While the 2008 and 2009 Irish squads finished 1-8 in November, this year’s unit went 3-0. It isn’t time to anoint Kelly the next Lou Holtz or Ara Parseghian, but Notre Dame played its best football down the stretch without several critical players such as quarterback Dayne Crist, running back Armando Allen, wide receiver Theo Riddick, tight end Kyle Rudolph, inside linebacker Carlo Calabrese, and nose guard Ian Williams who all missed at least one game due to injury.

But Kelly’s troops weren’t just undefeated, they were dominant. The Irish displayed a toughness and physicality led to a November winning streak where Notre Dame outscored their three opponents by a margin of 75-22.

If that wasn’t enough, the decisive victory over the Miami Hurricanes in the Sun Bowl was the explanation point on the season. The Irish dominated through the three meaningful quarters of play with an advantage in plays (20), yards (116—including an 85-yard advantage on the ground), first downs (6), turnovers (+4), and explosive gains (4 big gains, 116 big play yards). The result was a 30-3 score at the end of the third period, a far more accurate representation game’s outcome than the 33-17 final score.

The upward team trajectory combined with the return of a host of starters on both sides of the ball has many Irish fans excited about 2011. But before looking ahead, a review of the past is in order. This is the first of a two-part installment detailing the offensive and defensive performance of the Irish. This offensive analysis appropriately benchmarks the statistical production, providing value and ranking information on several pertinent metrics, and outlining underlying trends that contributed to the overall performance.

Benchmarking Notre Dame’s Performance

Consistent with previous assessments (2009 year-end offensive and defensive analyses, 2009 mid-year offensive and defensive analyses, and 2008 year-end offensive and defensive analyses), the statistical performance detailed here will be benchmarked to the competition.

There are a host of reasons benchmarking is valuable, but the primary one is quite simple: an examination of a team’s performance, without consideration of the competition against which that performance was generated, excludes a huge source of variance.

Here, performance ratios (or PR’s) will be used to account for the quality of competition (additional information on PR’s can be found here). Performance ratios are not entirely perfect, but do provide insight into how the opposition can skew a team’s performance and form the basis for the Team Performance Ratio (TPR) of the AVR.

A Tabular Description

The tables below contain 36 statistical metrics divided into five categories: miscellaneous, offensive efficiency, and total, rushing, and passing offense. This data will be supplemented with more detailed information aimed at understanding underlying factors that contributed to the high-level performance.

The pertinent statistics for each category are presented in tabular form and include the numbers for Notre Dame and the averages of their 13 opponents.

Each table has six columns (the miscellaneous table is void of PR’s):

1. Statistic — The statistical metric
2. Notre Dame — The value of 1. for the Irish offense
3. Notre Dame Rank — The rank of 1. for the Irish offense
4. Opponent Average — The average defensive value of 1. for Irish opponents
5. Opponent Average Rank — The average defensive rank of 1. for Irish opponents
6. PR — The PR of 1. for Notre Dame—values greater than zero indicate the Irish are performing above the average level of their competition, values less than zero are indicative of below average performance (Notre Dame ranked 64th in offensive TPR in 2010).

The stats presented here are from the NCAA statistics website and are accurate as of January 10, 2011.

Definitions and Disclaimers

The following disclaimers and definitions are pertinent to this discussion:

• Definition: An explosive—or big—gain is a run of 15 or more yards or a pass of 20 or more yards.
• Definition: Down and distance situations are defined as follows: short—less than three yards for a first down/touchdown, medium—between three and seven yards, long—greater than seven yards
• Definition: Open downs are those where a run is equally as viable as a pass, e.g. 1st and 10, 2nd and medium, and 3rd/4th and short. Closed downs are those where a pass play is “needed” for a chance to convert a first down/touchdown, e.g. 2nd/3rd/4th and long.
• Definition: A successful play is one that achieves the following gains: 1st down—40 percent or more yards needed for a first down/touchdown, 2nd down—60 percent or more yards, 3rd/4th down—100 percent of yards. Expressed differently, a succesful play is one that maintains an open down situation on the following play on play series that begin with 1st and 10.
• Definition: A meaningful possession is one that occurs when the outcome of the game is still in doubt (defined by score differential and number of remaining possessions), and excludes drives where the quarterback takes a knee to preserve a victory.

For reference purposes, the following are links to the statistical recaps for each 2010 Irish opponent (Purdue and Miami in absentia): Michigan, Michigan State, Stanford, Boston College, Pittsburgh, Western Michigan, Navy, Tulsa, Utah, Army and USC.

Possession, Penalties and Turnovers—One Out of Three Ain’t As Bad As It Seems

Time of possession stunk, but is it a meaningful metric? The (penalty) discipline was good. Turnovers must improve for the Irish to reach their ceiling.

Miscellaneous

There was a lot of talk prior to the season about Kelly’s offensive approach and how it didn’t seek to manage the game via ball control. Many were fearful that operating at a fast pace and scoring quickly would leave the defense on the field far too long.

True to his form, Kelly didn’t maximize possession. The Irish ranked in the bottom 15 of the country with 27:56 in time of possession. Furthermore, Notre Dame only enjoyed a possession advantage against WMU, Army and Miami, the last being the most skewed time of possession game of the entire season.

But, in reality, losing the time of possession battle is only important if a team is also behind in play differential, and Notre Dame ran more plays than their opponent in seven of 13 games (1.4 more plays per game). Additionally, the Irish offense averaged 2.47 plays per minute while opposing offenses averaged 2.18. In other words, the Irish defense had more time to rest between plays than did their opponents.

Former head coach Charlie Weis’ teams were never terribly undisciplined, but Kelly’s squad really minimized penalties. The Irish ranked 7th in penalties per game and 15th in penalty yards per game. Not only was Notre Dame not racking up infractions with any frequency, they also weren’t committing many penalties of the 10 and/or 15-yard variety.

Unfortunately, however, the discipline didn’t translate to the turnover department where the Irish were only +1 on the season (51st in the country). Notre Dame won the turnover battle seven times in 2010, but were on the other side of the ledger in several close losses including Michigan (-3), Michigan State (-2), and Tulsa (-2). Most of the damage came in the form of interceptions, Irish ball carriers only lost eight fumbles on the season (25th ranked), while Crist, Nate Montana, and Tommy Rees combined for 16 interceptions (99).

The most damaging aspect of the turnovers was the points opposing offenses were able to generate from them. The offense surrendered 24 turnovers that resulted in average starting field position near midfield and resulted in 69 points (2.9 per turnover, 5.3 per game). The defense was able to force 25 takeaways and turn them into 64 points (2.6, 4.9), but eight turnovers and 27 points off them came against the Broncos and Hurricanes. Excluding these two games the Irish faced a huge turnover deficit, forcing only 17 takeaways that turned into 37 points (2.2, 3.4) compared to allowing 69 points off 23 turnovers (3, 6.3), i.e. almost a touchdown per game surrendered off turnovers.

Regression In the Efficiency Department(s)

Down efficiencies regressed. Red zone opportunities are down. Red zone efficiency was eerily similar to 2009.

Offensive Efficiency

Third down efficiency declined slightly from 41 percent in 2009 to 38.3 percent this season. A breakdown of the situational third down efficiency (percentage of third downs/conversion rate):

• 3rd and short—23.9/62.8
• 3rd and medium—18.9/52.9
• 3rd and long—57.2/23.3
• 3rd and more than three yards—76.1/30.7

Compare the values above to the situational third down efficiency for the Irish defense (36.5 percent conversion rate, 28th ranked):

• 3rd and short—33/62.7
• 3rd and medium—26.1/34
• 3rd and long—40.9/16.9
• 3rd and more than three yards—67/23.5

In other words, converting in unfavorable situations wasn’t the problem—the Irish offense moved the chains at a higher rate than their counterparts in every situational category. But facing 3rd and medium-to-long distances occurred far too often, something that speaks to poor first down execution (see below for more detail on this).

Red zone efficiency was almost identical to last season, despite Kelly’s strong track record at Cincinnati. To compound the problem, red zone appearances per game were also down from 4.2 in 2009 to 3.5 this year. Virtually the same red zone efficiency coupled with fewer opportunities at least partially explains the dip in scoring production.

Goal-to-goal play, however, did improve. The Irish offense scored on 20 of 26 (76.9 percent) goal-to-go opportunities in 2010 compared to 15 of 25 in 2009 (60). Kelly’s squad notched eight goal-to-go rushing touchdowns (out of 11 total) and 12 passing scores to combine for 20 of 39 offensive touchdowns in goal-to-go situations. Part of being a strong play-caller is creating and taking advantage of high-probability scoring opportunities, and Kelly certainly improved over Weis in this area.

Perhaps more impressive was the execution improvement in these situations. Over half of the goal-to-go plays in 2009 went for zero or negative yardage compared to only 38.9 percent in 2010—with three new starters in the front five. Additionally, Kelly’s quarterbacks completed 60.7 percent of their passes in goal-to-go situations compared to 37.5 percent last season—with a first-year starter (Crist) and true freshman (Rees) under center, not the uber-accurate Jimmy Clausen.

Part of the reason for the improved performance lies in the play-calling. While Weis’ shifted from a pass-happy, spread attack in the open field to a run-first, heavy formation offense inside the 10-yard line, Kelly’s play-calling approach didn’t change. Counting sacks as pass plays, the Irish run/pass split overall (44/56), outside the red zone (44.4/55.6), and in goal-to-go situations (44.4/55.6) was virtually identical. There is something to be said for consistency in approach, and, in this case, it translated into solid goal-to-go scoring production.

A Fairly Pedestrian (Total) Offense

Rankings fall in the middle of the pack with PR’s around zero. Failing to capitalize on early scoring opportunities and poor execution on first down were the primary culprits.

Total Offense

Notre Dame, from a total offensive production standpoint, was a mediocre unit. A quick glance at the rankings in the table above shows a range from 53rd to 76th, with a mean value of 62. Moreover, all of the PR’s are just over zero,  indicating that the Irish produced near the rate opposing defenses typically allowed.

From a construction standpoint, Kelly largely favored the pass over the run (more on this below), with 33.3 percent of the total yards coming on the ground (96th in the country) compared to 66.6 percent of total yardage via the air (25). The first down and scoring trends are the same. Just over 34 percent of first downs came on the ground (102) compared to 58.2 percent through the air (20), while 28.2 percent of offensive touchdowns were rushing scores (117) compared to 71.8 percent passing (4). And, as noted above, eight of those 11 rushing touchdowns came in goal-to-go situations when calling a run play is virtually a no-brainer.

But being a pass-heavy offense doesn’t necessarily translate into average production. So, why where the Irish so pedestrian? For one, replacing over 70 percent of the scoring and yardage output—i.e Clausen and Golden Tate—isn’t easy. But there were certainly other issues, namely failing to take advantage of early scoring opportunities and poor execution on first down.

Notre Dame received the opening kickoff in 12 of their 13 games (USC was the lone exception), but only scored four times—all touchdowns—to open the game. On an aggregate basis, the Irish only generated a third of the possible opening possession points. For a unit that puts such a premium on receiving the opening kickoff, that is a relatively low return.

Moving the ball wasn’t really the problem, mistakes were. Including only meaningful drives, the Irish offense gained 42.6 percent of their available yards, but surpassed that mark on seven of 12 opening drives. Five opening drives, however, were punts (average 21.4 percent of available yards), one ended in an interception (93.2), and two others ended in a turnover on downs (62.5). In other words, three Irish possessions gained an average of 72.7 percent of available yards but failed to generate a single point.

Slow starts aside, the bigger problem was first down play. The Irish averaged 5.7 yards per first down snap (64th in the country) including a paltry four yards per carry (87) and 7.5 yards per pass attempt (66).  This clearly had a negative impact on the poor third down efficiency detailed in the section above, but it also impacted the ability to sustain drives and put points on the board.

Including only meaningful drives, Notre Dame averaged 8.4 first down yards on touchdown drives and eight yards on scoring drives (touchdown and field goal), but only 3.2 yards on non-scoring possessions. Minimal first down gains lead to unfavorable down and distances on third down, and, as noted above, the Irish struggled mightily with situational third down offense.

And the problem was not one of play-calling, it was one of execution. A breakout of the first down production by possession type (run/pass/total/average yards to go on third down):

• Touchdown—6.6/9.8/8.4/5.8
• Scoring—6.6/9.2/8.0/6.5
• Non-scoring—3.0/3.4/3.2/8

Additionally, the first down successful play percentages for touchdown (57.5 percent), scoring (55.4), and non-scoring (36.7) possessions further reinforce the contribution effective first down execution played on the overall success of the offense.

The Offensive Focus Was Not Running the Ball

The rushing attack wasn’t the focus of the offense, but (when called upon) performed quite well…although explosive rushing plays continue to be problematic.

Rushing Offense

Despite playing with two young and/or inexperienced quarterbacks, Kelly’s play-calling focus was not running the football, and the numbers back it up. The run/pass production for yards, first downs, and scoring mentioned above highlight a trend that is further supported by the rankings for rush attempts (109), yards (92), first downs (97), and touchdowns (109) per game, all of which fall in the bottom quarter of the country.

Additionally, the overall run/pass split (46.3/53.7) ranked 104th as the offense was run-heavy in only five games, and three of them—Utah, Army and Miami—came with Rees at quarterback. In fact, Kelly practically reversed his approach with Rees taking snaps. The Irish run/pass split from Purdue through Tulsa was 41.4/58.6 but switched to 58.8/41.2 over the final four games.

The efficiency and effectiveness followed the play-calling. Notre Dame averaged 29.7 attempts, 113.4 yards (3.8 yards per carry), and 6.7 first downs per game on the ground in their first nine outings compared to 36.8 attempts, 156.3 yards (4.3), and 7.3 first downs per game in their last four.

What makes the trends puzzling is the level of production when a run was called. Again, counting sacks as passes, the Irish averaged 4.4 yards per open down carry, 4.4 yards per first down rush, and 4.9 yards per attempt outside of the red zone. What was missing, however, were big plays.

Notre Dame ranked 77th in 10-plus yard rushing gains and 49th in 20-plus yard running plays. Given the relatively few opportunities to reel off a big gain, these numbers appear respectable. But a comparison to last year’s low-production rushing offense shows otherwise.

The 2010 offense generated 26 explosive rushing gains that totaled 614 yards (23.6 yards per carry). Expressed differently, Irish backs ripped off a 15-plus yard gain once every 15.9 attempts. Compare these numbers to 2009 when the offense generated 25 big rushing gains for 494 yards (19.8 yards per carry), i.e. one every 16 attempts. The 2010 per-carry average is nearly four yards higher, but the frequency of explosive rushing gains is virtually identical, as is the per-carry average without big plays—2.7 yards per carry in 2010 compared to 2.8 yards per carry in 2009.

Plenty O’ Passing, But Not A Lot of Efficiency

Kelly was quite clearly a pass-first play-caller, and the front five protected quite well, but the efficiency simply wasn’t there. Big play production took a dip as well.

Passing Offense

Simply stated, Kelly likes to throw the ball. The 2010 offense attempted 37 passes per game (22nd ranked) compared to 37.3 last year (19). And this with a first-year starter and true freshman taking snaps.

Despite all the passes, the efficiency, and even the effectiveness to a lesser extent, are hardly reminiscent of last season when the Irish fielded one of the nation’s most prolific air attacks. The loss of Clausen and Tate (along with three new offensive line starters) essentially precluded a repeat performance, but ranking 22nd in attempts per game, 75th in yards per attempt, 58th in completion percentage, and 75th in pass efficiency, speaks to relatively poor execution. Stated differently, throwing the ball so often with so little return isn’t a great option.

The front five played extremely well considering the youth and inexperience of first-year starters Zach Martin, Braxston Cave, and Taylor Dever. Notre Dame ranked 38th in sacks allowed per game at 1.5 and 26th in sacks per pass attempt at 24.1, both marks better than last year when the Irish fielded a mostly veteran offensive line. The attempts per sack were also better than the 2008 unit which allowed only 22 sacks.

But while these two sack metrics are impressive in their own right, they loom even larger after accounting for the competition. The PR’s in both categories (0.27, 0.39) indicate that the Irish offensive line limited their opposition to well below their usual sack production. No where was this more on display than in the Sun Bowl. The Hurricanes entered the contest averaging 3.1 sacks per game (6th in the country) but failed to record a single quarterback takedown against Notre Dame.

The Irish also performed well notching scores through the air. Notre Dame ranked 20th in passing touchdowns per game, again performing at a much higher level than their defensive competition (PR of 0.36). Some of the passing touchdown production was the result of the frequency of the throws, but improvement in the red zone also played a big part.

The Clausen-led 2009 offense notched 15 passing scores inside opponents’ 20-yard line while Kelly’s 2010 unit generated 18—primarily due to improved efficiency. Irish quarterbacks completed 62.5 percent of their red zone pass attempts in 2010, compared to 45.2 percent in 2009. Additionally, Crist and Rees combined for a 175.8 passer efficiency while Clausen only managed a 139.8 mark.

In addition to a dip in the efficiency and effectiveness of the passing offense, the big play production also fell. Weis’ 2009 unit notched a big play through the air every 9.3 pass attempts compared to 11.7 in 2010. Additionally, Clausen and company averaged nearly five yards more per big pass play and almost a yard per attempt more excluding explosive gains.

How About Some Possession Metrics?

Stat guru and Notre Dame fan Brian Fremeau (you can follow him on twitter @bcfremeau) of BCF Toys and College Football Outsiders was nice enough to provide some input on the Irish offensive possession-based efficiency using some components of the Fremeau Efficiency Index (FEI). A few highlights (metric, value/ranking—explanation):

• Offensive FEI, 0.122/42—Opponent adjusted success rate of maximizing offensive possessions
• Offensive Efficiency, -0.046/64—Unadjusted value of offensive drive success, i.e. the drive-ending scoring value of the offense divided by the expected value (based on starting field position)
• Offensive 1st Down Rate, 0.655/75—Percentage of offensive possessions resulting in at least one first down
• Offensive Available Yards, 0.44/66—Drive yardage gained divided by yards available
• Offensive Explosive Drives, 0.152/37—Percentage of drives that averaged at least 10 yards per play
• Offensive Methodical Drives, 0.131/64—Percentage of drives with at least 10 plays
• Offensive Strength of Schedule, 0.094/36—Likelihood that an elite offense (two standard deviations better than average) would have an above average (unadjusted) offensive efficiency against every opposing defense on the schedule
• Offensive Points Per Possession, 2.12/62—Points scored per meaningful drive
• Offensive Field Goal Efficiency, 0.751/3—The field goal efficiency measured by the value of a kicker (in points per attempt) over an average kicker accounting for the percentage of field goal points contributed by the offense, drive starting field position, and the kicker.

Overall, the possession-based efficiency numbers stackup very closely with the play-by-play-based metrics above. However, the Offensive Explosive Drives ranking and bipolar first down production on touchdown/scoring vs. non-scoring possessions indicates is a need for consistency. In other words, when the offense clicks, it really clicks. But a lack of consistent execution was the rule, not the exception.

What Is Needed Going Forward

Given the change that occurred last off-season, as well as the injuries to key personnel, Kelly’s first offensive unit performed fairly well. The Irish lost their two most prolific offensive players in recent memory, had three first-year starters on the offensive line, implemented a new scheme with virtually an entirely new coaching staff, and lost several critical offensive players to injury, yet still managed to be an average offensive football team.

Many (myself included) struggle to understand why the game plan was so pass-heavy with a new scheme, inexperienced/young quarterbacks, and new starters in the front five, but, in some regards, the Irish actually threw the ball better than last season when they had one of the most polished quarterbacks and explosive wide receivers in Notre Dame history. There weren’t many areas where the Irish offense excelled, but there was marked increase in passing efficiency in the red zone and in goal-to-go situations. Given the importance of these high-probability scoring situations, this improvement should not be understated.

The off-season will undoubtedly bring about an interesting quarterback competition, with as many four signal callers vying for the starting spot. But the balanced, more conservative offensive approach in the last four games is evidence that Notre Dame—provided the  dominant defensive play continues—can beat quality opponents without exceptional production from the quarterback position.

That doesn’t mean there isn’t room for improvement, there certainly is. Consistency is the name of the game moving forward, and it needs to manifest itself in two primary metrics: turnovers and first down.

If Kelly wants a BCS caliber team, improvement in turnover margin is a must. From 2000 to 2009 eight of the 10 BCS champions were +6 or better in turnover margin and nine ranked in the top 30. Moreover, the average turnover margin for these 10 title winners was +14.2. The 2010 Irish defense did their part generating 25 takeaways, but 24 turnovers is far too many and cost the Irish at least one game this season.

Additionally, more production is needed on arguably the most critical down in football. When the players executed Kelly’s spread scheme, Notre Dame consistently produced on first down, faced manageable distances on third down, moved the ball well, and extended drives. Unfortunately, this didn’t happen with enough frequency.

In summary, Kelly’s inaugural offense hardly set the world on fire. But given the situation, a top-flight performance wasn’t a realistic expectation. If the front five continue to play with physicality and the unit continues to gel as a team, the rest will take care of itself. An off-season of fast-paced, rep-heavy practices should improve consistency, and the return of wide receiver Michael Floyd provides a dependable option for any of the potential quarterbacks. Couple that with a vastly improved Irish defense, and you arrive at a recipe for a double-digit win season in 2011.

Similar Posts:

• How Good Are the Irish? A Year-End Offensive Statistical Review
• How Good Are the Irish? A Year-End Offensive Statistical Review
• Statistically Speaking: Notre Dame vs. Army

This article is © 2007-2012 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

The dust has settled on the 2011 season, and the Auburn Tigers came out on top. It was quite the turnaround for head coach Gene Chizik. Auburn finished the 2009 season in relatively pedestrian fashion. The Tigers compiled an 8-5 record, including a dubious 3-5 mark in conference play, edged out Northwestern in their bowl game, and finished the year ranked 34th in the AVR.

But behind the arm—and, perhaps more importantly, feet—of Cam Newton, Auburn reeled off 14 consecutive victories and hoisted the national championship hardware for the first time since 1957. Detractors of the BCS system can and will argue that TCU was cheated out of a shot to play for the title, but there is virtually no argument about which team had the more impressive resume.

Auburn played the 14th most difficult AVR strength of schedule (SOS), TCU the 95th. Sagarin notes a similar trend—the Tigers faced the 13th most difficult SOS while the Horned Frogs faced the 76th toughest slate of teams. Moreover, Auburn ranked first in quality wins/losses (QWL), i.e. they beat more AVR top 25 teams than any other squad in the country.

TCU had a great year and was a great team, but what they accomplished during the season pales in comparison to the gauntlet of teams Auburn went through on the road to Glendale. Additionally, the Tigers played and won one more game than the Horned Frogs. Although that doesn’t seem like much, when that game is a conference championship against a quality opponent, it makes running the table far more difficult.

The final season’s rankings (ESP, AVR, and top 10 AWP, SOS, TPR, MOV and QWL) are published in the tables below. There is plenty of information to scour and digest, but here are a few highlights:

• The top 10 teams in the AVR are Auburn, TCU, Boise State, Oklahoma, Ohio State, Oregon, Stanford, LSU, Oklahoma State, and Wisconsin. As was noted throughout the year, several played weak schedules. The Horned Frogs, Ducks, Cardinal and Badgers all faced a slate of competition that ranked in the bottom half of the FBS and only Auburn, Oklahoma, and LSU played a schedule ranked in the top 15.
• Comparing the final ESP and BCS rankings yields some interesting observations. One, two teams in the top 25 of the final BCS standings—West Virginia and Hawaii—do not appear in the top 25 of the ESP. Instead, Tulsa and Maryland round out the ESP top 25.
• And two, the average ranking delta between the ESP and BCS is 2.68 spots with a standard deviation of 1.7. The two ranking systems only agreed exactly on two teams—Auburn and Stanford—with six other squads—Oregon, TCU, Oklahoma, Texas A&M, Nebraska, and South Carolina—sitting only one place apart. Florida State (6 spots different), Arkansas (5), Michigan State(5), and Alabama(5) were the largest deltas.
• While the ESP and BCS mostly agree on the teams in the top 25, if not entirely on their exact placement, the AVR and Sagarin have more disagreement. Six teams—Mississippi State, North Carolina State, Iowa, USC, Arizona State, and Florida—appear in the Sagarin top 25 but not in the top 25 of the AVR. Instead, the AVR puts Michigan State, Nebraska, Utah, Northern Illinois, Tulsa, Hawaii, and Notre Dame in the top 25.
• As might be expected, there is also larger aggregate disagreement between Sagarin and the AVR. The average ranking delta between the two is 3.88 with a standard deviation of 2.51—both higher than the respective values for the ESP and BCS. The two ranking systems agree on Auburn at number one and LSU at number eight, but fail to match the relative placement of any other teams. The largest disparities include Stanford (7th in AVR, 2nd in Sagarin), Alabama (13th, 5th), Oklahoma (4th, 10th), Mississippi State (not ranked, 11th), Nevada (11th, 16th), North Carolina State (not ranked, 18th), Notre Dame (25th, 19th), and Iowa (not ranked, 21st).
• The Irish rank 25th in the AVR with the 1st ranked SOS, 22nd ranked QWL metric, 42nd ranked adjusted win percentage (AWP), 42nd ranked margin of victory (MOV), and 32nd best team performance ratio (TPR). The Irish finished the season ranked 64th in offensive TPR and 18th in defensive TPR. Notre Dame ranked 62nd in the latter category in 2009, and the 44-spot jump was the largest of any team from last season to this year.

Elite Selection Playoff (ESP)

AV Ranking (AVR)

Adjusted Win Percentage (AWP)

Strength of Schedule (SOS)

Team Performance Ratio (TPR)

Margin of Victory (MOV)

Quality Wins/Losses (QWL)

Rank	Team	Points
1	Auburn	1
2	Oklahoma	0.663
3	Nebraska	0.648
4	Arkansas	0.609
5	Texas A&M	0.542
6	Missouri	0.529
7	South Carolina	0.459
8	Nevada	0.45
9	Alabama	0.448
10	Wisconsin	0.431

Similar Posts:

• 2010 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Thirteen
• 2008 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Eight
• 2010 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Fourteen

This article is © 2007-2012 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

In many ways the two teams are heading in opposite directions. The Irish enter the game on the heels of an improbable three-game win streak having outscored Utah, Army and USC by a combined margin of 75 to 22 behind a resurgent ground attack and a defense that has allowed only one touchdown—a two-yard drive by the Trojans—in the last 15 quarters of play.

Meanwhile, Miami has dropped three of their last five including a 24-19 loss to a 4-8 Virginia squad and a 23-20 overtime defeat at the hands of South Florida. The late-season slide cost head coach Randy Shannon his job, and offensive line coach Jeff Stoutland will be leading the Hurricanes in the bowl game.

Overall, Miami boasts the same 7-5 record as the Irish with wins over (FCS) Florida A&M, Pittsburgh, Clemson, Duke, North Carolina, Maryland, and Georgia Tech, and losses to Ohio State, Florida State, Virginia Tech and the aforementioned Cavaliers and Bulls. The 12-team slate comprises the 35th most difficult AVR strength of schedule against which the Hurricanes have generated the 48th best offensive TPR and 12th best defensive TPR.

Miami, Version 2010

Stoutland is in his fourth year as the offensive line coach after occupying the same position at Michigan State for seven seasons. It remains to be seen whether Shannon’s dismissal will be a distraction or a point around which the players rally, but improvement in several fundamental areas is needed for the Hurricanes to play up to their potential and Stoutland has his work cut out for him.

Miami averages 8.1 infractions per outing (114th ranked) and racks up 66.9 penalty yards per contest (112). The squad certainly lacks discipline, but—without a doubt—the biggest problem has been turnovers. The Hurricanes rank 117th in turnovers lost with nine lost fumbles and 23 interceptions. The defense has been advantageous forcing 28 takeaways (16th best in the country), but the -4 turnover margin ranks 80th in the nation.

Offensively, Miami has gained nearly 47 percent of available yards with a three and out on only 18.1 percent of meaningful possessions, i.e. they have little trouble moving the ball. But over 22 percent of meaningful drives have resulted in a turnover including eight red zone turnovers in 50 appearances.

Offense

Mark Whipple is in his second year as offensive coordinator and quarterbacks coach and has 28 years of coaching experience to his credit. Whipple employs a pro-style offense that frequently operates from a two-back set but also spreads the field on occasion.

The Hurricanes have been balanced in their production but are primarily a run-first team with a passing attack built off the ground game. Miami ranks 26th in both rushing yards per game and yards per carry and 27th in yards per completion, the latter a strong indication of the ability to downfield, particularly off play-action. The unit hasn’t been very efficient, ranking 64th in third down efficiency and 90th in red zone touchdown efficiency, and at least part of the problem has been the aforementioned penalties and turnovers. Despite these self-inflicted mistakes, Miami has moved the ball well with 4.2 red zone appearances (38th ranked) and 22.3 first downs (25) per game.

The ground attack is spurred by a three-man backfield rotation of senior Damien Berry, redshirt freshman Lamar Miller, and true freshman Mike James. Berry is the leader and primary starter of the group, but each has at least 66 carries as the three have combined for 1,882 rushing yards and 14 touchdowns at 5.4 yards per attempt. Additionally, all three backs tip the scales in excess of 210 pounds and have the ability to wear down opposing defenses by pounding the ball and rotating fresh legs. Miller and James have performed especially well in the fourth quarter averaging six and 6.5 yards per carry in the final period of play.

Blocking for the three-headed running attack is a big (average 6′-5″ and 316.4 pounds), but relatively young and inexperienced offensive line. The unit endured a bit of personnel shuffling earlier in the year before settling into a consistent starting five that has performed well both opening running lanes and protecting the quarterback.

The anchor of the unit is left tackle Orlando Franklin, a senior and three-year starter with 37 career starts. But the remaining four are all first-year starters who have combined for only 51 starts. Guard Harland Gunn and center Tyler Horn are both redshirt sophomores who have started all 12 games this season as has sophomore guard Brandon Washington. Former Notre Dame recruit and true freshman Seantrel Henderson rounds out the group starting at right tackle over the last nine games of the season.

Stoutland hasn’t officially announced who will start under center but conventional wisdom suggests it will be Jacory Harris. Harris was the starter last season and started the first eight games this year before a concussion against the Cavaliers sidelined him for the remainder of the game as well as the next three contests.

The junior signal caller has earned a reputation for erratic play over the course of his career and the 53.9 percent completion rate, 121.7 passer efficiency, and 10 interceptions he generated in his eight starts did little to dispute it. The alternative is true freshman Stephen Morris whose performance wasn’t markedly different over the final five games (50 percent completion rate, 117.5 passer efficiency, eight interceptions). Morris also suffered an ankle injury during practice this week and may be unable to play Friday.

The primary receiving target for Harris and/or Morris is Leonard Hankerson. The senior wide out has been the leading receiver in each of the last two seasons, catching 66 passes for 1,085 yards (16.4 yards per reception) and 12 touchdowns this year. Hankerson’s size (6′-3″, 205 pounds) makes him a prime target in the red zone and his dependability has made him the preferred option on third down. Junior wide receivers Travis Benjamin and LaRon Byrd form the second and third receiving options combining to haul in 77 passes for 1,093 yards (14.2 yards per reception) and four touchdowns.

See the tables below for an in-depth look at the 2010 Hurricane offense (the Opponent Average and Opponent Average Rank columns refer to Miami’s 2010 opponents excluding Florida A&M).

2010 Miami Offensive Efficiency

2010 Miami Total Offense

2010 Miami Rushing Offense

2010 Miami Passing Offense

Defense

The Hurricane defense is led by second year defensive coordinator John Lovett. Lovett is a veteran coach with 19 years of coordinating experience at Ole Miss, Auburn, Clemson and Bowling Green, as well as a reputation for developing standout secondary players and strong pass defenses. The 2010 Hurricanes are no exception.

The Hurricanes operate from a 4-3 base set with a philosophy primarily devoted to two things: pressuring opposing offenses with a vertical, aggressive scheme and forcing turnovers. Miami ranks 2nd in attempts per sack, 1st in tackles for a loss per game, 22nd in attempts per recovered fumble, and 4th in attempts per interception.

Additionally, as is Lovett’s hallmark, the pass defense numbers are especially impressive as the Hurricanes have posted a 95.9 pass efficiency (2nd ranked), allowed a paltry 49.5 percent completion rate (2), surrendered only 5.9 yards per attempt (10), and allowed only seven passing scores (1). The performance in the total and efficiency categories mostly follow suit. Miami has allowed only 317.2 yards (16) and 19.7 points (21) per game, and rank 13th in third down efficiency and 3rd in red zone efficiency.

The defensive unit is led by Colin McCarthy and Sean Spence, two active, veteran linebackers each with three years of playing experience. McCarthy ranked second on the team in tackles and tackles for a loss last season and ranks first and fourth in the same categories this year while Spence ranks 16th nationally and leads the Hurricanes with 17 tackles for a loss. Each have posted at least 100 tackles combining for 206 stops, 26 tackles for a loss, and 3.5 sacks. Rounding out the linebacker corps is Ramon Buchanan with 50 tackles and 5.5 tackles for a loss.

The defensive front, led by end Allen Bailey, has good size (average 6′-4″, 286 pounds) and athleticism. Bailey led the team in sacks and tackles for a loss in 2009, leads the team in sacks this season with seven, and leads defensive linemen in tackles (43) and tackles for a loss (11). Olivier Vernon occupies the other end position while the interior of the defensive line is manned by Marcus Forston and Micanor Regis. Together with reserve linemen (and sometime starters) Adewale Ojomo and Josh Holmes, the Hurricane front four has accounted for 46.5 of the team’s 103 tackles for a loss and 25 of 37 sacks.

The backend of the defense features six players with significant playing time and production. Although not a full-time starter, sophomore safety Ray-Ray Armstrong leads the secondary in stops with 71 including 4.5 tackles for a loss. Armstrong is also tied with fellow safety Vaughn Telemaque and corner Ryan Hill for the team lead with three interceptions. Brandon Harris starts at the corner position opposite Hill, corner DeMarcus Van Dyke also contributes, and safety JoJo Nicolas has started the final eight games ahead of Armstrong. The unit is athletic, particularly Armstrong and Harris, with safeties that play well against the run and corners that can play on an island.

See the tables below for an in-depth look at the 2010 Hurricane defense (the Opponent Average and Opponent Average Rank columns refer to Miami’s 2010 opponents excluding Florida A&M).

2010 Miami Defensive Efficiency

2010 Miami Total Defense

2010 Miami Rushing Defense

2010 Miami Passing Defense

Adding It All Up

Offensively, Miami isn’t overly flashy, but they can be effective when things are clicking. The offensive line has played well, Berry, Miller and James are all viable options at running back, and the per-catch averages of Hankerson and Benjamin are ample evidence of the ability to stretch the field. Whipple wants to be successful running the ball, parlay the success on the ground into an efficient and explosive passing attack (a few shots downfield are virtually guaranteed), and mostly task his quarterback with managing the game.

The Hurricane defense is at least a top 20 unit that features a stout front four, active linebacker corps, and athletic secondary. Lovett has a defensive line that can tie up offensive linemen and routinely apply pressure without committing extra defenders, and linebackers that run very well to the ball. Miami is one of the nation’s top units against the pass, on third down, and in the red zone, but the aggressive, vertical nature of their play can leave them vulnerable to a competent rushing offense.

Keys to Winning

Offense

1. Build an early, sizeable lead. Much of Miami’s undoing has been the play of their quarterbacks. Harris’ poor performance has been well documented while Morris hasn’t been any better. The Hurricanes have the ability to run the ball and are efficient in the passing game when the run is effective, but won’t have the luxury of leaning on Berry, Miller and James and asking their signal callers to only manage the game playing from behind. The Irish must avoid turnovers, be consistent on offense, and take advantage of red zone opportunities in the early going to force Whipple away from his preferred game plan.
2. Ball protection is critical to a victory. The Hurricanes have certainly had problems with turnovers but the Irish haven’t exactly been immune to coughing up the ball—Notre Dame gave away 69 points off 24 turnovers during the regular season. Miami’s opponents forced 20 turnovers that resulted in 79 points in their five losses, but the Hurricanes reversed the trend in their seven wins turning 23 takeaways into 65 points. The Irish can’t afford to give the ball away to an offense that has been advantageous.
3. Run the ball…a lot. Miami ranks 10th or better in 11 of the 13 pass defense categories listed in the table above, excels pressuring the passer, has only surrendered seven scores through the air, and ranks 5th in 10-plus yard passes allowed. Moreover, the Hurricane defense held 10 of 12 opponents below their per-game average in passing yards, 11 below their per-attempt average, and nine below their passing efficiency total. The performance against the run, however, hasn’t been nearly as dominant. The Hurricanes rank 81st in rushing yards allowed per game, 60th in yards per attempt, and 101st in 10-plus yard rushing gains. Additionally, Miami allowed six opponents to rush for 150-plus yards, three to rush for 200-plus yards, and six to average four-plus yards per carry. Quarterback Tommy Rees has proven capable of making mistakes and will be facing a defense built to pressure the passer and force interceptions. The apposite offensive strategy is a heavy dose of running backs Robert Hughes and Cierre Wood.

Defense

1. Stop the run, particularly on first down. For the Irish, this game could come down to one aspect: stopping the run. The success (and failure) of the Hurricane offense has been mostly tied to their ability to establish the run and use it as the basis for throwing the ball. The run/pass splits for Miami in their seven wins are 59/41 overall, 65/35 on first down, and 67/33 on open downs compared to 47/53, 54/46, and 58/42 in their five losses. The production and efficiency on the ground in the winning outings isn’t decidedly different from the losing ones, but the efficiency throwing the ball certainly is—the Hurricanes average a pass efficiency of 142.4 in their wins compared to 87 in their losses. Moreover, stopping the run on first down is vitally important. Miami ranks 12th in first down yards per carry and averages 7.2 yards per first down rush on scoring drives compared to five yards per attempt on non-scoring possessions. Similar to the pass efficiency trends noted above, the first down completion rate on scoring possessions is 75.5 percent compared to 39.1 percent on non-scoring drives. If the Hurricanes are allowed to run the ball effectively on first down Irish defensive coordinator Bob Diaco will be forced to commit an extra defender to the box, make his secondary vulnerable to downfield throws, and fail to place the burden of execution on the inconsistent Hurricane signal callers.
2. Mind Hankerson on third down and in the red zone, watch the deep ball. Regardless of who lines up under center, Hankerson is the favorite receiving option on third down and in the red zone. The senior wide receiver was targeted on 41 of 125 (32.8 percent) third down pass attempts—almost twice that of the next favorite target—with 24 receptions and 14 first downs. In the red zone the numbers are even more preferential. Hankerson was the target on 19 of 46 (41.3 percent) throws, six of which went for scores. No other receiver has more than eight red zone receptions or one red zone touchdown. Additionally, Hankerson averages 16.4 yards per reception while Benjamin averages 17.5 yards per catch. Both are legitimate downfield threats, and Whipple will certainly try to stretch the field vertically to empty the box.
3. Avoid goal-to-go situations. Miami has struggled in the red zone but not in goal-to-go situations where their strong rushing attack is a potent weapon. Whipple has called a run on 35 of 45 goal-to-go plays (run/pass split of 78/22) with only three negative gains and 13 rushing touchdowns in 22 opportunities (59 percent). The Hurricane front five and trio of backs are well-suited to run the ball between the tackles—even on a short field—and the Irish defense must avoid these situations.

Prediction

Miami is a team that doesn’t play as well as the sum of their parts. The Hurricanes have plenty of talent but routinely shoot themselves in the foot with penalties and turnovers. With the uncertainty and transition surrounding the program there are plenty of question marks and the outcome of the game could largely be decided by the players’ psyche. Will Stoutland have his troops focused and prepared or will the same things that have plagued the Hurricanes all season continue to be their undoing? If it is the former, the Irish are in for a fight.

The winning formula for Notre Dame is simple: continue the strong, late season defensive play—particularly against the run—and utilize a recently developed downhill running game to exploit the weakness of the Hurricane defense. The team that runs the ball more effectively, takes pressure of their quarterback, and minimizes turnovers will win the game as both defenses will attempt to pressure the opposing passer into making costly mistakes.

Ultimately, the late season trend of the two teams continues and the Irish edge out a hard-fought victory.

Notre Dame 20, Miami 17

Similar Posts:

• Blueprint for BCS Championship Success II: Offensive Results
• Notre Dame vs. Pittsburgh: Keys to an Irish Win
• Blueprint for BCS Championship Success III: Defensive Results

This article is © 2007-2012 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

Disclaimer #1: The following is not intended for betting purposes.

Disclaimer #2: The following analysis does not include the Army—Navy game last weekend. It is not expected that excluding this single contest appreciably skews the results.

Making the Predictions

Similar to last year and the year before, the final AV Ranking (AVR) point values will be used to predict the bowl game winners against the spread. For historical and reference purposes the weekly ESP and AVR results (including the top 10 AWP, SOS, TPR, MOV and QWL rankings) are linked here for weeks 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7 and 6.

Last season’s predictions were especially strong going 4-1 in the five BCS games and only missing on the Cincinnati—Florida Sugar Bowl contest which had so many extenuating and motivating factors—Urban Meyer’s semi-retirement, Tim Tebow’s last college football game, Brian Kelly leaving Cincinnati for Notre Dame and not coaching in the game, etc.—that any computer prediction of its outcome was mostly useless. Unlike last season, however, this year the AVR predictions have been extended to include all the bowl game matchups.

The Bowl Season Lineup

It’s difficult to believe that there are 35 bowls featuring 70 teams. It seems that the reward of post-season play is diminished when over half of FBS programs receive a bowl bid. The table below lists all 35 bowls starting with the latest and working backwards.

2010 Bowl Season Lineup

Despite the dilution of reward due to the number of games, there are several intriguing matchups.

The BCS National Championship game features two teams in Auburn and Oregon that have bucked the 10-year national championship blueprint. While the Tigers and Ducks feature run-heavy, high-scoring offensive units neither defense is exceptional (although Oregon does have the 10th ranked defensive TPR).

Ohio State and Arkansas face off in a Sugar Bowl that will feature speed on power. The Razorbacks offense features gunslinger Ryan Mallett throwing to a host of fast, talented receivers while the Buckeyes have the traditional Big 10 build of a power football team on both sides of the ball.

Michigan State heads to Orlando to take on the Crimson Tide with hopes of proving the doubters wrong. The Spartans posted the same record as Ohio State and Wisconsin and even beat the latter head-to-head, yet the Badgers and Buckeyes both received BCS game bids while head coach Mark Dantonio’s troops were left out of the mix.

And, finally, the Irish and Hurricanes meet in the Sun Bowl in what is a preview of a three-game series over the next few years. The game is being built as a renewal of the fierce rivalry from the days when Lou Holtz and Jimmy Johnson roamed the sidelines.

Predicting the Winners and Point Deltas

Using the process described below, the final, week 14 AVR computer model rankings were used to predict the winner and point delta of each bowl contest listed in the table above.

A regression was performed with the final AVR results using only the “bowl equivalent” contests from the regular season. These bowl equivalent games are a subset of the regular season matchups that include only those contests where two criteria are met:

1. The two participants had a final AVR point value at or above the minimum final AVR point value of all 70 bowl game participants (Middle Tennessee State at 0.365)
2. The AVR point delta of the two participants was less than or equal to the maximum final AVR point delta of all 35 bowl game matchups (Connecticut and Oklahoma at 0.275)

The resulting data set constituted 277 regular season games.

The table below lists the results of these predictions for every bowl game. The table includes the Vegas favorite and associated line, the AVR point delta (home minus away), the AVR favorite and associated line, and two confidence columns.

The first confidence column (AVR win confidence) represents the percent chance the AVR will correctly predict the winner of the game based on the statistical variation of the 277 data points described above. The second confidence column (AVR Vegas line confidence) represents the percent chance the AVR predicts the favorite will cover the Vegas spread using the same variation.

2010 AVR Bowl Predictions*

* The Vegas line is based on a snapshot value.

A few noteworthy items:

• As mentioned above, the largest AVR point delta of any bowl game is the Fiesta Bowl matchup between Oklahoma and Connecticut. This at least partially explains some of the outrage of the Huskies receiving an automatic BCS bid while teams like Michigan State and Boise State have been relegated to lower tier bowls. This also happens to be one of the games where the Vegas and AVR predicted lines most closely agree—both give the Sooners (roughly) a 17-point advantage.
• Other games where Vegas and the AVR lines closely match include the Orange Bowl between Stanford and Virginia Tech, the Rose Bowl between the Badgers and Horned Frogs, the Chick-fil-A Bowl between South Carolina and Florida State, the Pinstripe Bowl between Kansas State and Syracuse, the Texas Bowl between Illinois and Baylor, and the Champs Sports Bowl between the West Virginia and North Carolina State. Each of these games had less than a one-point difference in predicted lines.
• Vegas and the AVR agree on 25 of the 33 (75.8 percent) predicted winners. The average line difference in the eight games where there was disagreement was 10 points compared to only 1.5 points when both Vegas and the AVR installed the same favorite. In other words, when the two disagree on the favored squad, they do so by a substantial margin. When they pick the same favorite, however, the disagreement between predicted margin of victory is much more modest.
• Excluding the Fiesta Bowl the average Vegas line in the other four BCS games is 2.9 points while the average AVR line is 3.1 points. Vegas and the AVR agree on two of these games—both predict Auburn to win the national championship and Stanford to best the Hokies. The AVR gives a slight nod to TCU and Ohio State, but the AVR Vegas line confidence is very low for both. Expressed differently, other than the Fiesta Bowl, the BCS games project to be very evenly matched contests.

So Where Did Vegas (or the AVR) Get It Wrong?

Eight of the 35 AVR predicted favorites have a win confidence in excess of 75 percent, i.e. these AVR installed favorites are a lock to win. These games feature a minimum line of 11.2 points and include the following winners (Vegas/AVR line in parentheses):

1. Nevada over Boston College (9.5/16.5)
2. Miami (OH) over Middle Tennessee State (2/13.8)
3. Oklahoma over Connecticut (17/16.9)
4. Nebraska over Washington (13/15.6)
5. Oklahoma State over Arizona (6/14.9)
6. Missouri over Iowa (1/12)
7. Air Force over Georgia Tech (2.5/11.7)
8. Boise State over Utah (16.5/11.2)

Additionally, five games feature AVR Vegas line confidences in excess of 75 percent, i.e. these AVR installed favorites are a lock to cover the spread (nota bene, in two of these contests there is disagreement between Vegas and the AVR as to which team is the favorite). These five matchups include (Vegas/AVR line in parentheses):

1. Miami (OH) over Middle Tennessee State (2/13.8)
2. Michigan State over Alabama (-11/4.4)
3. Central Florida over Georgia (-7/8.6)
4. Missouri over Iowa (1/12)
5. Southern Mississippi over Louisville (3.5/7.9)

Vegas believes Bama will win by two scores while the AVR favors Michigan State by just over a field goal. Similarly, Vegas has installed Georgia as a touchdown favorite over Central Florida while the AVR has them reversed at about the same margin of victory. These two games represent the biggest line disagreement among all 35 bowl contests, i.e. something about how Vegas and the AVR have measured these four teams is very different.

The intersection of the two data sets above is where a) Vegas and the AVR agree on the predicted winner and b) the AVR predicts a larger line than Vegas does. This includes Miami (OH) over Middle Tennessee State and Missouri over Iowa. In these contests there is no disagreement about who will win, only by what margin.

Similar Posts:

• 2009 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Fourteen and BCS Championship Predictions
• 2008 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Fourteen and Conference Championship Predictions
• 2009 Season Prediction Survey Results

This article is © 2007-2012 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

The season ended with three undefeated teams but only two will be playing for the BCS National Championship in Glendale. TCU, once again, is on the outside looking in as Auburn and Oregon will meet January 10th to decide the 2010 season champion.

The top 10 teams in the final ESP rankings look very similar to the BCS with a few exceptions. Auburn, Oregon and TCU hold the top three spots in both but Stanford is 6th in the ESP and 4th in the BCS. Five of the remaining six teams—Wisconsin, Ohio State, Michigan State, Oklahoma, and Arkansas—round out the rest of the top 10 in both rankings. The only major disparity is with Boise State and LSU. The ESP has the Broncos at 7th, the BCS 11, while the BCS puts LSU at 10th and the ESP has the Tigers at 11th.

If there is one team who was left out of the mix for no good reason, it’s Michigan State. The Spartans had the same record as fellow Big Ten conference teams Wisconsin and Ohio State, beat the Badgers in the only head-to-head matchup, and were left out of the BCS despite the other two getting invites to the Rose and Sugar Bowls respectively.

The Irish finished the year ranked 26th in the AVR. Notre Dame played the toughest strength of schedule in the country, ranked 20th in quality wins/losses (QWL), 45th in adjusted win percentage (AWP), 49th in margin of victory (MOV), and 37th in team performance ratio (TPR). The relatively lofty TPR ranking is owed mostly to a defense that improved steadily over the course of the season to finish 16th in defensive TPR. The offense, on the other hand, regressed from 2009 to rank 69th in offensive TPR.

Elite Selection Playoff (ESP)

AV Ranking (AVR)

Adjusted Win Percentage (AWP)

Strength of Schedule (SOS)

Team Performance Ratio (TPR)

Margin of Victory (MOV)

Quality Wins/Losses (QWL)

Rank	Team	Points
1	Auburn	1
2	Nebraska	0.664
3	Texas A&M	0.613
4	Arkansas	0.57
5	Oklahoma	0.569
6	Missouri	0.56
7	Alabama	0.467
8	Iowa	0.457
9	Nevada	0.455
10	Wisconsin	0.42

Similar Posts:

• 2010 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Nine
• 2010 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Eleven
• 2010 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Twelve

This article is © 2007-2012 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

Looking back this could certainly be a season of what if’s. What if quarterback Dayne Crist hadn’t been injured in the Michigan game? What if safety Harrison Smith hadn’t tripped on the overtime field goal against Michigan State? What if Kelly had kicked the field goal against Tulsa?

But that would diminish the accomplishments over the past four weeks. Sitting at 4-5 with the beatdown from Navy and the home loss to Tulsa fresh in the players’ minds, the Irish could have folded. They instead used the bye week to dig deep and have played some of their best football of the season over the last three games, particularly on defense.

Diving Into the Numbers

Per the norm, five tables—(1) miscellaneous/efficiency as well as (2) total, (3) rushing, (4) passing, and (5) drive offense/defense—with pertinent statistics for the game against the Trojans are shown below. This data is supplemented with more detailed numbers/analyses aimed at identifying the primary drivers for the performance in each category.

For a historical perspective and reference purposes, the following are links to the statistical recaps of the 2010 opponents: Michigan, Michigan State, Stanford, Boston College, Pittsburgh, Western Michigan, Navy, Tulsa, Utah and Army.

Miscellaneous/Efficiency

Red zone offense was really the deciding factor in this game. Penalties were lopsided in favor of the Irish. Situational defense was average, but third down play was still strong. Situational offense was the best all year but the efficiency was poor despite it.

Miscellaneous/Efficiency Statistics

When few points are scored and the outcome is decided by a narrow margin, capitalizing on red zone opportunities is critical to winning. Such was the case against the Trojans. Notre Dame scored a touchdown on all three red zone appearances while USC only managed one touchdown—a two-yard “drive” after quarterback Tommy Rees’ fumble—on their three appearances.

But, at least for the Irish defense, the strong red zone performance is nothing new. The Irish have only allowed a touchdown on 42.1 percent of opponent red zone appearances—good for 7th best in the country—and have allowed fewer than two red zone touchdowns in seven of 12 games.

Notre Dame has consistently been good in the penalty department—the Irish rank 9th in penalties per game and 22nd in penalty yards per game—but having only one infraction for 10 yards is an exceptional performance, particularly given the weather conditions. USC didn’t rack up a lot of penalty yards, but many of them put the Trojan offense behind the chains making execution difficult with a backup quarterback.

Defensive coordinator Bob Diaco’s troops played well on third down. USC entered the game converting over 45 percent of their third downs but only moved the chains on four of 17 (23.5 percent) opportunities against the Irish. And it wasn’t because of favorable situational characteristics.

The Trojans averaged 4.7 yards per first down play and five yards to go on third down, and faced three yards or more 64.7 percent of the time. Compared to the opponent season averages for Notre Dame (5.2, 6.8 and 67.5 respectively), these values are right on par. The Irish just played sound football on third down, particularly against the pass. USC head coach Lane Kiffin called a pass on nine of 17 third downs and only one was good for a first down.

For the offense, the situational play was some of the worst all year. The Irish faced an average of 4.7 yards to go on third down—a season-low mark—and needed more than three yards to move the chains on only 46.7 percent of third downs—another season-low mark. Yet, despite these favorable down and distances, Rees and company moved the chains on only a third of their opportunities.

Total Offense/Defense

It wasn’t the worst offensive performance of the year, but it wasn’t far off either. The Irish were able to overcome (points off) turnovers for the first time this season. The strong defensive play of the past three outings continues.

Total Statistics

The efficient offense on display against the Utes and explosive unit from the outing against the Black Knights was nowhere to be found.

No matter how you slice it, virtually every offensive category is at or near a season-worst value. The 296 yards of total offense is second only to Utah. The 4.5 yards per play is behind only Boston College. The 15 first downs ties for the second fewest. And the three explosive plays and 76 big play yards are third-lowest of the year.

The biggest problem for the offense was turnovers. The Irish had 14 possessions, four of which ended in a fumble or interception. Not only did these giveaways kill drives before they could get started, all four turnovers came before a single first down was generated and resulted in all 16 USC points.

Of course, this is nothing new for an Irish team that ranks 73rd in turnover margin. Notre Dame is +5 in turnover margin in seven wins and -8 in five losses. But more telling are the points off turnovers. The turnover story for the seven wins and losses (turnovers/average resulting field position/points off turnovers):

• Wins—10/Notre Dame 46-yard line/25
• Losses—14/Opponent 48-yard line/44

The points off turnovers stand out as the largest factors but takeaways also help tell the story. The Irish defense forced 15 turnovers in their seven wins and only six in their five losses. The number of turnovers and average resulting field position appear to be similar in the wins and losses but the contest against USC heavily skews the results.

Excluding the game against the Trojans the breakdown looks decidedly different:

• Wins—6/Opponent 39-yard line/9
• Losses—14/Opponent 48-yard line/44

To be certain, this was the first time all year the Irish were able to overcome turnovers and the points opposing teams generated from them, and the play on the other side of the ball was a big reason for it.

Defensively, Diaco’s unit continued the strong play from the previous three games. A breakdown of USC’s offensive output (season per-game averages/rank entering the weekend in parentheses):

• Pts—16 (32.6/20)
• Touchdowns—1 (4.4/22)
• Yds—261 (443.1/21)
• 1st downs—12 (24.5/12)
• Yds/play—3.8 (6.1/33)

The Irish held USC to roughly 50 percent of their average output in these categories.

But more impressive is the performance over the past four games. Since being dissected by Navy Notre Dame ranks 7th in points per game, 11th in yards per game, 10th in yards per play, and 4th in first downs per game. That’s at least a top 10 defense going against offenses with average rankings of 30, 41, 42 and 43 in those categories. In other words, the strong defensive play isn’t because of weak offensive competition.

One of the primary reasons for the improvement is limiting big plays. The defense struggled to minimize big plays in the early going, particularly against Michigan and Michigan State, as seven of the first 10 touchdowns came via explosive gains. Since then, and particularly over the past three/four games, the defense has improved dramatically defending big plays.

A comparison of the per-game big play production in the first eight games to the last four (big plays/big play yards/big play touchdowns):

• First eight games—4.6/136.4/1.3
• Last four games—3.5/84.8/0

And the performance has been even stronger if Tulsa is excluded. Against Utah, Army and USC the Irish have only allowed only 2.3 explosive gains and 54.7 big play yards per game.

Rushing Offense/Defense

The ground attack that came alive against Utah continues to produce. The Irish defense did to the USC running game what it did to Army.

Rushing Statistics

The last three games have been some of the most efficient for the Irish running game. Notre Dame has averaged 33 attempts, 143 yards, and 4.3 yards per carry over this three-game span, compared to season averages of 30.5, 120.8, and 4. The production may not seem overly impressive, but it has come despite some of the most run-heavy play-calling this season.

Kelly was fairly balanced against USC (run/pass split of 48.5/51.5), but has been decidedly in favor of the run over the last three outings. The Irish play-caller has dialed up a run on 57.2 percent of plays in the last four games compared to throwing the ball on 67.3 percent of snaps in the other nine contests.

Hughes and Cierre Wood have been particularly impressive in the aforementioned three-game span. The two Irish backs have combined for 72 carries, 377 yards (5.2 yards per carry), and 16 first downs.

On the other side of the ball, the run defense has been extremely stout the past four games. Notre Dame has allowed just over 95 rushing yards per game and 2.8 yards per carry against teams that average 200 yards and 4.8 yards per attempt. USC was no exception.

A comparison of the Trojan ground production (season average entering Saturday (rank)/season low entering Saturday/production against the Irish):

• Yds—192.4 (26)/108/74
• Yds/att—5.2 (18)/3.1/2.6
• 1st downs—10.6 (21)/5/4

Just like they did against Army, the Irish established new season-lows in every category against a strong running team.

Passing Offense/Defense

Not much going on for either offense through the air.

Passing Statistics

While the running game produced against a very athletic Trojan front, the Irish didn’t fare as well through the air.

In many ways the performance was puzzling. Rees wasn’t frequently pressured, had performed well in his previous two outings against Utah and Army, and was facing a defense that ranked 114th in passing yards per game, 88th in yards per pass attempt, and 95th in pass efficiency entering the weekend.

But Notre Dame posted, by far, their lowest pass efficiency and yard per attempt and completion values of the season, and only recorded one passing gain in excess of 20 yards for only the second time all year. The last of these seems to be the culprit for the overall production but the per-attempt and completion averages excluding big plays were nearly season-low values and well below the season average.

Perhaps even more telling was the hit/miss aspect of Rees’ performance. In the final two touchdown scoring drives of the first half Rees was 11 of 15 (73.3 percent) for 87 yards (5.8 yards per attempt, 7.9 yards per completion). The per-attempt and completion averages won’t blow anyone away, but they are much higher than the overall game values.

Without starting quarterback Matt Barkley, not much was expected from a Trojan passing offense that entered the game ranked 35th in the country at 35.1 pass attempts per game. But that doesn’t mean the Irish defense wasn’t tested through the air.

Kiffin didn’t dial his game plan back much for Barkley’s replacement, as Mitch Mustain threw the ball 39 times with minimal reward. Mustain managed to complete only 56.4 percent of his throws for only 187 yards, 4.8 yards per attempt, and 8.5 yards per completion, the lowest values allowed by the Irish defense since the season opener against Purdue.

Drive Offense/Defense

As was the case for most of the year for the Irish offense, only a few drives were really rolling…but one of those was the final scoring drive that was a thing of beauty. As for the defense, USC didn’t do much even with a short field.

Drive Statistics*

* Values only include meaningful possessions.

Notre Dame faced their worst starting field position of the year—their own 19-yard line—11 yards behind their average starting field position. The result? The lowest percentage of yards gained all season.

Three drives were successful ones that eclipsed six plays and 60 yards while 11 drives resulted in one fumble, three interceptions, six punts, and four three and outs. The biggest difference between these two sets of drives was the success of the ground game and explosive plays.

The production breakdown for these two sets of drives:

• Successful—30 plays, 218 yards, 7.3 yards per snap, 8.9 yards per rush attempt, 3 explosive gains for 76 yards, 12.6 yards per first down rush, 13 first downs, 100 percent of available yards gained
• Unsuccessful—36 plays, 78 yards, 2.2 yards per snap, 2 yards per rush attempt, 0 explosive gains, 2.3 yards per first down rush, 2 first downs, 8.5 percent of available yards gained

The run/pass split of the two drive sets wasn’t demonstrably different (43.3/56.7 for successful possessions, 50/50 for unsuccessful ones) and the completion percentage wasn’t dramatically different either (56.7 for successful, 50 for unsuccessful). But the production on the ground—particularly on first down—really determined which drives ended in touchdowns.

And this was no more true than on the final scoring drive, one that will be remembered for a long time. The Irish took 3:55 off the clock by marching 77 yards in only seven plays with play-calling that even the most devoted pass-happy offensive mind would love:

1. Pass, Floyd, gain of 11
2. Run, Wood, gain of 26
3. Run, Hughes, gain of 6
4. Run, Hughes, gain of 12
5. Run, Hughes, gain of 13
6. Pass, Floyd, gain of 4
7. Run, Hughes, gain of 5, touchdown

That’s five runs for 62 yards—good for a whopping 12.4 yards per carry. When the Irish needed it most, their front five came alive and senior Robert Hughes bulled his way into the end zone. A fitting reversal after the Trojans owned the trenches in each of the last four meetings.

On the other side of the ball USC’s four scoring “drives” looked like this: 19 plays, 43 yards, 2.3 yards per play, and two first downs. If USC didn’t start these four possessions with average field position at the Irish 23-yard line (and with none outside Notre Dame’s 28-yard line), it’s unlikely they would have scored at all.

Recapping the Game

The Irish played far from a perfect game. The offensive performance was one of the worst all year, Rees looked like the true freshman quarterback he is, the four turnovers proved extremely costly, and special teams were far from great—the missed extra point was bad but the Irish also lost 14 yards in field position via exchanged punts and 13 yards via kickoffs.

But that just speaks to how well the defense played. The four USC scoring drives started on an extremely short field but only averaged 10.8 yards and generated 16 points.

In other words, for the first time all year, Notre Dame was able to overcome self-inflicted mistakes, catch a few breaks, and pull out a win. And after all that has happened this season, it was nice to see some luck for the lads in blue and gold.

The common theme of the past three wins has been a relatively productive and mostly efficient running game paired with stout defensive play. The lines on both sides of the ball are playing their best football of the season and the team is undoubtedly more mentally and physically tough than they were earlier in the year.

Moreover, the Irish are certainly a better team in November than when they started the season, even playing with a true freshman quarterback and without a host of critical personnel. To his credit, Kelly stuck with his plan, stayed consistent in his approach, and developed his team into a hardworking, tough unit. They are far from an elite squad, but this group could have easily folded after Navy and Tulsa. Instead, they ripped off three wins to become bowl eligible and end the year with a healthy amount of momentum.

Similar Posts:

• Statistically Speaking: Notre Dame vs. Western Michigan
• Statistically Speaking: Notre Dame vs. Michigan State
• Statistically Speaking: Notre Dame vs. Michigan

This article is © 2007-2012 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

The Broncos fell one spot in the AVR but fell more sharply in both the AP and Coaches Polls dropping five spots in the former and seven in the latter. LSU dropped from 6th to 13th in the AVR, from 5th to 11th in the AP, and from 6th to 12th in the Coaches Poll. Oklahoma State fell five spots in the AVR and Coaches Poll and seven in the AP Poll.

Oregon moved up two spots in the AVR with their convincing win over Arizona and jumped Auburn for the top spot in the ESP. The Ducks sit atop both pools and are second in the AVR while the Tigers are 1st in the AVR and second in the polls.

TCU, the only other undefeated team, is in third place in the ESP and in both polls but 0.001 behind Boise State in the AVR mostly due to the 101st most difficult strength of schedule. The margin between the Ducks and Tigers (0.014) is far less than that between the Horned Frogs and Tigers (0.068) suggesting that TCU would need quite a bit of help to get into the BCS National Championship game. Since the Horned Frogs have no more remaining regular season games, it will require an Oregon loss to Oregon State or Auburn losing to South Carolina in the SEC Championship for TCU to have a shot playing for the championship.

The victory over the Trojans nearly pushed the Irish into the top 25 of the AVR. Notre Dame moved up for the third consecutive week, this time from 37th to 28th. The Irish retained their first place strength of schedule ranking, dropped two spots down to 21st in quality wins/losses (QWL), moved up seven spots to 47th in adjusted win percentage (AWP), rose two spots in margin of victory (MOV) to 48th, and dropped two spots in team performance ratio (TPR) down to 41st. The defense continues to rise in the TPR, now ranked 16th in the country, while the offense fell from 68th to 71st with the lackluster performance against USC.

Elite Selection Playoff (ESP)

AV Ranking (AVR)

Adjusted Win Percentage (AWP)

Strength of Schedule (SOS)

Team Performance Ratio (TPR)

Margin of Victory (MOV)

Quality Wins/Losses (QWL)

Rank	Team	Points
1	Auburn	1
2	Texas A&M	0.719
3	Nebraska	0.689
4	Arkansas	0.686
5	Missouri	0.59
6	Iowa	0.545
7	Alabama	0.537
8	Oklahoma	0.532
9	Nevada	0.51
10	Wisconsin	0.477

Similar Posts:

• 2010 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Eight
• 2010 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Twelve
• 2010 Elite Selection Playoff: Final Rankings

This article is © 2007-2012 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

But Notre Dame has outscored their last two opponents by a combined 55-6 and heads to the West Coast to battle the rival Trojans on the heels of two decisive victories. And this without a host of starters including quarterback Dayne Crist who’s true freshman replacement has been helped by a dominant defense, a resurgent running game, and manageable play-calling by head coach Brian Kelly.

To say that the Irish are playing their best football late in the season would be an understatement, particularly on the defensive side of the ball.

Diving Into the Numbers

Per the norm, five tables—(1) miscellaneous/efficiency as well as (2) total, (3) rushing, (4) passing, and (5) drive offense/defense—with pertinent statistics for the game against Army are shown below. This data is supplemented with more detailed numbers/analyses aimed at identifying the primary drivers for the performance in each category.

For a historical perspective and reference purposes, the following are links to the statistical recaps of the 2010 opponents: Michigan, Michigan State, Stanford, Boston College, Pittsburgh, Western Michigan, Navy, Tulsa and Utah.

Miscellaneous/Efficiency

Defensively, the Irish did to Army what they did to Utah…only better, at least after the first drive. Offensively, third down was the Tommy Rees show.

Miscellaneous/Efficiency Statistics

Not much outstanding in any category apart from third down.

Against a run-heavy team that uses three downs to chew through 10 yards with regularity, first down defense is essential. Army entered the game with an excellent third down conversion rate mostly because of strong first down offense. The Irish reversed the trend.

A breakdown of Army’s situational offense (season averages prior to the game against Notre Dame are in parentheses):

• Avg per play on 1st down—3.1 (5.6)
• % of 3rd down play series—88.9 (50.7)
• Avg yds to go on 3rd down—7.5 (5.3)
• 3rd down efficiency—43.8 (48)
• % 3rd and short—37.5 (42.3)
• % 3rd and long—43.8 (32.9)

The numbers above appear strong, but are even more compelling when the first Army drive is excluded. The Black Knights situational offense sans their first possession (again, season averages prior to the game against the Irish are in parentheses):

• Avg per play on 1st down—1.4 (5.6)
• % of 3rd down play series—91.7 (50.7)
• Avg yds to go on 3rd down—9.4 (5.3)
• 3rd down efficiency—27.3 (48)
• % 3rd and short—18.2 (42.3)
• % 3rd and long—54.5 (32.9)

Defensive coordinator Bob Diaco’s adjustments after the first possession certainly worked. Army generated only two short yardage third down plays after their first possession compared to nine third downs with more than three yards needed to move the chains. The Black Knights only converted two of these nine opportunities (22.2 percent).

For the Irish offense, third down belonged to quarterback Tommy Rees. Kelly called a pass on 71.4 percent of Notre Dame’s third down snaps. Despite needing an average of 8.3 yards to move the chains, Rees completed seven of his 10 throws for 11.5 yards per attempt, 16.4 yards per completion, four gains of 20-plus yards, five first downs, and a passer efficiency of 166.6. An exceptional performance, to say the least.

Total Offense/Defense

The first half offensive production was the best all year, particularly the big play production. On the other side of the ball, the story is very similar for the entire game, but it has really been the last three outings that are impressive.

Total Statistics

The first half offensive production was the best for the Irish all season. Notre Dame amassed 262 yards on only 31 plays at 8.5 yards per clip. The total yards and per-play average are the most this season.

Kelly was run-heavy in his first half play-calling with a run/pass split of 58.1/41.9, the highest of the season. But it was the passing output that really set the mark. Rees completed 61.5 percent of his throws in the first half for 13.1 yards per attempt, a blistering 21.3 yards per completion, and one touchdown.

Not surprisingly, the big play production was also the most in the first two quarters of any game this year. Two runs and six passes went for explosive gains that totaled 205 of the 262 first half yards. The eight big plays and 205 yards were the most in the first half all season (and more than several games) as were the six big gains and 164 explosive yards through the air.

As for the defense, Army posted the fewest yards (174), first downs (8), and yards per play (3.4) of any Irish opponent, and all three values are well below the average offensive output of the Black Knights.

But the strong performance has been the rule, rather than the exception, over the previous three games. The Irish defense hasn’t allowed a touchdown in 11 quarters of play—the last a nine yard passing score by quarterback G.J. Kinne on Tulsa’s opening possession—and has only allowed 19 points combined in the last three outings (two of Tulsa’s touchdowns came on non-defensive plays).

But even including the interception and punt return for touchdowns by the Golden Hurricane, the last three games have been exceptional for the Irish defense. Over this three-game span Notre Dame has allowed 11.3 points per game (4th in the country), 279.3 yards per game (15), 4.3 yards per play (10), and 14 first downs per game (6). In other words, Diaco has fielded (at least) a top 10 defense against the last three Irish opponents.

And it hasn’t come against weak offensive competition. Tulsa ranks 11th in scoring offense, 7th in yards per game, 28th in yards per play, and 5th in first downs per game. Utah ranks 14th, 35th, 19th, and 57th in the same categories. The Black Knights rank 54th, 88th, 90th, and 79th, but much of their production is skewed by their run-heavy offense which the Irish completely shut down (see below).

Rushing Offense/Defense

The game plan against Navy may have been unforgivably bad, but it was an aberration—Diaco’s troops completely shut down the Army option running attack. Offensively, the Irish got arguably their best production of the season.

Rushing Statistics

A statistical summary isn’t required to show how dominant the Irish defense was Saturday night, but it certainly paints a clear—and compelling—picture. A breakdown of Army’s offensive rushing production (season average entering the weekend/season-worst entering the weekend/production against Notre Dame):

• Yds/game—272.8/233/125
• Yds/att—4.7/3.8/3.1
• 1st downs—14.7/10/6
• 1st down yds/att—5/3/2.1
• Open down yds/att—5/3.7/1.7

No matter how you slice it, the Irish dominated the Black Knights rushing attack more than any previous opponent had all season. Every category listed above is, by far, a new season-worst value for Army.

On offense, Notre Dame eclipsed 150 rushing yards for only the third time in 2010 as Kelly called the highest percentage of running plays all year—run/pass split of 65.5/34.5—besting last week’s 59.2/40.8 mark.

The Irish were decidedly run-heavy in the first half with a 58.1/41.9 split as 18 rush attempts produced 92 yards (5.1 yards per carry). Once a sizeable lead was established in the second half, Kelly was even more slanted to the ground game, calling 20 runs to only seven passes (74.1/25.9).

About the only negatives were too few explosive gains (two on 38 attempts) and the second half efficiency dip (3.2 yards per carry) that made it difficult for the Irish to close out the game in dominant fashion.

Passing Offense/Defense

Apart from quarterback Trent Steelman’s first pass, Army didn’t produce much through the air. Rees’ numbers, on the other hand, were as efficient as last week but with more production.

Passing Statistics

Kelly seems determined to use an improved running game to keep the burden off his young signal caller. While Rees may have attempted 54 passes against the porous Golden Hurricane secondary, he has only attempted 40 combined in the past two games.

The result has been two efficient outings. Rees has posted passer efficiency ratings North of 160 in consecutive weeks and has thrown four touchdown passes and only a single interception.

The primary difference between last week’s performance against Utah and this week’s against Army was explosiveness. In both games Rees was 13 of 20 (65 percent), but the per-attempt and completion averages, long gains, and explosive production were much better against the Black Knights.

A comparison of Rees’ pass production against Utah and Army (yards per attempt/yards per completion/long gain/explosive plays/explosive play yards):

• Utah—6.5/9.9/26/2/50
• Army—10.7/16.5/35/6/164

As noted above, the majority of the big play production against the Black Knights came in the first half when the running game was chewing up five-plus yards per attempt, something the Irish haven’t had working since early in the season.

Drive Offense/Defense

Through the meaningful minutes, both sides of the ball were the best, or close to the best, in a host of categories.

Drive Statistics*

* Values only include meaningful possessions.

Army entered the game against Notre Dame gaining 48.7 percent of available yards. Against the Irish defense, they gained a paltry 18.2 percent. It was the lowest available yards totaled against Diaco’s defense all year by a team that routinely sustains drives.

Take away the first drive, however, and the performance is even more impressive. Army’s first possession was a 16 play, 88-yard drive that ended at the Irish two-yard line where Notre Dame managed to prevent a first and goal from resulting in a touchdown.

The remaining (meaningful) drives:

• 3 plays, 7 yards, 2.3 yards per play, 0 1st downs, 8.9 percent of available yards
• 3 plays, 3 yards, 1 yards per play, 0 1st downs, 4.1 percent of available yards
• 3 plays, 4 yards, 1.3 yards per play, 0 1st downs, 5.6 percent of available yards
• 3 plays, 12 yards, 4 yards per play, 1 1st downs, 12.8 percent of available yards
• 3 plays, 3 yards, 1 yards per play, 0 1st downs, 3.9 percent of available yards
• 6 plays, 8 yards, 1.3 yards per play, 1 1st downs, 13.3 percent of available yards
• 2 plays, 2 yards, 1 yards per play, 0 1st downs, -4.3 percent of available yards
• 6 plays, 24 yards, 4.0 yards per play, 1 1st downs, 28.9 percent of available yards
• 3 plays, 4 yards, 1.3 yards per play, 0 1st downs, 4.9 percent of available yards

The numbers are staggering. The longest drive was only six plays and 24 yards, four were three and out’s, and two ended in interceptions—one of which was returned for a touchdown. Much like the situational defense, the Irish turned the tables against an offense that had no problem sustaining drives against almost every opponent they faced this season.

On the other side of the ball, the offense chewed up 55.6 percent of available yards—nearly the best all year—but over 78 percent of the available yards in the first half before Kelly went to a very run-heavy play-calling mode.

The Irish offense also had only one three and out, averaged a season-best 3:15 in time of possession per drive, and scored on three of the first four first half possessions.

Recapping the Game

Asked why the Irish are playing some of their best football without several critical starters, Kelly’s response was simple:

It’s because Notre Dame has moved from being a collection of individuals to being a team.

Looking at how the Irish are performing on the field, it’s difficult to argue with the man at the helm. The little things that make a big difference—wide receivers blocking downfield, sound tackling in open space, good assignment football—are starting to surface more and more as the season wanes, and the Irish appear to have shrugged off their November woes of the past two years.

Over the last three games the lines on both sides of the ball have played with much more intensity, passion and physicality, the defense has been downright dominant, several backup players have stepped up and produced, and the offense has found a running game just in time to help a young—but thus far very efficient—freshman quarterback. To make things even better, a football team that operated with plenty of self-inflicted mistakes early in the year has kept penalties, dropped passes, and turnovers to a minimum in the last two outings.

There is plenty of momentum in South Bend, but the challenge now becomes sustaining it against a very talented opponent. USC’s on-field product this season may not be what it once was under former head coach Pete Carroll, but there is still plenty of athleticism on the roster and the Trojans will likely be motivated to play the Irish.

For now, having two consecutive, dominant wins may be enough. But ending the season on a four-game win streak would be a huge step forward going into 2011.

Similar Posts:

• Notre Dame vs. Army: Keys to an Irish Win
• Evaluating the Irish: Army Black Knights
• Statistically Speaking: Notre Dame vs. USC

This article is © 2007-2012 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

The Irish moved from 52nd to 37th with their win over the Black Knights. Entering the away game against the Trojans the Irish have played the nations most difficult AVR strength of schedule (SOS). Notre Dame ranks 19th in quality wins/losses (QWL), 55th in adjusted win percentage (AWP), 50th in margin of victory (MOV), and 39th in team performance ratio (TPR). The Irish rank 68th in offensive TPR but the last three games have the defense all the way up to 18th.

USC, Notre Dame’s final regular season opponent, ranks just two spots ahead of the Irish at 35th.

Elite Selection Playoff (ESP)

AV Ranking (AVR)

Adjusted Win Percentage (AWP)

Strength of Schedule (SOS)

Team Performance Ratio (TPR)

Margin of Victory (MOV)

Quality Wins/Losses (QWL)

Rank	Team	Points
1	Auburn	1
2	Nebraska	0.944
3	Wisconsin	0.777
4	Texas	0.573
5	Iowa	0.562
6	South Carolina	0.534
7	LSU	0.516
8	Alabama	0.491
9	Oregon	0.472
10	Boise St	0.444

Similar Posts:

• 2010 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Nine
• 2010 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Ten
• 2010 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Eleven

This article is © 2007-2012 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

The underlying storyline figures to be the matchup between the Irish defense and the Black Knights offense. The last time defensive coordinator Bob Diaco faced a triple-option attack the results were far from positive. Since then, however, the Irish defense has turned in arguably its best two performances of the season—Diaco’s unit surrendered only 13 points to Tulsa (11th ranked scoring offense), and then bested that effort by allowing only a field goal to Utah (15th ranked scoring offense).

Army is 6-4 against the 102nd toughest AVR strength of schedule with wins over Eastern Michigan, North Texas, Duke, Tulane, VMI, and the aforementioned Golden Flashes, and losses to Hawaii, Temple, Rutgers, and Air Force. Excluding the Falcons, Army’s losses have been by an average margin of 4.3 points, and none have been by more than a touchdown.

Army, Version 2010

Head coach Rich Ellerson is in his second season in West Point. Ellerson has nearly 30 years of college coaching experience including over 10 years of head coaching experience, primarily at the FCS level.

Last season Ellerson went 5-7, a two-win improvement over the prior year. The five wins were the most by an Army team since 1996 and the 6-4 record this year has secured the same honor for a second consecutive season.

Ellerson is nothing if not innovative. Offensively he is widely regarded as an option expert, and the Black Knights certainly run plenty of it. But his defensive experience is even more intriguing. Ellerson started his coaching career at Hawaii under Dick Tomey before reuniting with Tomey in the early 90′s as the defensive line coach at Arizona. While in Tuscon, Ellerson, Tomey and defensive coordinator Larry MacDuff developed the “Desert Swarm” double-eagle flex defense, an unconventional 3-4 alignment designed to confuse blockers and create exotic blitz packages.

Apart from the option-based offense and atypical defense, one of the primary reasons for Army’s success this season is turnovers. The Black Knights have only coughed up the ball 10 times (6th best in the country) and have forced 22 takeaways (19). Additionally, as is often the case with service academies, Ellerson’s troops rarely handicap themselves with penalties, averaging only 4.4 infractions (5) and under 45 penalties yards (21) per game.

Offense

Ian Shields serves as the offensive coordinator for Ellerson. Sheilds was with Ellerson at Cal Poly, is well-versed in the tripe-option, and also doubles as the quarterbacks coach.

The Black Knights offense is primarily a split-back veer attack that runs through a pair of sophomores—quarterback Trent Steelman and fullback Jared Hassin. The two are responsible for the majority of Army’s rushing production with 304 carries, 1,454 yards (4.8 yards per carry), and 20 touchdowns, and combine for about 145 rushing yards per game.

Last year the Black Knights struggled running effectively on the perimeter, but Hassin’s inside presence has helped this season. The sophomore fullback is certainly the first priority for the Irish defense, but slot backs Patrick Mealy, Malcolm Brown, and Brian Cobbs aren’t to be ignored. Sheilds likes to run plenty of jet sweeps and the trio have combined for 945 rushing yards and 10 touchdowns, and are typically good for over 100 yards a game on the ground.

Upfront Army features a veteran and experienced offensive line. Anees Merzi, Zach Peterson, Seth Reed, and Jason Johnson lead the front five. All four are seniors, started at least 10 games in 2009, and have started at least nine games this season. Sophomore Frank Allen rounds out the unit which has combined for nearly 110 career starts.

The unquestionable (and obvious) strength of the Black Knights offense is running the ball. Army ranks in the top 10 in rushing attempts, yards, first downs, and touchdowns per game as well as yards per carry, and haven’t posted fewer than 230 rushing yards in any outing this season.

As one would expect of a strong rushing team, Army excels on third down and in the red zone. The Black Knights rank 18th in the country converting third downs at a 48 percent clip and score touchdowns on 77.2 percent of their red zone opportunities (5).

See the tables below for an in-depth look at the 2010 Black Knights offense (the Opponent Average and Opponent Average Rank columns refer to Army’s 2010 opponents excluding VMI).

2010 Army Offensive Efficiency

2010 Army Total Offense

2010 Army Rushing Offense

2010 Army Passing Offense

Defense

The Black Knights defense is led by co-defensive coordinators Payam Saadat and Chris Smeland. Saadat came with Ellerson from Cal Poly and coaches the linebackers while Smeland works with the safeties and is familiar with the double-eagle scheme—he used it as the defensive coordinator at Utah State, Louisville and Michigan State.

As with all 3-4 defenses, the most important position unit is the linebackers, and Army’s corps is led by senior Stephen Anderson and junior Steven Erzinger. Anderson and Erzinger are active players with excellent pursuit abilities and are the top two tacklers on the team. Rounding out the unit is Jarrett Mackey and Chad Littlejohn who have combined for 62 stops.

Anderson and Erzinger may headline the linebacker position, but the leader of the defense is end Josh McNary. Last year McNary finished fourth in the country in sacks (12.5) and third in tackles for a loss (22.5), and his production this year hasn’t been much different. The senior currently ranks 43rd with 12 tackles for a loss and 11th with 9.5 sacks. McNary is joined up front by Mike Gann and Marcus Hilton who have combined for 51 tackles, 9.5 tackles for a loss, and four sacks.

Donovan Travis and Donnie Dixon are the two best players in the secondary. The two have totaled 95 tackles, Dixon ranks fourth on the team with 5.5 tackles for a loss, and Travis has notched a team-high four interceptions and eight pass breakups. Josh Jackson, Richard King, and Jordan Trimble fill out the remaining spots in the backend of the defense.

Statistically, the defense grades out pretty well in several metrics including third down efficiency (38th ranked), yards (30) and first downs (26) per game, as well as multiple passing categories highlighted by yards per game (22), first downs per game (15), and completion percentage (25). But the Black Knights do struggle against the run allowing 140.4 rushing yards per game (45) at a clip of 4.3 yards per carry (72). As such, opponents’ preferred method of attacking Army’s defense has been running the ball.

See the tables below for an in-depth look at the 2010 Black Knights defense (the Opponent Average and Opponent Average Rank columns refer to Army’s 2010 opponents excluding VMI).

2010 Army Defensive Efficiency

2010 Army Total Defense

2010 Army Rushing Defense

2010 Army Passing Defense

Adding It All Up

The Black Knights offense applies pressure via all three facets of the triple-option, but Hassin is the cog that makes it work. The fullback is a workhorse and opens up the rest of the offense for Steelman and the slot backs. Army isn’t as precise in their execution as Navy, but if the defensive scheme isn’t better than it was against the Midshipmen, they won’t have to be.

Defensively, several areas appear solid, but the Black Knights have been the beneficiary of a ball control offense and weak competition. Army’s offense ranks third in time of possession (34:05), limits possession opportunities of their opponents, and minimizes the exposure of the defense (only 58.6 defensive snaps per game). Additionally, excluding Hawaii and Air Force, Army’s average opponent offensive rankings in scoring, yards per game, and yards per play are 83.9, 82.4 and 83.3 respectively.

Keys to Winning

Offense

1. Continue to grind it out like last week. The Black Knights have allowed 33 scoring drives vs.77 non-scoring possessions. The primary difference has been their ability (or inability) to stop the run. Army’s opponents have been markedly more run-heavy on scoring drives averaging 6.2 yards per carry with a 60/40 run/pass split while gaining only 4.1 yards per rush attempt at a 46.7/53.3 clip on non-scoring possessions. Quarterback Tommy Rees is inexperienced, McNary and company rank 26th in attempts per sack, and Notre Dame is still missing multiple receiving targets to injury. Running the ball early and often will manage the game and help the young Irish signal caller.
2. Ball protection is essential. The Irish have struggled with ball protection and given up plenty of points as a result. Army forces better than two turnovers per game and have turned 22 takeaways into 104 points. Expressed differently, the Black Knights average a touchdown and a field goal off turnovers each game. Against a ball control team that minimizes possessions and scores off takeaways, Notre Dame cannot afford turnovers.
3. Capitalize early. No option offense plays well when behind. The Irish have received the opening kickoff in every game this season, and a touchdown on the first possession would be a good start to building a lead and forcing Shields to call more passes than he’s comfortable with.

Defense

1. Don’t read, don’t react, just attack. The biggest mistake in the defensive game plan against Navy was a passive approach. Defending the triple-option isn’t about waiting, it is about collapsing on the ball. The Irish must attack the fullback and take away the first option, attack the quarterback to take away the second option, and force the pitch. At each juncture the defense forces a quick decision—an opportunity for Steelman to be wrong and/or make a mistake. Additionally, this strings out the play and allows more time for the Irish to react, run and pursue—something that utilizes the athletic advantage of Notre Dame’s personnel.
2. First down is the key. Army runs the ball effectively, but Steelman isn’t a polished passer and the Black Knights cannot afford to get behind the chains. The primary reason Army excels on third down is because of their situational play. Shields calls a run on 85.4 percent of first downs and the Black Knights average 4.3 yards per carry. This leads to manageable third downs—over 42 percent have been short yardage situations that Steelman and company convert at a 74.6 percent rate. When faced with third and long, however, Army has only moved the chains 26.5 percent of the time. Moreover, Army averages 6.3 yards per first down rush on their scoring drives and only 3.8 yards per first down carry on non-scoring possessions. If Diaco can minimize running gains on first down and force long distance third downs, the advantage tilts heavily towards the Irish defense.
3. Option defense 101: stop the fullback. Hassin is a bruising runner that gets tough yards but it is the ancillary benefits that make him such a big piece of the offense. Take away the dive and the other parts of the triple-option become much less effective.

Prediction

Similar to the Utes, Army hasn’t played strong competition. Their six wins are over less than mediocre opponents and the Black Knights defense has benefited from poor offensive competition. The Irish have a significant talent advantage, the defensive play has improved tremendously since the woeful outing against Navy, and the offense has enough weapons to build a lead and get Army’s offense out of its comfort zone.

Still, Ellerson isn’t afraid to take risks, and his game plan will probably include some trick plays and risky decisions. The matchups favor Notre Dame but the offense is still missing too many key pieces to put together a dominant performance. If the Irish commit self-inflicted mistakes or turn the ball over with any frequency, they could certainly lose this game.

Notre Dame 27, Army 17

Similar Posts:

• Statistically Speaking: Notre Dame vs. Army
• Evaluating the Irish: Army Black Knights
• Statistically Speaking: Notre Dame vs. USC

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