesn’t mean consistent recruiting at a high level is impossible, it just means there is a smaller margin for error. Hard work and casting a nationwide net can overcome this problem.

Weis certainly proved this.

Over his tenure recruiting was very good and the roster holes weren’t because of admissions problems. Most of the misses were elite players who were admitted, they simply chose to go elsewhere for a variety of reasons. The players that could not gain admission to Notre Dame were few and far between.

There is also the other side of the argument. Academics can be a selling point. A very small percentage of college football players make it to the NFL, and even those who do have very short careers. A degree from Notre Dame is a strong asset if a professional football career isn’t possible, or when a player’s time in the NFL is over. The high graduation rate of Irish players and reputation of Notre Dame as an academic institution all but guarantees a sustainable, lifelong career in a non-football related job.

On Clausen And Tate Departing And The Irish Skill Talent…

Skill talent gets fans excited. Winning the battle in the trenches allows the skill players to succeed.

The Irish will boast a bevy of talent at the running back, tight end and wide receiver positions in 2010, but it matters little if the front five cannot perform adequately or if there is no quarterback capable of distributing the ball.

Provided there is some defensive improvement, Kelly won’t need Dayne Crist or one of the incoming freshman to win games in 2010. Kelly has proven capable of developing quarterbacks and in his offense where this position is primarily one of distribution.

It is really about the defense next season. Notre Dame will have plenty of weapons in the running and passing games, and Kelly’s track record on the offensive side of the ball should produce good results. The real question mark will be a defense that struggled throughout the 2009 campaign.

[Audio clip embedded: please view full post to listen.]

Similar Posts:

• 670 the Score Radio Interview Audio and Reflections
• Spread and Pass, Brian Kelly’s (Somewhat) New Irish Offense
• Spring Football Focus Part I: Personnel Changes

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

For the 33 Irish seniors, it was a bitter way to end a season ripe with high expectations. For head coach Charlie Weis it was a final loss to end a five-year coaching tenure. For junior quarterback Jimmy Clausen and wide receiver Golden Tate, it may have been their final game in a Notre Dame uniform.

Offense

This game featured some familiar problems for the Irish offense to go along with improved play in other areas.

The Irish gained 447 yards for an average of 8.1 yards per snap and scored 38 points, second only to the 40 points scored against Washington State. Most of the yardage came via big plays and the offense had only three negative plays, their lowest total of the year.

The pass was heavily favored as only 20 runs were called for running backs and Tate out of a season-low 55 plays. Correspondingly, 76.1 percent of the yards came through the air, very near the season-high against Navy (88.3 percent), while 23.9 percent of the offensive production came on the ground.

The first downs followed a similar trend. Notre Dame moved the chains 21 times in the game (very close to the season-low 20 against Pittsburgh), but only notched six on the ground. The six rushing first downs tied Washington, Navy and Pittsburgh for the least all year.

Weis solved the persistent red zone touchdown efficiency problems by scoring from afar. The offense had two red zone possessions and scored touchdowns both times—once on a five-yard pass from Clausen to Tate and the other on an 18-yard strike from Clausen to wide receiver Michael Floyd. The remaining touchdowns came via big passing plays—78 and 28-yard catches by Tate, and a 46-yard reception by Floyd.

In fact, the big plays were a huge part of the offense. Better than 60 percent of the total production came from eight plays (three runs, five passes) that gained 271 yards (33.9 yards per play). Without these eight plays the Irish averaged only 3.7 yards per snap, very near the low mark of the season set against Washington.

Third down was a mixed bag. The offense started strong in the first quarter (four of five) but failed to convert a single third down opportunity through the final three quarters of play.

Rushing

Weis has all but abandoned the run over the last four games as the offense has averaged a paltry 89 yards per game on the ground. Against Navy, Pittsburgh and Connecticut, this was somewhat understandable as the Irish averaged only 3.1 yards per rush.

But against Stanford, Notre Dame gained 107 yards on 25 carries at a rate of 4.3 yards per attempt—a value that climbs to 5.3 when sacks are excluded. This is especially puzzling given that the Irish led for much of the game.

Running back Robert Hughes was particularly effective—albeit seldom used—with 77 yards on only 13 carries (5.7 yards per attempt). On the fifth drive of the game Hughes ran the ball three consecutive times for 24 yards and two first downs. The next play Weis emptied the backfield and passed from the shotgun.

This makes little sense and is indicative of the head-scratching play-calling evident throughout the year.

The run was working, and working well. Hughes is a rhythm back that gets better with more carries. Mixing in the pass to keep the opposing defense off-balance is a valid strategy, but using an empty-gun formation telegraphs the pass and completely removes the threat of the run.

Similar to the previous 11 games, the Irish were good running the ball in short yardage situations. There were nine short yardage situations in this game. Six runs were called and four resulted in first downs (66.7 percent). Unfortunately, one of the failed attempts was when the Irish needed to extend a winning scoring drive late in the game.

Three explosive runs gained 54 yards (18 yards per rush). Without these three gains and excluding sacks the Irish averaged 3.5 yards per carry.

Passing

If it was the last game in the Blue and Gold for Clausen and Tate, they certainly went out in style as the Irish passing game was both effective and efficient.

Clausen completed 76.7 percent of his passes (23 of 30) for 340 yards, five touchdowns, and no interceptions as he averaged 11.3 yards per attempt and 14.8 yards per completion.

Five explosive passes went for 217 yards (43.4 yards per completion) and three touchdowns. The per-completion average for these plays was second only to Nevada (48.8 yards per completion). Excluding these five passes Clausen averaged 4.9 yards per attempt and 6.8 yards per completion—the lowest value of the season.

For the year the Irish signal caller has completed 68 percent (289 of 425) of his throws for 3722 yards, 28 touchdowns, and only four interceptions, averaging 8.8 yards per attempt and 12.9 yards per completion. This performance has been good for a 161.4 passer rating.

What makes these numbers even more impressive is how they have come.

Clausen is responsible for as much of the offensive execution as any quarterback in the country. Additionally, he has no running game to fall back on, has been consistently pressured, and has been restrained by play-calling that makes execution in the passing game extremely difficult.

Tate was his usual, electrifying self. The junior wide receiver generated the bulk of the production through the air catching 10 balls for 201 yards (20.1 yards per reception) and three touchdowns. Floyd added six catches for 85 yards (14.2 yards per reception) and two touchdowns of his own.

Similar to the Navy and Pittsburgh games, the front five couldn’t protect Clausen when it mattered most. The offensive line surrendered two sacks, both on the final drive of the game and one when the Irish had no timeouts left to stop the clock. The Irish have allowed one sack per 17.9 pass attempts after surrendering one per 20.3 pass attempts last year.

Defense

The Irish defense had one of their worst outings of the year in almost every facet of the game but played particularly poor on first down.

The Cardinal offense gained 496 yards on 69 plays (7.2 yards per snap) using a run-heavy approach. Stanford head coach Jim Harbaugh ran the ball 48 times and attempted only 21 passes to gain 15 rushing and 10 passing first downs.

Nine plays were explosive gains that generated 198 yards (22 yards per play), roughly 40 percent of the total offense. Without these plays Stanford averaged five yards per snap, slightly below the season-high 5.2-yard average posted by Michigan State earlier in the year.

Six of these nine plays came on first down. Notre Dame surrendered eight yards per first down play, allowing 19 of 33 (57.6 percent) plays to gain five or more yards while holding the Cardinal to two or fewer yards on only 11 tries (33.3 percent).

Perhaps more astounding were the number of first down plays that resulted in first downs. Out of 25 total first downs, 11 (44 percent) came on a first down play as the Cardinal offense moved the chains on a third of their play series without needing a second or third down.

When the Irish managed to force second and third down the outcome wasn’t much better. Similar to the game against Boston College, the defense surrendered several big gains in long distance situations and allowed 66.7 percent of third downs to be converted. Most of these gains came through the air as co-defensive coordinator Jon Tenuta loaded the box in a futile attempt to stop the Cardinal running game.

Things were just as ugly in the red zone where the opposing offense scored on all six possessions inside the Irish 20-yard line. Five of these scores were touchdowns.

Rushing

If Cardinal running back Toby Gerhart wasn’t a Heisman Trophy contender prior to Saturday, he certainly should be now.

Behind a rather small offensive line, Gerhart grew stronger as the game progressed and Stanford’s rushing attack posted arguably the most efficient and effective outing of the year against the Irish defense.

The opposing rush offense was dominant and mostly responsible for a 14 play and more than 10-minute time of possession advantage. The former was second only to game against Washington while the latter was the largest possession disparity of the season for the Irish.

Gerhart’s bruising, physical running style resulted in three touchdowns and 205 yards rushing on 29 carries, good for a gaudy 7.1 yards per rush.

As a team the Cardinal scored four touchdowns and gained 280 yards rushing on 48 attempts (5.8 yards per rush). Both values are second only to Navy. Without the sack of quarterback Tavita Pritchard the average increases to 6.1 yards per carry.

Five big runs gained 99 yards (19.8 yards per attempt) and accounted for 35.4 percent of the rushing production. Without these plays Stanford still managed 181 yards on 43 attempts, good for 4.2 yards per rushing attempt, the highest allowed this season by Notre Dame.

First down rush defense was just as bad, if not worse. Nearly 35 percent (8 of 23) of first down running plays moved the chains as the Cardinal offense averaged eight yards per first down rush attempt including explosive gains of 18, 18, 28 and 19 yards.

About the only bright spot for the Irish was allowing first down conversions on only five of 10 short yardage rushing attempts.

Passing

It wasn’t just the run defense that struggled.

Quarterback Andrew Luck completed 70 percent (14 of 20) of his pass attempts for 198 yards and no interceptions to lead a passing offense that was equally as efficient as the Cardinal running game.

As a team Stanford gained 216 yards through the air at a rate of 10.3 yards per attempt and 14.4 yards per completion. The 71.4 percent completion percentage was the highest allowed all year by Notre Dame.

Four passes went for more than 20 yards. These four plays gained 99 yards (24.8 yards per play) and were responsible for almost 46 percent of the production through the air. Excluding these four pass plays Stanford averaged 10.6 yards per completion and 6.9 yards per attempt—the highest value posted against the Irish this season.

Notre Dame allowed 7.8 yards per first down pass as Luck completed six of 10 attempts for 78 yards and three of the 10 Cardinal passing first downs.

Special Teams

Kicker David Ruffer continued to fill in nicely for the injured freshman Nick Tausch, connecting on all five point after attempts and both field goal tries.

However, the special teams problems weren’t in the scoring department. Despite a healthy 43-yard punting average by Ben Turk that included a 53-yard boot, the Irish gave away 12 yards in field position.

The biggest culprit was kickoffs as Notre Dame surrendered 10 yards in net kickoff average.

Summary

It is unfortunate, but fitting, that the Weis era would end with a loss similar to so many others. A prolific passing attack was undermined by poor defense and puzzling play-calling that included no commitment to running the football. The latter remains arguably the most baffling aspect of Weis’ college coaching career.

If the game against Connecticut didn’t prove the value of a running game, this one certainly did. The Cardinal red zone touchdown efficiency, 10-minute time of possession and 14-play advantage, 71.4 percent pass completion rate and efficient pass attempt average, minimal (4) negative plays, and 66.7 percent third down conversion rate are all directly tied to the ability to run the ball. Perhaps more impressive is that Stanford accomplished this with a much smaller line than the front five for Notre Dame.

The result was similar to almost every other contest this season, a close outcome with a chance for an Irish win. Lately that chance has favored the other team as Clausen and company have been unable to produce when it mattered most.

Scoring 38 points should be enough to win a game, but the reality is that the Irish didn’t accomplish what they needed to win on either side of the ball. The offense managed to score from outside the red zone but didn’t control the ball and spent too much of the day in spread formations attempting to go downfield.

The defense failed to stop the run, despite crowding the box and affording Luck success through the air. Moreover, the Irish front seven failed to penetrate and allowed Gerhart to run downhill for most of the game.

This game marks the end of the Weis regime but his failure was evident long ago. Several off-season changes brought hope of a nine or 10-win season, but these changes were guesses aimed at correcting problems of the past, not solutions of anticipated challenges. The constant change over the past three seasons has prevented player development and consistent performance on the field.

Despite his failure, Weis has left the program in a better state than when he started and a proven, qualified coach should be able to turn the program around in relatively short order. Hopefully athletic director Jack Swarbrick finds him quickly.

Be sure to check back soon for year-end statistical reviews similar to those performed over the bye week this season (offense and defense) and at the end of last year (offense and defense).

Similar Posts:

• Statistically Speaking: Notre Dame vs. Connecticut
• Notre Dame vs. Stanford: Keys to an Irish Win
• Statistically Speaking: Notre Dame vs. Washington

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

His list of shortcomings is long and condemning, but painfully reiterating what the on-field product clearly shows adds no value other than venting frustration at the most readily identifiable target.

He deserves better.

In 2005, Weis took a job no one wanted. Notre Dame had a reputation as a program that couldn’t recruit. The Irish offense was a trainwreck. And the secondary was among the worst in the country.

During his tenure, Weis developed two Heisman Trophy candidate quarterbacks in Brady Quinn and Jimmy Clausen, and morphed the Irish offense into a modern, pro-style unit. While the production of his offense has been overstated both last year and this season, these accomplishments are far from trivial.

Perhaps more important was his work on the recruiting trail. Weis and his assistants were tireless in their efforts, scouring the country from coast to coast to find talented players like Clausen, Ethan Johnson, Michael Floyd, Golden Tate, Kyle Rudolph and Manti Te’o. The last of these Weis recruited on crutches with two knees that desperately needed surgery.

His teams have performed well in academics, there have been very few disciplinary issues off the field, and he was an excellent steward of the players. Stories like “Pass Right” will forever be inscribed in Irish football lore.

There is no questioning his effort, devotion or love for his alma mater, and that is ultimately what separates him from his previous two predecessors. Weis did everything he could, and for that his legacy deserves to be remembered better than that of Bob Davie or Tyrone Willingham.

But with a 6-6 record in year five of his tenure, his best simply isn’t good enough.

It’s Time To Move On, But To Whom?

So who should athletic director Jack Swarbrick hire as the next coach at Notre Dame? First, let’s examine the situation surrounding Weis’ hiring.

It is human nature to focus on recent and negative data. Negatives are viewed as the cause of failure and the latest evidence and experiences often seem to be the most pertinent, especially when emotion is involved. This is known as the availability bias and the natural consequence is seeking a corrective action that compensates for these deficiencies.

In many ways, Weis’ hiring reflected this philosophy.

Much of Notre Dame Nation, myself included, didn’t see this at the time. While I wasn’t sold on Weis, I was impressed by his success in the NFL and partially won over by the “hard-working, intelligent, nasty” team promised at his introductory press conference. I was more impressed when he turned the once-dormant Irish offense into a scoring machine. And I was even more impressed when I read his book “No Excuses,” and heard the things he said to the team upon his arrival at Notre Dame. Eventually, I moved from skeptic to believer.

I did this mostly because many of Weis’ strengths were the weaknesses of Notre Dame’s previous two coaches.

Weis is brash, confident (almost to a fault), and direct. Willingham was timid, guarded, and lacked transparency (also almost to a fault). Davie seemed to always have a canned response. Davie and Willingham fielded offenses that lacked explosion and production. Weis’ offenses set record after record. Neither Davie nor Willingham “got” Notre Dame and what it stood for. Weis not only “gets it,” he is an alumnus who embraces it. Willingham was lazy, Weis never stops working. Willingham couldn’t recruit, Weis has hauled in several highly-ranked recruiting classes.

But does that mean that Willingham and Davie didn’t do good things during their tenure in South Bend? Furthermore, does it mean that Weis is infallible? It was nearly impossible to foresee his failure at the time of his hiring, but the past three seasons have certainly proven it.

The lesson of Weis’ failure (and Davie’s and Willingham’s) is that Notre Dame needs a coach who does many things well, not one that excels in a few areas that have been lacking over the recent coaching regimes.

So this begs the question: who should be hired as the next head football coach at Notre Dame? There is no simple answer. Notre Dame is a unique place that has unique coaching challenges. What works for other programs doesn’t necessarily apply.

The Criteria For Success

The list below doesn’t answer this question with a specific name, but rather with a specific set of criteria. To ensure success, the following criteria (in no particular order) must be satisfied:

1. He must have head coaching experience. Notre Dame is not a place where you learn on the job. The margin for error is small, and even small mistakes are unforgiving. Prior head coaching experience is necessary to develop requisite leadership, organizational and time management skills.
2. He must have experience in a college football program with consistent success. Too often coaching hires are based on the performance of one or a few seasons. A coach must be proven through consistent success. Hot coaching names come and go (see Turner Gill), but consistent success in the past is the best indicator of succeeding in the future. It is preferable that this come as a head coach, but many assistant coaches have learned what it takes to succeed from their superiors.
3. He must have offensive or defensive coordinator experience. Part of being a head coach is allocating time and effort of the assistant coaches and players. A head coach must have a first-hand understanding of the effort level and time needed to prepare and implement a game plan in order to properly and effectively allocate resources.
4. He must be able to relate to younger players and adapt to their changing needs. One of the primary jobs of a head coach is having his team emotionally prepared for each game. To effectively motivate and lead, a head coach must connect with young adults and understand the challenges college students face. Additionally, a freshman is not the same as a senior. The head coach must adapt his approach as each player matures.
5. He must be able to recruit well. There is a litany of things that go into this—proven success, being able to relate to high school players, forming relationships with high school coaches, working tirelessly, and hiring a staff who can also recruit. At Notre Dame this also means casting a nationwide net. Academic standards make the number of potential recruits much smaller than at other schools. The only way to combat this problem is to delve into every available talent pool.
6. He must be able to recognize and hire assistant coaches who can develop and utilize the talent he recruits. Talent is synonymous with athleticism and proportional to potential. Players who excel at the high school level frequently do so by being more athletic than their peers. This is not sufficient at the college level when teaching fundamentals that maximize potential becomes far more important to success. Assistant coaches must be able to teach and instill fundamentals, as well as put players in positions that maximize their strengths and minimize their weaknesses.
7. He must be disciplined, well-organized, and consistent, and he must maintain a team with those same qualities. With few exceptions, players take on the attitude and persona of their coach. Discipline minimizes turnovers and penalties. Organization minimizes poor game and clock management. Consistency ensures continued success and sustains player development. The lack of consistency over the past few years has severely hampered the progress of many Irish players.
8. He must have goals that are aligned with Notre Dame’s athletic department and administration. This is more important at Notre Dame than perhaps any other program. The head coach at Notre Dame must “get it,” and embrace what the Notre Dame family represents. He must work well with the administration and maintain a vision for the program that is consistent with the aspirations of the University.
9. He needs to have a well-defined and complementary offensive and defensive philosophy. This doesn’t mean he has to be a play-caller on either side of the ball, but it does mean he needs to hire offensive and defensive coordinators/coaches who are capable of implementing schemes congruent with the philosophies of the head coach. Moreover, these schemes need to complement each other such that the strengths of the scheme on one side of the ball accentuate those on the other.

In Closing…

The next few weeks will be filled with speculation as hot names like Bob Stoops, Urban Meyer and Brian Kelly dot the headlines covering the Irish coaching search.

Some candidates may be disinclined to take the job. Many of the coaches that exhibit the criteria listed above are in established programs where success is more easily achieved. Taking a more difficult job like Notre Dame isn’t necessarily appealing, even with the unparalleled praise that comes with leading the Irish back to the top. But these candidates are not the only ones that can succeed.

There are other coaches that possess most of the items above. To maximize the chance of success Swarbrick must find a candidate with as many as possible, and a well-defined plan to minimize risk in the others. Additionally, more emphasis must be applied to some of the criteria—e.g. head coaching experience and recruiting prowess—than to others.

Weis will leave the program in a better state than his predecessor. While they may not rival USC or Florida, the Irish boast plenty of talent on both sides of the ball. With better fundamentals and improved coaching, Notre Dame can certainly succeed at an elite level.

It is Swarbrick’s task to find this coach and bring him to South Bend. His legacy will be defined by it.

Similar Posts:

• Facing an Angry Mob: The Future of Charlie Weis at Notre Dame
• Under Pressure (Already)
• Where’s Our Golden Ticket?

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

TCU and Boise State have had great runs, but they are too far away in point differentials to make up the ground needed to get into the top two. The bias of pre-season polls and poor competition has shattered their shot at a title game appearance. Cincinnati is undoubtedly in the same category.

The Irish finish the season at 60th in the AV Ranking, going 6-6 against the 26th most difficult schedule and generating the 47th best TPR. A cursory view of this metric seems to be an excellent predictor of team ranking as Alabama, Florida and Texas occupy the top spots and several other highly ranked teams have excellent TPR rankings.

Stay tuned for some BCS bowl game predictions, similar to those performed last season.

Elite Selection Playoff (ESP)

AV Ranking

Adjusted Win Percentage (AWP)

Strength of Schedule (SOS)

Team Performance Ratio (TPR)

Margin of Victory (MOV)

Quality Wins/Losses (QWL)

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